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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explain the motivations which led the leadership 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain to, at first, give qualified support 
to the British war effort at the start of World War Two and to give greater 
insight into the motivations which led members of the Party’s Central 
Committee to abandon this line one month into the war, in favour of a line 
of opposition to the war based on advocating an immediate peace conference 
mediated by the Soviet Union. It finds that the Party leaders initially gave a 
degree of support to the war because they felt that the war was not a simple 
imperialist war but rather a war of resistance to fascist aggression; an idea 
based on theoretical concepts adhered to by the Party during the 1930s. The 
Central Committee felt that supporting the war would allow the Party to 
prevent German fascism being imposed on Britain through conquest and 
would provide the opportunity to re-establish democratic rule in states 
which had already succumbed to Nazism. Furthermore it felt that such a 
policy would be supported by the British workers and would not conflict 
with Soviet policy. This thesis also finds that, whilst the intellectual 
authority of the Comintern and the Soviet Union were the primary trigger 
for the Party’s change in line, the Party leadership were also convinced of its 
correctness on the basis of pre-existing suspicions of the war aims of the 
British government as well as a belief that campaigning for peace would 
allow the Party to safeguard British democracy from its enemies at home 
and abroad. At the same time it highlights differences between the 
motivations of the majority of the Central Committee and the Party’s 
secretariat for supporting the new line, specifically in their perceptions of 
the possibilities of a German victory in the war. 
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Introduction 
 
At eleven o’clock on the 3rd of September 1939, following the 
expiration of Britain’s ultimatum calling on Germany to withdraw its troops 
from Poland, the British government declared the outbreak of hostilities 
between the two nations. The previous day, in anticipation of the expiration 
of the ultimatum, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) issued its 
first manifesto on the war, entitled War! Communist Policy. In this 
document the Party called for the people of Britain to give their support to 
the war, which the Party characterised as a struggle between fascist and 
democratic ideologies. The triumph of German fascism over Britain, the 
Manifesto declared, would lead ‘to the forcible destruction of every 
democratic right and liberty that the working class has fought so bitterly, 
and at such cost and sacrifice, to win from its class enemies.’1 As such, the 
CPGB declared its support for all measures necessary for a British victory, 
which would not only defend the British people against the horrors of fascist 
rule but also assist the establishment of democratic governments in 
Germany and its recent territorial acquisitions, particularly Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.2 At the same time however, the Party’s manifesto claimed 
that the war could not be won whilst the Government of Neville 
Chamberlain still held power. The Party accused the British government of 
having latent fascist sympathies and pursuing the war for their own, 
unsupportable imperialist aims. It claimed the government, by its policy of 
appeasing Hitler, sacrificing democratic nations to fascist expansion and 
refusing pacts of collective security with the Soviet Union, had paved the 
path to war itself.3 Thus the Party called for a war on two fronts which 
entailed supporting the military fight against Hitler on the one hand, whilst 
at the same time supporting a political fight to replace the Chamberlain 
                                                 
1 War! Communist policy” in Pollitt, Harry, How to Win the War, (Communist Party of Great Britain, 
London, 1939), p. 29. 
2 “War! Communist policy” in Pollitt, How to Win the War, pp. 25-6. 
3 “War! Communist policy” in Pollitt, How to Win the War, p. 25. and pp. 28-9. 
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government with a government led by the Labour Party, which would work 
effectively for a German defeat.4  
 
At the outbreak of war the Party’s leaders were united in their 
support of the aims set out by the manifesto. Despite the emergence of some 
doubts amongst members of the Party’s two highest administrative bodies, 
the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, later in the month, the 
majority of the Party’s leaders remained convinced of the correctness of the 
Party’s War on Two Fronts line, with the majority of the Central Committee 
reaffirming their support of the line at a meeting on September 24th and 
only two Party leaders, Rajani Palme Dutt and William Rust, opposing the 
line. The very next day however, the Party’s representative to the 
Communist International, Douglas Frank (a.k.a. Dave) Springhall, returned 
to Britain bearing instructions from Moscow which criticised the Party’s 
line, calling on it to oppose the war as an unsupportable imperialist war. 
The Central Committee adjourned for a week, reconvening on October 2nd to 
vote on its line. At this October meeting Dutt and Rust, now backed by 
Springhall again expressed their opposition to the War on Two Fronts line 
but now they were joined by the majority of the Central Committee. 
Thirteen of the other sixteen Party leaders recorded as having voted on the 
Party’s line in October voted in opposition to the line of the September 
manifesto and instead embraced a new line based on the Comintern’s 
position.5  
 
On October 7th the Party published a new manifesto explaining the 
new line in its paper the Daily Worker. The new manifesto, entitled Peace or 
War?, declared that the war was an imperialist war, being pursued by the 
British and French governments purely for extension of their own empires 
and to plunder their own peoples.  It denounced the continuation of the war, 
calling for the Chamberlain Government to be replaced by a new 
government which would be prepared to pursue an immediate peace 
                                                 
4 “War! Communist policy” in Pollitt, How to Win the War, p. 25. and p. 30. 
5 King, Francis and Matthews, George, About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second World 
War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990), p. 292. 
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conference mediated by the Soviet Union.6 Immediately after the publication 
of the new manifesto the Party held meetings of its District Committees and 
aggregate meetings of the wider membership, all of which gave their 
support to the Party’s new line.7 This new line or at least certain elements of 
it, were espoused by the CPGB until mid-1941. The Party maintained its 
calls for a negotiated peace with Germany until shortly after the Fall of 
France in 1940, after which it continued to denounce the war as imperialist 
but began campaign for a new government which would pursue a truly 
defensive war.8 The Party only abandoned the characterisation of the war as 
imperialist after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. 
 
During the two Central Committee meetings held in September and 
October to discuss the Party’s stance on the war, two poles in the Party 
leadership emerged. On the one hand, Harry Pollitt, the Party’s General 
Secretary at the time of the outbreak of war, along with John Ross Campbell 
and the Party’s only M.P., William Gallacher, were consistent in their 
support of the Party’s War on Two Fronts line in both meetings. On the 
other hand, a second grouping, comprised of Rajani Palme Dutt, William 
Rust and Dave Springhall (who formed a three person secretariat to replace 
Pollitt after the change in line) formed a consistent opposition to the Party’s 
initial line on the war. The motivations which led these groups of leaders to 
support and oppose the War on Two Fronts line respectively and the 
arguments which they used to do so have already received some 
considerable historical study. The work of Historians such as Kevin Morgan, 
Nina Fishman, John Callaghan and Monty Johnstone have given detailed 
insight into the different priorities and perspectives which underlay the 
stances adopted by these leaders during debates on the Party line. The focus 
placed by Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher on practical politics, anti-fascist 
sentiments, the military strength of Germany and the self-preservationist 
nature of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, alongside the focus placed by 
                                                 
6 ‘Peace or War?’, Daily Worker, October 7th, WMCL 
7 Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 192-41, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1985), p. 271. 
8 Morgan, Kevin, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist Politics 1935-
41, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989), p. 174. 
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Dutt, Rust and Springhall on ideological conformity with the wider 
international communist movement, mistrust of British imperialism, the 
strength of British and French imperialism and the dominance of the Soviet 
Union in European political affairs go a long way to explaining why these 
two groups reacted to the clarification of the Comintern’s line in the way 
that they did.9  
 
Similarly detailed treatment has been given to the reasons why the 
Party rank-and-file supported the change in line. In this regard the works of 
Morgan as well as Noreen Branson are notable. Both historians have 
provided detailed assessments of the factors which led the Communist rank-
and-file to eventually agree to the Imperialist War line. Specifically, 
Branson suggests that solidarity with the USSR and its desire for peace 
along with a lack of faith in the Chamberlain Government’s claim to be 
waging a democratic war (based on its treatment of its colonial subjects) 
were primary factors in the rank and file’s decision. Morgan, on the other 
hand, suggests that the rank and file were convinced by their suspicion that 
fighting under the Chamberlain government could not be in working class 
interests and their belief that the USSR’s support for peace could mean 
peace without appeasement of Hitler. Both Morgan and Branson note that 
the belief that the Chamberlain government could not wage a just, anti-
fascist war and the desire to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Second 
International in 1914 also played an important role in influencing the rank 
and file’s acceptance of the Imperialist war line.10 
  
Unfortunately lacking in historical coverage however, is the position 
of the members of the Central Committee, beyond the groups outlined 
above, during the change in line. As noted earlier, the members of the 
                                                 
9 Morgan, Kevin, Harry Pollitt, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994), p. 106-10. and 
Fishman, Nina, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 1933-45, (Scolarpress, Aldershot, 
1996), pp. 254-5. and 
Callaghan, John, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1993), 
pp. 181-90. and 
King, and Matthews, (eds), About Turn, pp. 24-33. 
10 Branson, History of the Communist Party, (1985), pp. 271-3. And 
Morgan, Against Fascism and War, pp. 91-100. 
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Party’s Central Committee were initially, seemingly unanimous in their 
support for the War on Two Fronts line, reaffirming this support at the 
September meeting. In October however, thirteen Party leaders who had 
previously given the Party’s initial line at the very least their tacit support 
now turned against it. Explanations of why these leaders changed their 
position on the Party’s line are scarce in the existing literature. Some 
accounts of the Party in wartime skip over the wider Central Committee’s 
reasons for supporting the imperialist war line altogether. Neil Redfern, 
Noreen Branson and Kevin Morgan for example, mention only that the 
wider Central Committee did, in fact, eventually side with the new line 
presented by Dutt’s interpretation of the war with little to no explanation of 
the factors that led them to do so.11 Other historians have given more 
attention to reasons behind the changes in the wider Central Committee’s 
attitude to the war in October but even these explanations are often still 
lacking in terms of details.  
 
The Party leadership’s decision in October is usually portrayed as 
simple deference to the Comintern’s or the USSR’s position on the war. 
There are differences in the way this deference has been portrayed however. 
James Eaden, David Renton and Hugo Dewar portray the leadership’s 
acceptance of the Soviet/Comintern line as a purely mechanical action. 
Eaden and Renton, for example, argue that the Central Committee was 
swayed to the Imperialist War line by the authority of the Soviet Union 
suggesting that faith in the Soviet Motherland acted, above all else, as the 
ideological cement which held the CPGB together during the ‘diplomatic and 
military merry-go-round’ ride of Stalin’s regime.12 Dewar also takes a rather 
cynical view of the process by which the CPGB decided its approach to the 
war. He suggests that the Nazi-Soviet peace proposal forced the Party 
leadership to accept that they were out of line with Soviet policy and that 
                                                 
11 Redfern, Neil, Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars, (I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, 
New York, 2012), p. 96. And 
Branson, History of the Communist Party, p. 268. And 
Morgan, Against Fascism and War, p. 90. 
12 Eaden, James, and Renton, David, The Communist Party of Great Britain Since 1920, (Palgrave, 
Hampshire, 2002), pp. 82-3. 
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the Party needed to change its policy on the war. For Dewar in the Party 
leadership’s decision ‘Everything depended on how the Soviet Union saw 
matters’.13 John Callaghan and Francis Beckett also argue that deference to 
the Comintern was the key factor influencing the Central Committee but 
they argue that this deference was sincere rather than mechanical in 
nature. Beckett argues that by the October meeting the majority of the 
Central Committee had convinced themselves that the Comintern, 
Dimitrov, Stalin and the USSR could not all be wrong and that their duty 
was to support the international line. However, he suggests that they did so 
not for cynical reasons but because sincere intelligent Communists believed 
the Soviet Union could do no wrong and that Dimitrov would never go soft 
on fascism.14 Callaghan too highlights the belief that the USSR could do no 
wrong as heavily influencing the Party leadership. He also argues that the 
Central Committee’s decision was made on the basis of their deepest 
convictions, in particular their belief in the need for international solidarity 
behind the USSR (the minimum expression of which was the unity of the 
Comintern behind the leadership of the CPSU). He contends that the Party 
leadership did what they thought should have been done in 1914 and 
accepted the International line.15 Callaghan furthermore, suggests another 
factor which informed the Central Committee’s decision; namely a deep 
mistrust of the British Government, its democratic credentials and its 
ability to wage a democratic war.16 It is difficult to judge which of these 
interpretations is more accurate however, as few accounts give detailed 
specifics of how exactly the Comintern and Soviet Union’s influence 
convinced the Party leadership of the correctness of the new line that was to 
be projected by the Party. 
 
Attempts to understand how exactly the wider Central Committee 
was convinced to accept the Party’s new line are further frustrated by 
                                                 
13 Dewar, Hugo, Communist Politics in Britain: The CPGB from its Origins to the Second World War, (Pluto 
Press Limited, London, 1976), pp. 131-2. 
14 Beckett, Francis, Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Party, (John Murray 
Publishers Ltd., London, 1995), pp. 91-5. 
15 Callaghan, Dutt, pp. 185-8. 
16 Callaghan, Dutt, p. 188. 
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divisions amongst historians as to the degree of unanimity with which the 
CPGB’s leaders supported the War on Two Fronts line in September. The 
majority of historians agree that the War on Two Fronts line was accepted 
by the entire Party leadership largely as a continuation of the policy of 
opposing both the British government and the expansion of foreign fascism 
pursued by the Party from the mid-1930s onward. At the same time 
historians remain divided over the degree to which the Party’s leaders 
accepted this line. Kevin Morgan, for example, argues that the dual edged 
approach taken by the Party was largely the result of its failure to make a 
concrete decision on whether British imperialism or foreign fascism was its 
main enemy in the run up to war.17 Morgan suggests that this led to the 
emergence of less than overt differences between members of the Party in 
terms of how they saw the purpose of the Party’s line. However, whilst he 
outlines some of the priorities of Pollitt, Campbell and Dutt, helping to 
explain their respective support of and opposition to the War on Two Fronts 
line in September and October, Morgan gives little description of the 
priorities of the rest of the Central Committee members in the run up to the 
war that might contextualise their more fickle position on the Party line.  
 
The work of Noreen Branson and John Mahon seems to support 
Morgan’s idea that the Party leadership’s support of the War on Two Fronts 
line was accompanied by subtle divisions amongst the Central Committee. 
Both Branson and Mahon explicitly point out the fact that members of the 
Central Committee voiced doubts over the Party’s existing line at the 
September meeting but they fail to explain what these doubts were, missing 
out on an important chance to contextualise the Party’s change in line.18 
Others, such as Neil Redfern and Nina Fishman, perceive less ambiguity in 
the Party’s initial line on the war. Redfern claims that any and all 
ambiguities in the Party line had been resolved in favour of supporting the 
British war effort by the time the British declaration of war was made. By 
the outbreak of war, Redfern argues, the Party leadership was ‘spoiling for a 
                                                 
17 Morgan, Against Fascism and War, p. 101. 
18 Branson, History of the Communist Party, (1985), p. 267. And 
Mahon, Harry Pollitt, (1976), p. 251. 
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fight’.19 Fishman makes a similar argument, suggesting that by mid-1939 
the anti-government elements of the CPGB’s pre-war line had become little 
more than a formal veneer with the Party becoming more and more 
convinced of the need to give qualified support for the British war effort in 
order to prevent Hitler from dominating Europe.20 In order to give a more 
detailed explanation of the wider Central Committee’s decision to support 
the Imperialist War line it is important to contextualise this decision with 
an understanding of the factors which led them to support the War on Two 
Fronts line in the first place. Depending on whether the Party leadership 
was, as Refern and Fishman argue, fully resolved to support the war or, as 
Morgan, Branson and Mahon suggest, still somewhat divided, their decision 
to oppose the war in favour of peace may be seen in different lights. 
 
This tendency to overlook or rely on overly simplistic generalisations 
to explain the decision of the Central Committee is perhaps unsurprising 
given the tendency for decisions on national policy to be dominated by a few 
key members of the Party’s Political Bureau, with the Central Committee 
acting merely as a rubber stamp for those decisions; an all too frequent 
reality which was openly acknowledged by the Central Committee itself (see 
appendix I). However, in this situation in particular, one must reject the 
notion that the Central Committee simply deferred to the pre-determined 
decisions of the Politburo. In October, unlike in other situations requiring a 
key decision on policy the Central Committee was not confronted with a 
united and resolved Politburo line but rather a divided Politburo. Whilst, as 
will be shown later in this thesis, the lines put forward by Pollitt, Campbell 
and Gallacher on the one hand and Dutt, Rust and Springhall on the other 
were not diametrically opposed to one another, they were different enough 
to be mutually exclusive. This left the Central Committee with the 
responsibility to choose which approach the Party would take. When one 
takes into account the democratic centralist organisation of the Party in 
which lower ranking Party authorities were bound to accept the decisions of 
                                                 
19 Redfern, Class or Nation, pp. 92-4. 
20 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 252. 
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those above them, then it is clear to see that when it came to the October 
decision over the Party’s approach to the war, the Central Committee really 
did hold at least a part of the power over the Party’s national policy which it 
was formally meant to exercise (see appendix I).   
 
Despite the unusually prominent position of the Central Committee 
at this point in the Party’s history, little attention has been given to the 
arguments put forward by individual members of the committee for and 
against the Party’s lines on the war. One of the most detailed accounts of 
the wider Central Committee’s attitude towards war throughout the change 
in line can be found in Monty Johnstone’s introduction to Francis King and 
George Matthew’s About Turn. However, even this work is problematic in 
terms of detail. For example, Johnstone argues that at the September 
meeting, no member of the Central Committee disputed the imperialist 
character of either the war or the Chamberlain government’s reasons for 
waging war but, at the same time, practically everyone agreed that the 
theoretical position developed by the Party during the 1930s, that 
democratic states should receive the support of the working class when at 
war with fascist states, either already or potentially applied to Britain’s war 
against Germany.21 Johnstone does not, however, provide any detail about 
the other major factors which underwrote the Central Committee’s support 
of the War on Two Fronts line in September, such as the belief that a line of 
support for the war was the best way to win the Party the support of the 
working class and would not contradict the policies of other sections of the 
international communist movement. Johnstone’s account of the October 
meeting suffers from similar problems with details; Johnstone identifies 
that two of the main points debated by Central Committee members in the 
course of arguing for or against the Imperialist War line were the character 
of fascism and the prospects for revolution in Germany. Unfortunately 
Johnstone fails to highlight any specific examples of how the Party’s leaders 
came to convince themselves of the correctness of Dutt’s position in regards 
to these two points, other than examples of those who did so on the basis of 
                                                 
21 King and Matthews, (eds), About Turn, p. 26. 
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blindly following the USSR or Comintern.22 In this regard Johnstone 
highlights specifically the examples of Maurice Cornforth and Ted Bramley. 
Cornforth, he notes, ‘had argued as strongly as any the need to work for “the 
military defeat of fascism”’ at the September Central Committee meeting 
but at the October meeting, inspired by ‘the need to constantly follow the 
Soviet Union’, he now argued the case for an immediate peace. Bramley, on 
the hand, argues Johnstone, was convinced to suppress his doubts and vote 
for Dutt’s line because it represented the line of the Comintern and 
Dimitrov, both of which ‘Bramley’ had enormous respect for.23  These 
examples fit with Johnstone’s overall conclusion that the main reason why 
the wider leadership accepted the Imperialist war line was its ‘ingrained 
tendency to “blindly follow the International” as “an unrivalled political 
authority and guide”’.24 Unfortunately however, Johnstone does not 
highlight examples of leaders who were able to explain their acceptance of 
the new line in terms other than blind acceptance of the decisions of the 
USSR and Comintern. Furthermore Johnstone also fails to note that the 
majority of the Central Committee’s view of the Party’s main practical 
objectives remained the same between September and October and 
overlooks the arguments put forward by many in the Central Committee in 
favour of the new line on the basis that it could achieve these practical 
objectives. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed analysis of the 
reasons behind each individual Central Committee member’s reasons for, at 
different times, supporting and opposing the British war effort. This thesis, 
however, seeks to provide a more detailed explanation of the primary 
considerations which influenced Party leaders’ support for, then rejection of 
the War on Two Fronts line than is usually found in existing accounts. In 
order to achieve this goal, the first chapter will, outline the context for the 
Party’s later decisions by exploring the development of the Party 
leadership’s general attitude towards war and the British government in the 
                                                 
22 King and Matthews, (eds), About Turn, pp. 30-4. 
23 King and Matthews, (eds), About Turn, p. 30. 
24 King and Matthews, (eds), About Turn, p. 34. 
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years preceding the war, with a particular focus on explaining changes in 
the leadership’s attitude towards supporting a war led by the Chamberlain 
government. Chapter two will, via analysis of the speeches given by 
members in defence of the War on Two Fronts line in September 1939, 
attempt to show how such changes in the Party’s attitude towards war led 
Party leaders to support a stance of qualified support for the war in 
September 1939. Chapter three, on the other hand will, using a similar 
analysis of speeches given by Central Committee members in October, 
identify the primary factors which led Party leaders to oppose the war and 
support an immediate peace in October 1939. More specifically it will 
explore separately the main reasons behind the Party Leadership’s decision 
to revise its estimation of the character war, from an Imperialist War in 
which it was correct to defend British liberties from fascism to a purely 
imperialist war, before then considering the factors which convinced the 
Party to adopt a practical policy of support for the Soviet Union’s call for an 
immediate peace. 
By answering these questions this thesis also aims to provide some 
limited insight into the relationship between the leadership of the CPGB 
and the USSR and the Comintern; specifically in terms of the role that the 
policy decisions of the latter two played in influencing the decisions of the 
former. In addition this thesis seeks to highlight areas of significant 
disagreement or conflict within the Central Committee which may prove 
useful for indicating further lines of study.
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Chapter 1 – Democracy, Fascism and War 
 
Understanding why the Party initially both supported the war and 
opposed the National Government in September 1939 is key to 
understanding its decision to oppose the war in October but to fully 
understand this decision one must understand the development of the 
Party’s attitude towards war and the National Government between 1935 
and 1939.  From its inception in 1920 until 1935 the CPGB’s attitude 
towards any war involving Britain was unequivocal: while Britain was still 
an imperialist power its wars would be imperialist wars, which the Party 
could not support.1 Indeed, at the beginning of the 1930s the CPGB adhered 
to the resolutions on war prescribed by the 6th World Congress of the 
Comintern. These perceived three main types of war, inter-imperialist wars, 
counter revolutionary wars and wars of colonial liberation. Only in the case 
of the latter two was it deemed appropriate to support one side of the 
conflict and in neither case was this the imperialist side. In the case of a 
counter-revolutionary war waged by a capitalist nation against a socialist 
nation it was the duty of all Communist Parties to work for the victory of 
the socialist nation, and in the case of a war for colonial liberation 
Communist Parties should support the struggle of the colonised against the 
colonisers. In inter-imperialist wars, Communist Parties were expected to 
adopt Lenin’s tactics of revolutionary defeatism and fight for the defeat of 
their own imperialist government and the transformation of the imperialist 
war into a civil war.2 Following the Seventh World Congress of the 
Communist international and its redefinition of the domestic and 
international tasks of the Communist Parties however, the Party’s attitude 
was to change. 
 
Before Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the Comintern and its national 
sections acknowledged few differences between bourgeois democratic and 
                                                 
1 Redfern, Neil, Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars, (I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, 
New York, 2012), p. 77. 
2 Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 192-41, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1985), p. 134. 
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fascist regimes. Both were considered dictatorial forms of governance by the 
ruling classes over the working classes, with bourgeois democracy simply 
maintaining a democratic façade to veil the dictatorship, whilst Fascism was 
an open form of capitalist dictatorship.3 Between 1928 and 1933 the 
Comintern, perceiving global capitalism to have reached a period of 
fundamental crisis and believing social revolution to be just around the 
corner, argued that fascism acted as a prop to maintain the capitalist 
system.4 As the working class increasingly came to favour the idea of 
proletarian revolution, it was argued, the bourgeoisie inevitably turned to 
fascist methods of direct suppression to prevent revolution and the 
overthrow of the capitalist system.5 At the Seventh World Congress of the 
Comintern the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International (ECCI), Georgi Dimitrov, redefined fascism’s role 
in domestic politics. Dimitrov’s arguments only fundamentally contradicted 
one of the Comintern’s previously outlined assumptions. Dimitrov still 
argued that the current period was one of capitalist decline and growing 
revolutionary potential in which the bourgeoisie turned to fascism and 
fascist methods to prevent a critical build-up of revolutionary forces, but he 
now sought to differentiate between bourgeois democracy and fascism and 
the respective elements of the bourgeoisie which represented them.6 
Dimitrov’s concept of fascism explicitly rejected the idea that the 
establishment of a fascist dictatorship was supported by the entire 
bourgeoisie; instead suggesting that fascism was the distinct policy of ‘the 
most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of 
finance capital’ and that fascists usually gained power through ‘mutual, and 
                                                 
3 Branson, History of the Communist Party, p. 125. And  
King, Francis and Matthews, George, (eds) About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second 
World War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990), pp. 15. 
4 For a breakdown of theoretical basis for the Comintern’s arguments regarding the likelihood of 
Revolution see Kozlov, Nicholas N., and Weitz, Eric D., “Reflections on the Origins of the ‘Third Period’: 
Bukharin, the Comintern, and the political economy of Weimar Germany”, The Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Sage Publications Ltd., July, 1989), pp. 387-410. 
5 Morgan, Kevin, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist Politics 1935-
41, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989), p. 21. And 
Branson, History of the Communist Party, , p. 125 
6 Dimitrov, Georgi, ‘The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle 
of the Working Class against Fascism’, 
<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm#s1>, [accessed 
03/11/14] 
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at times severe, struggle against the old bourgeois parties, or a definite 
section of these parties.’7 Neither, Dimitrov stated, should the victory of 
fascism be seen as a simple transition from a veiled to an open dictatorship. 
Dimitrov and others at the Seventh Congress made it clear that capitalist 
democracy was not a veiled bourgeois dictatorship but actually offered 
certain legitimate democratic rights, such as the ability to create working 
class organisations, which needed to be defended as they made it easier for 
the working class to defend their interests.8 Fascism meant the loss of these 
rights and the establishment of the ‘open terrorist dictatorship’ of the 
bourgeoisie, turning the workers into ‘pariahs of capitalist society’ and the 
‘factories into barracks where the unbridled arbitrary rule of the capitalist 
reigns.’9 This differentiation between regimes, combined with a belief that 
despite the overall revolutionary character of the period, immediate 
revolutionary prospects were minimal, led Dimitrov to argue that the 
immediate task of the Communist Parties was to defend the democratic 
liberties of the workers from fascism. 10 Practically this meant campaigning 
for the creation of a Popular Front, a broad political alliance with the 
reformist socialists of the Social Democratic Parties, the political 
organisations of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and 
any other elements prepared to resist the growth of fascism, ultimately 
aiming to elect a ‘People’s Government’ based on the Popular Front.11 
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The Seventh Congress also altered the International Movement’s 
understanding of the role of Fascism in international politics. At the 
Congress it was argued that the world was on the brink of another global 
war.12 This war would, regardless of when it came and the form it took, 
inevitably transform into a counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet 
Union.13  In this situation the Comintern argued that the main task of the 
Communist Parties in international politics was now ‘the struggle for peace 
and the defence of the USSR’.14 To achieve these goals their focus should be 
on opposing the foreign policy of fascist states, for in international politics as 
in domestic politics; the 7th World Congress identified a division between 
fascism and bourgeois democracy. If a new world war would inevitably 
become an anti-Soviet war then it was the fascist states that were most 
actively pursuing such as war. The fascist states, compelled by the need to 
find new markets for their expanding economies to stave off economic 
collapse, were the states most interested in a redivision of the world’s 
territory.15 Each new territorial acquisition they made acted to reinforce 
their aggressive actions, heightening the danger of a new world war in the 
process, thus fascist aggression had to be resisted.16  Meanwhile, the 
Comintern now argued that some bourgeois democratic states were no 
longer interested in waging an imperialist war. It was argued that a number 
of large imperialist powers, in particular France and the USA, had emerged 
from the last worldwide imperialist war relatively satiated and were, for 
now, primarily concerned with maintaining peace and the status-quo for 
fear that a new imperialist conflict may lead to the loss of the gains made in 
the previous one.17 Additionally, a number of smaller states, such as the 
Baltic States, feared that fascism’s imperialist offensive may lead to them 
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losing their national independence and were thus also presently concerned 
to maintain the status quo.18 As well as posing a passive threat to the Soviet 
Union as the chief fomenters of world war the Fascist States were also were 
seen to be playing an actively threatening role. At the Congress the 
Comintern argued that the Soviet Union, by its mere existence, provided an 
example of Socialism in action, which was a powerful inspiration for the 
workers of other countries to follow its example of proletarian revolution. It 
was suggested that the fascist states, in particular Germany, were most 
keenly aware of this and, as a result, were motivated by ‘the most savage 
hatred of the Soviet Union.’19 This hatred led them to see attacking the 
Soviet Union as not only a chance to gain new markets but also to ensure 
the ‘destruction of their most dangerous enemy’.20 The imperialists of the 
bourgeois democratic states, it was claimed, also saw the Soviet Union as an 
enemy but for the time being their desire to maintain peace lead them to 
perceive the USSR as a ‘formidable power’ which was also interested in 
peace and therefore a potential short-term ally.21 The non-aggressive 
capitalist states were therefore, despite their continued hostility towards 
the USSR, drawn towards allying with it and its peace policy to protect their 
own interests.22 
 
In this situation the Comintern began to argue that the Soviet Union’s 
relationship with the capitalist world had entered a new phase 
characterised by the possibility for the workers’ state to take advantage of 
divisions between the aggressive and non-aggressive capitalist states by 
allying itself with the latter in order to resist aggression of the former and 
thereby preserve peace. In support of the Soviet Union’s conversion to the 
principles of collective security the Comintern began to argue for the 
creation of a Peace Front, using sanctions through the League of Nations 
and pacts of mutual assistance between the USSR and the peace-seeking 
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bourgeois democracies to deter fascist aggression.23 As a result the 
individual Communist Parties were now expected to use the Popular Front 
to pressure their existing bourgeois governments to oppose fascist 
aggression through the League of Nations and to agitate in favour of the 
Soviet Union’s foreign policy and the election of Popular Front governments 
which would support it.24 
 
The CPGB adopted the line of the 7th Congress with great enthusiasm.25 
Indeed as early as 1933 the Party had been calling for co-operation between 
the Comintern and the Second International against Fascism.26 
Additionally, as Noreen Branson and Nina Fishman note, CPGB policy had 
been moving relatively smoothly away from the sectarian tactics of the third 
period since 1933 and the Party officially adopted a policy of building a 
Working Class United Front in its Trade Union work in response to the rise 
of fascism in Europe at its 13th Party Congress in February 1935, before the 
7th World Congress.27 The CPGB now saw as its ultimate goal the 
replacement of the Chamberlain government with a Labour led Popular 
Front government to pursue a progressive policy at home and collective 
security abroad. The Party also saw, however, the immediate need to 
pressure the National Government to actively support collective security 
and join the mutual assistance pact, signed by France and the Soviet Union 
in May 1935, to provide immediate resistance to fascist aggression.28 More 
importantly however, picking up on the Congress’ redefinition of the role of 
fascism in domestic and international politics the CPGB now argued that 
there were three differences between the situation faced by the world in 
1939 relative to that faced in 1914, which made a changed attitude to war 
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necessary. Firstly the ability to make a clear division between the 
aggressive and non-aggressive states, secondly the existence of the Soviet 
Union and the need to defend it; and finally the fact that the victory of a 
fascist nation in an imperialist war meant the expansion of fascist domestic 
policies onto the defeated nations by force.29 In this changed situation the 
Party now foresaw two situations in which it would be acceptable for 
communists to support their own governments in war. Firstly it was argued 
that the need to defend the Soviet Union from a new counter-revolutionary 
war meant that rather than remaining aloof from an imperialist war, in 
countries which allied themselves to the Soviet Union the Communist Party 
should actively support its government, even if it was still a bourgeois 
government.30 Additionally the CPGB now argued that the need to prevent 
the creation of new fascist regimes by military conquest meant that it was 
now appropriate for the working classes of democratic countries menaced by 
fascism to act in defence of their national independence.31 Indeed the 
CPGB’s decision to provide military support to the Spanish Republic in the 
Spanish Civil War and its decision in 1938 that it would extend the same 
support to Czechoslovakia should it find itself embroiled in a war with 
Germany, were both couched in precisely these terms.32  
 
Despite these changes in the Party’s attitude towards war it is 
important to note that the CPGB’s approach to defending Britain during the 
Popular Front Period was never, as Kevin Morgan points out, as simple as 
for democratic Britain and against fascist Germany.33 Indeed in the eyes of 
the CPGB the National Governments of the Popular Front period, under 
both Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, were seen not as 
democratic governments but rather the main fascist threat in British 
                                                 
29 Pollitt, Harry, “A Working Class Peace Policy”, The Labour Monthly, (May 1936), pp. 299-300. And 
Morgan, Against Fascism and War, pp. 58-9. 
30 Redfern, Class or Nation, p. 78. 
31 Minutes of September 24th-25th Central Committee Meeting, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, 
CP/IND/POLL/2/7, p. 2/4. 
32 “Report of the Central Committee to the 14th National Congress”, Modern records Centre, 
MSS.15X/2/103/284, pp. 8-9. And 
“The People Can Speak With Decisive Voice” (May 1938), in “Report of the Central Committee to the 
15th Party Congress”, MRC, MSS.15X/2/103/203, p. 132. 
33 Morgan, Against Fascism and War, p. 57. 
23/140 
 
politics. At the Seventh Congress Dimitrov informed the CPGB that the 
main threat of fascism in Britain for the moment was the National 
government. The main fascist organisation in Britain, British Union of 
Fascists (BUF) led by Sir Oswald Mosley, had, for now, been pushed into the 
background by the action of the British Working class. As a result the main 
fascist danger in Britain now stemmed from the National Government who 
Dimitrov accused of ‘passing a number of reactionary measures directed 
against the working class’ which would make it easier for the creation of a 
fascist regime in Britain. This was not just a peculiarity of the British 
situation however, in the same speech Dimitrov argued that, in general, 
 
‘bourgeois governments usually pass through a number of preliminary 
stages and adopt a number of reactionary measures which directly 
facilitate the accession to power of fascism. Whoever does not fight the 
reactionary measures of the bourgeoisie and the growth of fascism at 
these preparatory stages is not in a position to prevent the victory of 
fascism, but, on the contrary, facilitates that victory.’34 
 
As a result Dimitrov argued that the CPGB’s immediate task was to utilise 
the discontent of the masses to ‘repel the reactionary offensive of the 
“National Government”’.35 The CPGB’s leadership largely agreed with 
Dimitrov’s understanding of the British situation and focused its anti-fascist 
work on the National Government. As both Dylan Lee Murphy and Kevin 
Morgan have pointed out, after the Congress the CPGB’s leaders saw the 
BUF as a reserve weapon of the British bourgeoisie which acted to distract 
the British public from the National Government’s more subtle attempts to 
introduce fascist measures to Britain.36 Indeed this focus on the National 
Government is apparent in Arthur Horner’s 1936 pamphlet Towards a 
Popular Front, where he argued that when considering fascism in Britain ‘I 
am not thinking of Mosley and his Blackshirts’ but rather the British 
Government, which Horner argued had only not already fully adopted 
fascism because, as yet, it had not felt the need to.37 The failure of the BUF 
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or any other openly fascist party to emerge as a mass movement in Britain 
however, led the CPGB’s leaders to equate the National Government’s 
repressive methods in Britain, Ireland and the colonies (such as the 
treatment of strikers, the Sedition Act, the Public Order Act and the IRA 
Bill) with fascism itself.38 As Kevin Morgan notes, for the CPGB to have 
concluded from the failure of a self-identifying fascist movement to emerge 
in Britain that Britain was somehow immune to fascism, would have been 
at odds with the characterisation of fascism as the inevitable result of 
capitalist decline.39 The Party’s leading theorists rather turned to Dimitrov’s 
argument at the 7th congress that ‘The development of fascism, and the 
fascist dictatorship itself, assume different forms in different countries, 
according to historical, social and economic conditions and to the national 
peculiarities… of the given country’ to argue that the British National 
Government represented exactly those groups who desired the 
establishment of fascism in Britain to advance their interests.40 Thus could 
John Ross Campbell argue in a 1938 pamphlet that the National 
Government was ‘the representative of those reactionary circles in Great 
Britain who in their own way are working for a government similar to those 
of Germany and Italy.’41  So great was the Party’s belief in the National 
government’s fascist credentials that it even went as far as to compare the 
Labour leadership’s hostility to the idea of the Popular Front movement and 
its apathy towards the need to remove the National government to the 
failure of the German Social Democrats to unite with the KPD against the 
threat of Hitler in 1933.42 
 
This understanding of the National Government as a fascist threat 
proved a serious obstacle to the CPGB entertaining the idea of supporting a 
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war against fascism or even supporting preparation for such a war under 
the British Government. Indeed throughout the 1930s the CPGB denounced 
any action taken by the National Government to prepare for war; from the 
extension of its rearmaments programme in 1937 to the introduction of 
conscription in 1939, every preparation the National Government made was 
denounced as a step towards fascism in Britain.43 As James Jupp has noted, 
the only defence measure that received any measure of explicit support from 
the CPGB was the provision of Air Raid Precautions.44 Even such purely 
defensive measures, however, were viewed with suspicion by the CPGB, 
which even went as far as to suggest that air raid wardens might be used to 
further suppress British democratic rights in time of war, arguing that, ‘if 
allowed to become the monopoly of the reactionary supporters of the 
National Government’ the Warden Organisation, in combination with the 
police, would form ‘a most dangerous organisation for the suppression of any 
opposition to the continuance of war.’45 
 
It was not only the threat the National Government posed in terms of 
the imposition of fascism in Britain, that prevented the CPGB from counting 
Britain amongst the democratic forces of the world however; it also 
considered the National Government to be a sponsor of foreign fascist 
regimes and anti-Sovietism. The CP’s understanding of the National 
Government as pro-fascist was based on the belief that, in the 
circumstances of the post-war world, the capitalists of Britain and those of 
the fascist states had developed shared interests. International politics in 
the post-war period, it was argued, was defined by the antagonism between 
Socialism and Capitalism above all other international antagonisms. In this 
situation it was believed that rival imperialists, whilst retaining bitter 
divisions amongst themselves became drawn towards co-operation with one 
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another to maintain the capitalist system and the class domination of the 
bourgeoisie against the rise of socialism. This common imperialist concern 
was felt most sharply by the oldest and strongest imperialist groups, such as 
Britain’s ruling class, whose relations with other capitalist nations were 
influenced by a sense of stewardship over the capitalist system.46 Britain, 
the CPGB argued, understood that the bourgeoisie in Germany and other 
fascist nations was in a state of acute crisis (indeed they had turned to 
fascism in order to overcome this crisis situation) thus British Imperialists 
were driven by their desire to maintain the Capitalist system across the 
globe to support the fascist regimes that prevented the fall of capitalism in 
Germany, Italy, etc. As a result, given the fascist states’ reliance on 
territorial expansion for their survival, the National Government was 
compelled towards submitting to fascist expansion and rejecting collective 
resistance to fascism to avoid weakening their class allies.47  As a political 
letter issued by the Party leadership on April 25th 1939 explained, 
 
‘[Chamberlain] is the cool, scheming leader of British monopoly 
capitalism, consciously carrying out a policy which, from his point of 
view, is necessary for the preservation of capitalism, in spite of the 
fact that it conflicts with certain British trading interests… and even 
endangers the British Empire… Chamberlain thinks that these are 
secondary to the danger to the whole structure of capitalism if 
German Fascism collapsed and this opened up the way to the Soviet 
system in Europe… The reactionary British Bourgeoisie… have 
decide to co-operate with Fascism, because they see such co-operation 
as necessary for their unsavoury class interests’48 
 
The CPGB’s evaluation of the National Government’s actions in the 
events which led to the signing of the Munich agreement of 1938 is a perfect 
example of this kind of thinking. In his pamphlet How to Win the War 
(Published September 14th 1939), Harry Pollitt argued that, prior to the 
Munich agreement, the strength of Czechoslovakia’s military and its 
treaties of mutual assistance with the USSR and France made it from both 
a military and a political standpoint ‘the strongest bastion of democracy 
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against the advance of Fascism.’49 Furthermore, as John Ross Campbell 
argued shortly after the signing of the agreement, Czechoslovakia had been 
in a key strategic position, preventing the fascist powers driving a wedge 
between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies, blocking Hitler’s 
access to the Oil wells and granaries of Romania and preventing Hitler from 
creating a group of fascist puppets up to the Soviet border which could 
provide the raw materials for an attack on the USSR or the Western 
Democracies.50 Both Pollitt and Campbell however noted that Germany, 
fearing a protracted war and the intervention of Czechoslovakia’s allies, 
would not have dared to attack Czechoslovakia to seize the Sudetenland it 
coveted, thus Pollitt argued that a ‘challenge to [German] aggression at that 
moment could have halted the whole Nazi advance without war.’51 The 
National Government’s actions in forcing the Czech Government to accept 
German territorial demands were interpreted then, not as a move to save 
peace, nor as an action which rewarded the National Government with any 
personal benefits, instead the CPGB argued that Chamberlain supported 
the Munich Agreement in order ‘to save the face and prestige of Hitler… 
break the peace front, and open Europe and Britain to fascism and new 
wars.’52 The CPGB claimed that the same motivations underlay the British 
government’s policy of non-intervention in Spain, it’s refusal to work with 
America to restrain Japanese aggression in the Pacific, its failure to 
intervene in the German annexation of Austria, its role in pressuring 
Poland to reject Soviet military assistance in 1939, with all of these actions 
being taken as evidence of the National Government’s attempts to ally itself 
with foreign fascism.53 Furthermore these attempts to aid fascism abroad 
were seen as evidence of the National Government’s attempts to impose 
fascism on Britain, with CPGB propaganda arguing that the National 
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government and its supporters, specifically the Cliveden set, were seeking to 
‘smash democracy in Europe, as a preliminary to smashing it in Britain’.54 
Allowing the National Government to arm itself, the Party believed, would 
only aid it in its pro-fascist ambitions.55 
 
In addition to being seen as pro-fascist the British government was 
also seen as anti-Soviet. Morgan points out that the principle of class 
solidarity used to explain the British Government’s support of fascist powers 
was also used to explain its hostility to the Soviet Union. The supremacy of 
the antagonism between socialism and capitalism in the post-war period, 
and the concept of international ruling class solidarity that created, not only 
encouraged Britain to act in support of its ailing imperialist rivals but also 
encouraged it to lead attempts to create a united front of imperialism 
against the USSR.56 CPGB propaganda throughout the Popular Front 
period regularly argued that Britain aimed to build a reactionary Pact 
against the Soviet Union which would be spearheaded by German and 
Italian Fascism who would in turn be supported and protected by Britain.57 
All of the National Government’s attempts to appease fascism were 
perceived by the Party as being deliberate attempts to strengthen the fascist 
powers and push them towards war with the Soviet Union.58 Thus the 
National Governments rearmaments programme and its negotiations with 
the USSR in the late 1930s were not seen as measures of genuine, 
principled resistance to Hitler but rather as a method of suggesting to him 
that westward expansion would be resisted and that he should direct his 
aggression eastwards towards the Soviet Union.59 
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If the CPGB perceived the National Government as anti-Soviet and 
as pro-fascist at home and abroad then this characterisation did not extend 
to the British nation as a whole. The Party argued ‘Whatever the crimes of 
our imperialist rulers… the mass of the British people has always been on 
the side of freedom’.60 Thus even while the Party refused to support defence 
measures under the Chamberlain government, it recognised that the British 
people had democratic rights which needed to be defended against the twin 
threats of foreign and domestic fascism.61 From 1938 onwards the Party 
began to overwhelmingly prioritise this foreign fascist danger over the 
domestic fascist threat. This shift in priorities can be seen in the Party’s 
extension of the Popular Front to include conservatives who shared no 
common domestic policies with the CPGB and were only considered 
progressive because of their anti-Hitler stance.62 Furthermore as Neil 
Redfern points out the Party even began to abandon in part its stance on the 
election of a Popular Front government as a precondition to rearmament. 
Redfern points out that following the intervention of the Comintern the 
Party began to change its line on conscription, noting that following this, 
whilst the party retained its theoretical opposition to conscription under 
Chamberlain, it abandoned practical opposition by cancelling a planned 
campaign against conscription.63  This shift in focus would have only been 
exacerbated by the statements coming out of Moscow at the time. For 
example in May 1939 Campbell, when transmitting the Comintern’s line on 
conscription in Britain, noted that the view in Moscow was that the current 
threat of fascism for the majority of European states lay not in the growth of 
the fascist mass movement within their own country’ but in ‘the danger of 
intervention from without by Nazi Germany, or by fascist Italy.’64 
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The perceived connection between the policy of the National 
Government and the advance of foreign fascism meant that this focus on 
foreign fascism did not lead the Party to abandon wholesale its opposition to 
the National Government. Even as the Party prioritised the struggle against 
foreign fascism it continued to regard the National Government and foreign 
fascism as mutually reinforcing evils and thus failed to provide a single 
party-wide understanding of which was the greater enemy.65 The growing 
threat of war did nothing to dampen the Party’s interpretation of 
Chamberlain as an ally of Hitler, even as late as September 1939 the Party 
was still warning of the danger of British-Nazi collaboration.66 Thus at the 
same time as it started to focus on the threat posed by foreign fascism, so 
too did CP propaganda radicalise its anti-Chamberlain propaganda, with 
Central Committee statements focusing, from February 1938 onwards, less 
on pressuring the National Government to modify their foreign and 
domestic policies and more on the idea of working for its immediate removal 
by a Popular Front Government.67 This increasing focus on the danger of 
foreign fascism and resolve to defend the democratic rights of the British 
people against a German invasion, combined with unrelenting  opposition to 
Chamberlain as an ally of fascism, led the Central Committee issue a 
statement in the Daily Worker on August 30th 1939 in which it declared,  
 
‘If, as a result of fascist aggression, the world finds itself embroiled in 
war, the Communist Party will do all in its power to ensure speedy 
victory over fascism and the overthrow of the fascist regime. At the 
same time it will demand and work to achieve the immediate defeat 
of Chamberlain and a new government in Britain representing the 
interests of the common people and not the rich friends of fascism.’68 
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Even before War broke out then, the CPGB’s leadership had already agreed 
to adopt the War on Two Fronts line. It is little surprise then that when, 
three days later, the Party espoused the same line in its first manifesto on 
the war it received the implicit support of the entire Central Committee.69 
The War on Two Fronts line was, as Dutt was to claim at the October 
Central Committee meeting, ‘the inevitable decision on the basis of the 
entire line that we had been pursuing as a Party.’70  
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Chapter 2 – A War on Two Fronts 
 
The outbreak of war then made very little difference to the 
fundamental assumptions and policies which made up the CPGB’s line. The 
Leadership’s united support of the War on Two Fronts line represented its 
continued adherence to the basic elements of the Popular Front line 
although adjusted slightly to reflect the reality of war with Germany. The 
impetus for a re-evaluation of the Party line therefore came not from the 
outbreak of war itself but rather the first signs of opposition to the Party 
line emerged, as Kevin Morgan, Monty Johnstone, John Callaghan and 
Keith Laybourn and Dylan Murphy have all argued, only after the Party 
received a Soviet press telegram on September 14th, which hinted that the 
CPGB’s conception of the war was out of sync with the USSR’s.1  The Press 
Telegram, rather than portraying the war as an anti-fascist conflict started 
primarily by Nazi Germany, as the CPGB had in its September manifesto, 
claimed that it was ‘an Imperialist and predatory War for new redivision of 
the world… a robber war kindled from all sides by the hands of two 
Imperialist groups of powers’, an interpretation which, as Harry Pollitt 
noted, seemed ‘in absolute contradiction’ to the line of the CPGB.2  
Following the receipt of this telegram, Rajani Palme Dutt began to express 
concerns regarding the Party’s line in the Politburo, receiving support from 
one or two other members of the Politburo who also harboured doubts about 
the Party’s line.3 These initial doubts were only reinforced by subsequent 
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statements by the American and Belgian Communist Parties which now 
also denounced the war as imperialist declaring both sides to be equally 
responsible for its creation, suggesting that the CPGB was not only out of 
step with the line of the Soviet Union but that of the Comintern as well.4 As 
a number of leaders at the meeting itself came to note, it was because of 
these doubts that the Politburo called the Central Committee together to 
discuss the War on Two Fronts line on September 24th.5 At the meeting 
however, only two of the twelve Party leaders who gave speeches, Dutt and 
William Rust, spoke in opposition to the Party’s established line. This raises 
the question; if, as a number of historians have suggested, the Party was to 
eventually adopt its new line on the war in October primarily because of the 
intervention of the Comintern, why, even after the aforementioned events 
made it increasingly clear that the Comintern and the Soviet Union were in 
opposition to the War on Two Fronts line, did the bulk of the Central 
Committee continued to support that line at the September meeting? 
 
In order to answer this question it is first important to understand 
the manner in which the opposition argued against the War on Two Fronts 
line. Both Dutt and Rust saw the war as an imperialist war for which 
Britain, France and Germany were equally responsible and in which Britain 
was fighting for its own imperialist interests, to defend its empire against 
its rival, Germany.6 Dutt argued that Germany held direct responsibility for 
the war by virtue of its aggressive acts but he maintained that Britain, by 
its policy of aiding the rise of Germen fascism and creating the conditions 
for war through its refusal of the Peace Front, shared equal responsibility.7 
He also pointed out that the National Government’s failure to take any 
practical steps to defend Poland and the fact it had not acted previously to 
resist fascism, proved that it was not acting out of genuine concern for the 
liberties of small nations or the anti-fascist will of the British people, but 
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rather in its own self-interest.8  These were not new ideas, indeed the 
Party’s September manifesto spelled out quite clearly that the National 
Government was pursuing the war for its own imperialist interests and, 
even if it did not explicitly espouse the idea of equal responsibility, it did 
blame Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement for creating a situation in 
which Germany was ‘able to plunge Europe into war.’9 However, in contrast 
to the Manifesto, Dutt and Rust now claimed that the fact that one of the 
imperialisms was democratic and the other was fascist should make no 
difference to the way the Party approached the war. Dutt argued that 
neither of the two conditions under which the Party and the Comintern had 
previously agreed to support a bourgeois government in an imperialist war 
applied to the current war. Firstly, he announced, Britain’s failure to secure 
a Peace Front with the USSR meant that the war could not be seen as just.10 
Dutt reaffirmed the idea that had Britain allied with the USSR, its 
involvement in the war would have been justified, despite the imperialist 
aims which would have motivated that involvement, by the defence it would 
have rendered to the Soviet Union. As Britain has refused the Peace Front, 
however, the war had to be seen as an imperialist war in the fullest sense.11 
Dutt even denied the applicability of the Party’s support for democratic 
states against the threat of external imposition of fascism arguing that, in 
all cases in which the Comintern had supported such wars, the country 
which received that support was a small state in danger of being overrun by 
a fascist state. Britain, he argued, was a large imperialist power which did 
not face this problem.12 Dutt and Rust also argued that the signing of the 
Nazi-Soviet pact had led to a shift in the balance of international forces 
although only Rust provided a clear explanation of what was meant by 
this.13 Rust argued that Germany’s signing the Nazi-Soviet pact represented 
the culmination of a shift in German foreign policy; fearful of the strength of 
the Soviet Union, Germany had ceased to pursue aggressive aims at the 
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expense of the Soviet Union and was thus no longer the main spearhead of 
anti-Soviet war.14 By comparison he argued, British imperialism had 
deliberately chosen war with Germany and had as its main aim the 
formation of an anti-Soviet front.15 Thus Rust, using Stalin’s speech to the 
18th Party congress of the CPSU to reinforce his position, hinted that the 
Party’s previous differentiation between fascist and democratic states, at 
least in terms of their relationship with the Soviet Union, no longer 
applied.16 Thus Dutt and Rust argued that the war had to be seen as 
imperialist, even if one of the sides involved was fascist. In this situation, 
Dutt argued, the international line had been clearly defined at the 7th 
Congress,17  
 
‘Should a new imperialist world war break out, despite all efforts of 
the working class to prevent it, the communists will strive to lead the 
opponents of war, organised in the struggle for peace, to the struggle 
for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war against 
the fascist instigators of war, against the bourgeoisie, for the 
overthrow of capitalism.’18 
 
Despite this talk of revolutionary defeatism however, the actual suggestions 
for modifications to the Party line put forward by Dutt and Rust were rather 
more conservative. Unwilling to fully commit themselves to the line they 
had just explained, both argued against making any immediate changes to 
the Party line, stressing the need to wait for the return of the Party’s 
representative to the Comintern, David Springhall, so that he could clarify 
the Comintern’s position.19 At the same time both argued the need to refocus 
the Party’s propaganda and activities to emphasize the struggle for a new 
government. Dutt in particular argued that the Party should call for the 
election of a People’s Government which would issue terms for a democratic 
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peace and only if these were rejected seek alliance with the USSR and USA 
to fight fascism.20 
 
Pollitt, Campbell, Gallacher and the other seven members of the 
Central Committee who spoke that day remained unconvinced. The other 
leaders’ opposition to Dutt and Rust’s line was not based on its portrayal of 
the war as an imperialist conflict, indeed the majority of the other speakers 
explicitly agreed with this point. As Campbell pointed out, anyone who ‘did 
not understand that Chamberlain and Daladier were representatives of 
imperialism as much as Hitler… [and] did not understand that a war 
between two imperialist systems is an imperialist war… should not be a 
member of this C.C.’.21 Rather, they did not agree with Dutt and Rust’s 
suggestions that the fact that one of the imperialist powers conducting the 
war was fascist should make no difference to the Party’s characterisation of 
the war or its response to it. The majority of speakers instead argued that 
the distinctions made by the Party throughout the Popular Front period 
between fascist and bourgeois democratic imperialisms had to determine its 
response to the war. Firstly the supporters of the War on Two Fronts line 
rejected Dutt and Rust’s claim that Britain and Germany were equally 
responsible for the war, arguing that the distinction between aggressive 
fascist states and non-aggressive democratic states made it impossible to see 
Britain and Germany as equally responsible for the conflict. Whilst none the 
Central Committee attempted to argue that Britain had no responsibility for 
the war, a number argued that Germany held primary responsibility. 
Campbell for example noted that in the last imperialist war in 1914 ‘there 
were two sets of imperialist powers each bound by secret treaties having 
claims on each other’s territory’. In the current war however, Campbell 
argued that there were aggressive and non-aggressive powers, thus even if 
both were imperialist the Party could not claim that the belligerents in 1939 
held equal responsibility for the war in the same way as they had in 1914.22 
Emile Burns too argued that the existence of fascism prevented the Party 
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from seeing the war in the same way as it had seen the First World War; as 
imperialist with equal responsibility.23 Pollitt made a similar argument, 
claiming that, despite the fact that the war was imperialist and despite 
Britain’s role in creating it, Nazi Germany remained the direct aggressor.24 
Far more important for the Central Committee however, were the 
differences they had previously made between the internal regimes of fascist 
and democratic states. As John Campbell pointed out ‘the extension of 
fascism is not the extension of merely an imperialist system, but of a 
destructive reactionary system, which means the enslavement of the 
working class’.25 The other supporters of the War on Two Fronts line argued 
that the outbreak of imperialist war did nothing to devalue this distinction 
between bourgeois democracy and fascism. Arthur Horner for example, told 
the other leaders that ‘It is no use now to make the announcement that 
there are two imperialisms; there is no difference between them. [sic] 
Germany and Britain exist in a different stage of capitalism’, at the present 
moment German imperialism was fascist whilst British Imperialism was 
democratic.26 Harry Pollitt too pointed out that the Party had been arguing 
since before the outbreak of the war that it was already the period of the 
Second Imperialist War, noting that this had never previously altered the 
Party’s stance of providing support to ‘any resistance on the part of any 
country or any people to fascist aggression’.27 Pollitt and Horner along with 
the other speakers who favoured the War on Two Fronts line argued that 
the potential for a German victory to spread the fascist stage of capitalism 
to Britain meant it was impossible for the Party to remain indifferent to the 
outcome of the war despite its imperialist nature.28 Peter Kerrigan for 
example, contended that although the war was ‘an imperialist war in its 
fullest sense’, the defeat of German fascism was the ‘immediate question’ 
which the Party had to address as the military defeat of Britain would mean 
the imposition of fascism on the country and the destruction British 
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democratic liberties. 29 Maurice Cornforth argued in a similar vein that, 
despite the imperialist character of the war and the role that British 
imperialism had played in its instigation by aiding German expansion, the 
Party was still justified to pursue the War on Two Fronts line to defend 
British democracy.30 Reflecting the focus on the defence of British liberties 
which the Party developed in the late 1930s, the majority of the Party 
leadership, far from accepting Dutt’s idea that only small states were 
justified to resist fascism, was operating under the assumption that any 
democratic nation was justified to defend itself from fascism.  
 
This need to defend Britain was keenly felt by the supporters of the 
Party line. In their speeches the majority, contrary to Dutt, outlined their 
belief that Britain was at risk of imminent defeat by Germany. For some the 
danger to Britain stemmed from relative military strength of the war’s 
belligerents. Campbell in particular argued that the difference in military 
strength between the two sides of the war was not so great that a British 
defeat was ruled out. All that was needed for Britain to be defeated, he 
suggested, was ‘a little luck here or a little blundering there.’31 This view 
seems to have been shared by William Gallacher who questioned Dutt’s 
policy of postponing support for the war until after the election of a People’s 
government on the grounds that Hitler could potentially conquer Britain 
before a new government could be elected.32 For Gallacher this potential 
German victory would not necessarily even require an invasion. He argued 
that if Germany were to secure a victory on the continent in the early stages 
of the war, then Hitler could use the forces he would wield and the support 
he could give to his associates in Britain as a result of that victory, to ensure 
that everything the Party ever fought for was ‘indefinitely destroyed’.33 
Other Party leaders focused more on the policy of the National Government 
to explain the risk of a British defeat. Cornforth, for example felt that the 
National Government had no intention of pursuing a complete victory over 
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German fascism but rather sought only to weaken it so that it could be 
forced to resume its expansion in the east, at the expense of the Soviet 
Union. He argued that it was ‘precisely because of this double-faced policy 
the Chamberlain government is pursuing’ that the possibility of British 
democracy being over-run by German fascism was ‘a very real thing 
indeed.’34  Although only ten of the nineteen Central Committee members 
who eventually voted on the Party’s line in October had the chance to voice 
their opinion at the September meeting, the speeches delivered by the 
remaining leaders at the October meeting suggest that the entire Central 
Committee were largely agreed on the need to defend British democracy 
from German fascism. Leaders such as Ted Bramley, Marian Jessop and 
Peter Kerrigan all claimed in October that had they had the chance to speak 
at the previous meeting they would have opposed Dutt and Rust’s position 
because of the threat that German fascism posed to Britain. They suggested 
that in September they believed the defeat of Germany was in the interests 
of the British workers as it would prevent Britain and its colonies being 
dominated by fascism.35 
 
Dutt and Rust did not merely criticise the War on Two Fronts line for 
espousing support of the British war effort however; in addition they argued 
that adherence to the line either was already or would be damaging to the 
Party’s struggle for socialism in Britain. Rust argued that the Leadership’s 
focus on the need to defeat Hitler had already led Party activists to abandon 
the struggle to maintain working conditions in the factories as they felt it 
necessary to make sacrifices to secure the defeat of Hitler.36 Dutt on the 
other hand argued that even simply supporting the war in general would 
eventually lead to the masses turning away from the Party, arguing that, as 
the war went on and its human cost increased, the people of Britain would 
eventually turn against it and all who supported it, regardless of their 
reasoning for doing so.37 Furthermore, Dutt suggested that the British and 
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French governments would use the war as an excuse to adopt fascist 
methods themselves, pointing to the ongoing repression of the French 
Communist Party as an example of this.38 The rest of the Central 
Committee rejected this idea, arguing that the War on two Fronts was the 
best line to promote socialist advance not only in Britain but also on an 
international scale.  
 
The supporters of the Party line argued that the predominant 
attitude amongst the British working class was one of support for the war 
and resistance to German fascism. Horner pointed out ‘In this particular 
war the Labour movement, trade unions, like ourselves, have been the 
advocates of standing up to Hitler.’39 Indeed Horner along with the Party’s 
North East district secretary Hymie Lee (who was not a member of the 
Central Committee but nevertheless spoke at the September meeting) 
argued as Pollitt had previously, that the working class’ desire to resist 
Hitler was so strong that it had played a role in compelling the National 
Government to declare war in the first place.40  Any leader who suggested 
that there was any ill-feeling amongst the workers towards the war pointed 
out that these were based on the way the war was being conducted, in terms 
of the degradation of working conditions caused by the blackout and other 
war measures and the lack of military advances, rather than any 
fundamental opposition to the war itself.41 Indeed the supporters of the War 
on Two Fronts line argued that it was precisely by opposing this poor 
prosecution of the war that the Party was most likely to win the support of 
the British labour movement. Unsurprisingly Campbell and Pollitt were 
particularly vocal in their support for this idea. Campbell told the 
assembled Committee that the pro-fascist stance of the National 
Government constituted the Party’s ‘strong weapon’ against the British 
imperialism.42 Pollitt on the other hand, argued that the Party should pay 
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particular attention in its propaganda to the enthusiasm of the National 
Government for anti-working class action at home, such as raising hours 
and lowering wages, in comparison to its enthusiasm for action against 
Germany. He argued that if the Party fought for the government to pursue 
the war against Germany ‘with the same intensity that British capitalism 
[is] conducting it against the trade unionists it will find an echo in every 
factory in this country.’43 Finlay Hart too suggested that focusing on the 
National Government’s prosecution of the war would win the Party the most 
popular appeal suggesting that it would be because of Chamberlain’s foreign 
policy rather than his domestic policies ‘that large numbers are going to fall 
out with the government.’44  Indeed the majority of the Speakers at the 
September meeting pointed out that if the Party ignored the mood amongst 
the working class by opposing the war as Dutt and Rust suggested, it would 
leave the Party separated from the workers. As Horner pointed out, ‘If we 
are the advocates of capitulation in any way before German fascism, we will 
find ourselves as a group of intellectuals at the top without any masses at 
the bottom’.45 Gallacher was even more explicit, if the Party were to issue 
the line proposed by Dutt and Rust it would be result in its ruin.46   
 
On an international scale too the Central Committee also felt that 
both the struggle against the National Government and the war were useful 
in promoting Socialist advance. Campbell, for example, suggested that, if 
the Party were successful in its fight for a People’s government, its victory 
would be a great inspiration for the German workers’ struggle against 
Hitler.47 Cornforth on the other hand advocated support for the war on the 
basis that the military defeat of Germany would mean increased 
revolutionary prospects on a global scale. The defeat of Hitler, he argued, 
would not only result in the liberation of the German, Austrian and Czech 
workers from the conditions of fascism but also that the process of liberating 
the people of Europe would inspire liberation movements in China and 
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India.48 Gallacher pointed out in his speech that German, Austrian and 
Czech communists would likely support a struggle against fascism for their 
liberation, arguing that all of the CPGB’s sister parties in the countries 
dominated by Germany saw their primary objective as the defeat of German 
fascism.49 Campbell went even further, arguing that the defence of Britain 
itself was in the interests of the international movement and in particular 
the Soviet Union. The imposition of fascism on Britain by either internal or 
external forces, he contended, would be a disaster ‘from not only the point of 
view of the people of Britain and France, but from the point of view of the 
world revolution and the Soviet Union itself.’50 If Germany was victorious 
and the British labour movement crushed, Campbell said, the Soviet Union 
would be robbed of precious allies, thus he argued a British defeat should be 
seen as a Soviet defeat and the Party should orientate its policy as such.51  
 
The proliferation of arguments that the War on Two Fronts line 
served the best interests of the international movement and the Soviet 
Union in the speeches at the September meeting might seem strange given 
the evidence that the Party had received suggesting that both the 
Comintern and the USSR were moving towards a position of opposition to 
the war. Those who supported the line however, attempted to argue away 
this evidence. Although it was now claiming that the war was imperialist, 
the supporters of the line pointed to the practical actions of the Soviet Union 
as evidence that, despite this, it was still committed to the fight against 
fascism. The majority of the speakers in September agreed with Horner’s 
argument that the Soviet Union’s actions had only hindered Germany’s 
freedom of action rather than any anyone else’s. The Soviet Invasion of 
Poland was commonly used as an example of this. The CPGB’s leaders, 
having no knowledge of the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet pact which 
allowed for the division of Poland, adopted the USSR’s explanation of the 
invasion perceiving it not as an opportunistic land grab but as a principled 
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attempt to defend the people of Eastern Poland and of the Soviet Union 
itself from German expansion.52 Those in favour of the Party line, in 
particular, Cornforth and Pollitt, used this example to argue that there 
would be no contradiction between the Party pursuing a line of resisting 
fascist expansion in the west and the Soviet Union’s policy of resisting 
fascism in Eastern Europe.53 Other leaders drew upon Campbell’s argument 
that a British defeat was not in the Soviet Union’s interests, to argue that 
the War on two Fronts would not contradict Soviet policy. Kerrigan for 
example, expressed his disbelief that the Soviet Union would ever support a 
Germany victory over Britain ‘with the achievement of fascism here and its 
inevitable consequences to us.’54 Gallacher too pointed out that the progress 
of the USSR depended on the support of the proletariat of all other 
countries, and that the best way to ensure that it had this support was for 
the Communist Parties of other nations to win the support of their workers 
by adopting policies based on the situation in their country.55 Given the 
danger German fascism posed to Britain the independent policy Gallacher 
had in mind was clear, ‘to continue the fight on two fronts’.56 
 
The Central Committee also argued that the Comintern had not and 
did not plan to abandon the fight against fascism and would thus not oppose 
the War on Two Fronts line. Indeed, excluding the recent statements of the 
American and Belgian Parties, all other recent statements of both the other 
National Parties and the Comintern itself suggested that the international 
movement’s interpretation of the war was not dissimilar to the CPGB’s. As 
Pollitt pointed out, at the outbreak of war the entire international 
movement had supported the same analysis of the war as the CPGB.57 The 
Parties of not only of large imperialist nations, such as France and the USA, 
but also of smaller capitalist countries, such as Belgium, Sweden and 
Norway, all initially made statements on the war based on Popular Front 
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period conceptions of the differences between fascist and democratic states, 
arguing that Germany was the aggressor and favouring its defeat.58 The 
Communist International itself gave no indication of abandoning the 
Popular Front theories which underpinned the CPGB’s decision to support 
the War on Two Fronts line either. The September issue of The Communist 
International journal included numerous articles which continued to 
denounce German fascism as ‘the worst regime of violence known to history’ 
and pointed out that ‘no nation, no country is secure in the face of it’.59 
Furthermore, a number of statements made by the Comintern prior to the 
outbreak of war suggested a line of support for the defence of Britain. Of 
particular note in this regard is the Comintern’s argument, following the 
Munich crisis in 1938, that through the extension of the political franchise 
and the election of working class representatives, the workers had now won 
a place for themselves within their own nations. As a result of this the 
Comintern called upon the Communist Parties to support the national 
independence of their countries, and by extension the workers place in that 
country, against fascist aggression and any attempt of the national 
bourgeoisie to betray the nation, thus effectively extending the right to 
defend bourgeois democratic nations against fascism to other countries 
beyond the small states stipulated at the 7th Congress.60 Horner drew 
particular attention to such ideas in his speech, pointing out that, in 
conversations he had with Georgi Dimitrov in 1937, Dimitrov had 
specifically supported the notion of defending Britain’s territorial integrity 
against any fascist attack.61 However, it was not the case that the 
leadership argued in favour of the War on two Fronts line solely because it 
aligned with policy of the rest of the international movement. As Andrew 
Thorpe has noted; Dimitrov’s claims at the Seventh World Congress and 
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since, that the Communist Parties must seek to increase their appeal by 
taking a more active role in working out their own strategies to fit local 
conditions, had begun to take root within the CPGB.62 Indeed this can be 
seen in the emphasis that some members of the Central Committee – in 
particular Pollitt, Campbell, Cornforth and Gallacher – placed upon the 
importance of the Party deciding its own line on the war. All four leaders 
pointed out that such an approach had not only been advocated by the 
Comintern itself but was also important for ensuring the Party’s influence 
over the British workers in the future.63  
 
Overall then the speeches at the September 24th-25th meeting seem to 
suggest that Campbell was correct when he described his fellow leaders’ 
contributions to the meeting as being ultimately divided by those who took 
the view ‘that fascism raises a fundamentally new problem and that our 
tactics in relation to this war must be evaluated from that fact’, and those 
‘who are returning to the position held by the Trotskyists in their criticism 
of the Seventh World Congress, namely, that fascism makes no difference 
and that all the formulas of 1914 are valued guids [sic] to us in the present 
situation.’64 Despite this however, some Party leaders also expressed doubts 
about the Party’s line. Specifically these leaders began to argue that too 
much of the focus of the Party’s statements and propaganda had been on 
calling for the effective prosecution of the military war against Hitler. The 
majority of the Central Committee members who spoke at the September 
meeting, including Pollitt, now argued that the Party had to put greater 
emphasis on the political war against Chamberlain. For some of the 
speakers the need for this change was relatively straight forward and had 
little to do with the character of the war itself. Pollitt, Hart and Kerrigan, 
for example, all argued that attacks on working conditions and democracy in 
Britain since the outbreak of a war meant that the Party needed to sharpen 
its attacks on British capitalism. Potential press censorship, rising prices, 
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unemployment, falling wages and increased overtime were all cited as 
evidence that the Government, in league with British employers, was 
waging war against the British working class with Pollitt, Hart and 
Kerrigan arguing that if the Party gave more attention to these issues it 
would be able to strengthen its support amongst the workers.65 For Emile 
Burns, William Gallacher and Idris Cox however, the justification for 
refocusing the Party’s work was very different. All three argued that the 
fact that the war was being conducted by the Chamberlain government for 
imperialist aims meant that, whilst it could be converted into a democratic 
struggle against fascism by the election of a new government led by the 
Labour movement, it was not one currently. They argued that the Party now 
needed to focus its propaganda on achieving this new government. Unlike 
Dutt and Rust however, all three rejected the idea that the Party should 
abandon its support for the fight against Hitler in the meantime.66 
 
Thus it seems that the Party leadership, excluding Dutt and Rust, 
ended the first day of the September meeting united in its support for the 
War on Two Fronts line. Despite this however, the party’s leaders were not 
completely uncritical of that line. Those who spoke in favour of the War on 
Two Fronts at the September meeting did, in general, agree that the 
differentiation between fascist and bourgeois democratic states expounded 
by the Party from 1935 onwards justified the Party’s decision to give 
qualified support to the war effort, partly because they prevented Britain 
bearing equal responsibility for the war but more importantly because they 
implied the need to defend British democratic rights. There was also general  
agreement on the idea that the War on Two Fronts line could be supported 
on the grounds that it would aid Socialist advance at home and abroad and 
would not run in opposition to the line of authorities such as the Soviet 
Union and the Comintern. At the same time however, a number of Central 
Committee members did perceive a need to adjust the Party’s line to combat 
the Chamberlain government’s reactionary policy at home and its 
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imperialist aims abroad suggesting that the Party’s leaders still harboured 
mistrust of the British Government. None of the issues which underlay 
these suggested corrections to the Party’s line, however, were enough to 
encourage any fundamental reassessment of the Party’s characterisation of 
the war, and the Party’s decisions in October must be viewed from that 
perspective. 
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Chapter 3 – An Imperialist War 
 
On the 25th of September Dave Springhall returned from Moscow 
carrying details of the Comintern’s stance on the war. The Central 
Committee reconvened to hear his report which detailed the line contained 
within the Comintern Secretariat’s Short Thesis (a document produced on 
September 10th intended to serve as the basis of the international line on 
the war), as well as recounting important points taken from discussions held 
with Georgi Dimitrov and Andre Marty prior to his departure from the 
Soviet Union.1  Springhall explained to the Central Committee that the view 
of the ECCI was that the war was a purely imperialist war. Springhall 
announced that the Comintern had now abandoned the idea that there was 
a distinct differentiation between fascist and bourgeois democratic states, 
noting that the Comintern, and Dimitrov in particular, believed that, by 
refusing to sign a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and by 
their respective roles in Poland’s decision to refuse Soviet military access to 
Polish territory before the outbreak of war, Britain, France and Poland’s 
rulers had all adopted a policy which created the conditions for war.2 
Springhall pointed out that because of this, the Comintern believed ‘it was 
now necessary to see that the differentiation between the fascist and the so-
called democratic countries had lost its former significance.’3 Springhall’s 
report made it relatively clear that, in this regard, the Comintern meant 
that fascist and bourgeois democratic countries could no longer be described, 
as they had been since the Seventh Congress, as aggressive and non-
aggressive respectively. In response to questioning from other members of 
the Central Committee he acknowledged that Britain still had more 
democratic rights than Germany whilst at the same time warning that such 
rights might yet be taken away.4 Britain, France, Poland and Germany, 
Springhall noted, had all pursued the war and had all done so in their own 
imperialist interests, in particular Germany was pursuing European and 
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World domination whilst Britain aimed to preserve its European hegemony 
against its German rivals. Thus, he explained, The Comintern had reached 
the conclusion that the war had to be ‘seen as a war of two imperialist 
groups with conflicting imperialist aims’, a purely imperialist war ‘which 
the working class in no countries can give any support to’.5 Springhall told 
the other Party leaders that, in this situation the CPGB must oppose the 
war and work for the achievement of socialism in Britain, in the immediate 
period by simply explaining the imperialist nature of the war to the British 
working class but ultimately by working for a British military defeat in 
accordance with the Leninist, revolutionary-defeatist approach to 
imperialist war.6 Springhall’s report threw into sharp question everything 
that the Central Committee had claimed the previous day regarding the 
Comintern’s position on the war. After a brief questioning session in which 
Springhall answered questions on the personal input he had had on the 
drafting of the Short Thesis – which was none – and the content of his 
report, the Central Committee meeting was briefly interrupted to allow the 
Politburo time to discuss the Comintern line. When the meeting resumed 
the Politburo proposed that the Central Committee adjourn until October 
3rd to allow its members to consider the line before making a final decision 
on it.7 Between the two meetings, although the War on Two Fronts line 
remained the formal line of the Party, preparations for a change in line 
began immediately. Evidence of these preparations can be seen in the 
restructuring of the Party leadership; with Pollitt being replaced as General 
Secretary of the Party by a new secretariat consisting of Dutt, Rust and 
Springhall in order to reassure the Comintern that there would be no 
sabotage of the new line.8 The changing attitude of the Party was made 
evident in the pages of the Daily Worker. As Kevin Morgan, Keith Laybourn 
and Dylan Murphy have pointed out there was an immediate change in tone 
of the articles published in the Party paper with particularly noticeable 
statements opposing the war budget published in the September 27th 
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edition.9 Between September 25th and 29th these changes in Party policy 
remained small, the Daily Worker ceased to talk of the need to win the war 
and began to present social problems in Britain (e.g. unemployment, rising 
prices and cost of living, falling wages, worsening conditions in British 
industry, etc.) as issues which needed solving in their own right rather than 
focusing on the damage these issues did to the war effort as had been the 
norm before Springhall’s return. There was however no overt talk of peace 
or imperialist war.10 All of this changed on September 30th. On Friday 
September 29th the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany issued a joint 
communique calling for an immediate peace in Western Europe.  Printed in 
the Daily Worker on September 30th, the communique explained that a 
treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union confirming the demarcation 
of their respective borders in Poland, had ‘created a firm foundation for a 
lasting peace in Eastern Europe’ and that both the Soviet and German 
governments now believed that ‘the liquidation of the present war between 
Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other would 
meet the interests of all nations.’ In addition, the communique stated that, 
should Britain and France fail to respond to the peace proposals placed 
before them, they would ‘bear the responsibility for the continuation of the 
war.’11 With the Soviet Union now publicly in favour of peace the question of 
the CPGB’s stance on the war became unavoidable and the reaction from 
the Party was instantaneous. On the same day as the Nazi-Soviet peace 
proposals were announced Party organisers were informed to work to the 
Comintern line as explained by Springhall.12 On September 30th the 
Politburo issued a statement in the Daily Worker in the name of the paper’s 
editorial board advocating peace and on October 1st William Gallacher, the 
Party’s only Member of Parliament, gave a speech in Glasgow calling for a 
peace settlement.13 Despite this there was still division amongst the Party’s 
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leaders. The statement issued by the Politburo in the Daily Worker was an 
uneasy blend of the War on Two Fronts line and the new line of opposition 
to the war; it claimed that the Chamberlain government was pursuing the 
war for imperialist aims but did not claim that the war itself was 
imperialist, at the same time it called for peace but justified this by claiming 
that a Soviet-backed peace would be able to halt fascist aggression.14 The 
statement, drafted by Gallacher, was supported by only five of the eight 
members of the Politburo. Dutt, Rust and Springhall argued that the Party 
had to adopt the Comintern line on the war in full - even though the Central 
Committee had not met.15 As a result of the Soviet Union’s actions and the 
divisions within the Politburo the Central Committee was reconvened a day 
earlier than expected on October 2nd. 
 
The October Central Committee meeting was opened by Dutt, who 
presented a report written collaboratively by the Party secretariat. Dutt, 
Rust and Springhall now, in light of the clarification of the Comintern’s line 
on the war and the Soviet-German peace proposals, put forward a much 
revised and much bolder opposition to the War on Two Fronts line. The 
Secretariat repeated Dutt and Rust’s arguments from the September 
meeting regarding Britain and France’s responsibility for the war and their 
imperialist aims to explain the war’s imperialist nature but they now 
argued much more forcefully that the fact that Germany was a fascist 
country should make no difference to the party’s stance on the war, in line 
with the Comintern’s latest stance. Specifically, the Secretariat argued that 
there had been a change in the relative strength, aggressiveness and anti-
Soviet ambitions of Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on 
the other. 
 
In his opening speech, Dutt argued that Germany had never been 
strong itself, but rather its strength had stemmed from the assistance which 
British imperialism had given to it. Thus the outbreak of war, with the 
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resulting loss of British support this brought, had fundamentally weakened 
Germany.16 Moreover, the Secretariat argued that the USSR had used its 
military strength to compel Germany to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact, which 
had in turn weakened Germany’s position by breaking its alliances with 
Japan and Italy in the anti-Comintern pact and placing limits on its 
expansionist goals in the East.17 The Soviet invasion of Poland too was seen 
by the secretariat as a further check to Germany’s power.  Dutt pointed out 
that Germany’s economic goals lay not in western Poland but in the wealth 
of South Eastern Europe (in particular Romania), he argued that the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Poland had prevented expansion in this direction and 
left Hitler in control of only the poverty stricken areas of Poland, which, far 
from strengthening Germany, would only increase its economic burdens.18 
Taking up this argument Rust thus pointed out that, even if Germany had 
technically won a victory in Poland, overall events in the East had left 
Germany in a weaker position.19 The result of all of these Soviet actions, in 
particular the Soviet invasion of Poland, the Secretariat argued, was the 
expansion of the prestige of the USSR in the minds of the people of Eastern 
Europe and Germany, which in turn was encouraging them towards 
revolution, further weakening the Nazi regime.20 The Secretariat pointed to 
the joint Soviet-German peace proposals as open confirmation of Germany’s 
weakness, arguing that, because of its weakened position, Germany was 
terrified of a prolonged war and that its decision to sue for peace was a 
desperate bid to avoid such a situation.21  
 
Whilst the Secretariat perceived the erosion of German aggression it 
simultaneously perceived an increase in the aggressiveness of British and 
French imperialism. The secretariat took up the Comintern’s argument that 
the refusal of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact was not the result of mere short-
sightedness on Britain’s part but rather part of a deliberate decision to 
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create the conditions for war with Germany.22 They argued British 
imperialism’s aim was the destruction of Germany.  Germany’s weakness 
meant Britain did not fear its own defeat at all; rather its greatest concern 
was how to defeat Germany without triggering proletarian revolution. More 
importantly, the Secretariat also believed that the governments of Britain 
and France were becoming more reactionary and increasingly antagonistic 
towards the Soviet Union. Springhall stated that the actions of the Soviet 
Union in weakening Germany had convinced the bourgeoisie in Britain and 
France that the Soviet Union was now a far greater threat than Germany.23  
Indeed, despite arguing that Britain and France now primarily desired the 
defeat of Germany, the secretariat pointed to growing anti-Soviet 
propaganda in the capitalist press and the repression of the French 
Communist Party to argue that the imperialists of both countries were both 
preparing for an attack on socialism and the Soviet Union.24 The Secretariat 
argued that Britain and France, in pursuing this goal, had not abandoned 
the idea of trying to turn Germany against the Soviet Union. Rust pointed 
out that the possibility of Chamberlain making a deal with Hitler could not 
be ruled out, but more than this Dutt, Rust and Springhall now argued that 
Britain and France were committed to the continuation of the war in order 
to inflict a defeat on Germany which would make it more subservient to 
their anti-Soviet aims.25  
 
Thus the Secretariat argued the international roles of fascism and 
bourgeois democracy had completely changed. They pointed out that 
previously Germany had been the spearhead of aggression whilst Britain 
and France could have played a progressive role by allying themselves with 
the Soviet Union to prevent war; now, they claimed, Germany’s weakness 
had compelled it to abandon its anti-Soviet aims and to sue for peace, 
whereas Britain and France had purposely refused to prevent war, and were 
now continuing the war in the face of Germany’s offers of peace in order to 
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further their anti-Soviet objectives. In light of this they now argued ‘it is 
definitely the French and British Imperialists who are the pacemakers of 
the war’.26 The secretariat’s argument actually went beyond the Comintern’s 
analysis of the war. Where the Comintern’s Short Thesis had simply stated 
that ‘The division of states into fascist and “democratic” states has now lost 
its former sense’, the Secretariat now claimed these roles had been 
reversed.27 Despite this the Secretariat did not try to argue that there had 
been any change in the internal character of fascist and bourgeois 
democratic regimes, indeed they claimed that there was more need than 
ever to fight against the development of fascism in Britain. However, they 
argued that the differences between the domestic policies of fascist and 
democratic states did not change the fact that their international roles had 
changed.28 The Secretariat argued that the Party’s failure to recognise these 
changed roles had led it to embrace a policy of national defencism, which 
was counter to the interests of the British working class and the 
international movement as a whole.29 
 
The secretariat also reiterated Dutt and Rust’s arguments from 
September that the War on Two Front’s line had hindered the work of the 
Party and its lack of opposition to Chamberlain was paving the way for 
fascism in Britain.30 They argued that, contrary to the beliefs of the Central 
Committee in September, British workers were actually opposed to the war 
and would become more so if they were given a clear lead from the Party.31 
Far from just benefitting the British Party however, the Secretariat also 
argued that taking a line of opposition to the war would also benefit 
revolutionary forces in the rest of the world and particularly in Germany. 
Perceiving growing revolutionary impetus amongst the German working 
class, despite the Nazi dictatorship, the secretariat argued supporting the 
war would discourage German workers from revolution. Continuing the 
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war, they argued, would leave the German people ‘feeling that they are 
fighting for their lives and existence as a nation’ pushing them to support 
both the German war effort and the Nazi government.32 Beyond just 
damaging the revolutionary movement in Germany the secretariat 
perceived the Party’s old line of supporting the war as anti-Soviet. Support 
for a war waged by British imperialism, Dutt explained, inevitably led to 
anti-Sovietism because the aims of British imperialism were anti-Soviet.33  
 
The secretariat presented its alternative to the War on Two Fronts 
line to the Central Committee in the form of a resolution almost identical to 
the Comintern’s Short Thesis which was to be voted on by the Party and a 
draft manifesto which was left open to alteration. The Party, they argued, 
had to expose the Imperialist character of the war and work to end the war. 
The secretariat, breaking from the view expressed by Springhall after his 
return to Britain, made it clear that operating against the war did not mean 
working for a Germany military victory. Dutt pointed out that it was the 
Party’s duty in imperialist war to oppose British imperialism and its 
imperialist aims but this did not mean favouring a German victory. ‘It is not 
that we are in favour of Hitler winning anything whatever’ Dutt argued, 
‘But if for that reason we start supporting the imperialist war of 
Chamberlain, then in practice we are supporting imperialism.’34 Dutt and 
Rust both argued against the Party adopting any revolutionary defeatist 
slogans but rather suggested that the Party’s main aim should be to 
promote the peace proposals of the Soviet Union.35 Believing that German 
aggression had already been destroyed by the actions of the Soviet Union 
the Secretariat argued that the Party should support any peace offer which 
came as a result of the Nazi-Soviet peace proposals.36 The Party, they 
argued should work to create a mass movement to force the Chamberlain 
government to agree to a peace conference involving the Soviet Union 
(which would prevent Chamberlain attempting to reach an anti-Soviet 
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agreement with Hitler) or to replace it with a government which would. 
Support for this mass movement was to be generated by a political 
campaign which would show the British people that the war was being 
waged for unsupportable, imperialist aims and that it was counter to their 
immediate interests.37 Fighting for a mass movement for peace on these 
grounds, the secretariat claimed, would allow the Party to better defend the 
workers interests in Britain and would allow intensification of the struggle 
against the Chamberlain government.38 In addition to this, they argued, 
achieving such a movement would encourage revolutionary activity in 
Germany. Dutt explained that whilst supporting the war would push the 
German workers to support Hitler, seeing British workers fighting their 
government and forcing it to accept peace it would convince Germans to 
strengthen their fight against Hitler.39 
 
Of the nineteen Central Committee members who voted on the 
adoption of the new line only Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher cast their 
votes in opposition. For Pollitt and Campbell the basis of their opposition 
was simple, they refused to accept the idea that there was no longer any 
difference in the international roles played by fascist and bourgeois 
democratic states. Campbell told the Central Committee, ‘I cannot accept 
this thesis that the difference between fascism and democracy has lost its 
former significance.’40 He argued instead that there was no evidence that 
Germany had abandoned its aggressive aims; he reasoned that Hitler had 
only signed the Nazi-Soviet pact in order to avoid exposing Germany to a 
war on two fronts against both Britain and France, and the Soviet Union at 
once.41 Where the Secretariat  saw Germany as having had its aggressive 
ambitions curtailed by the strength of the Soviet Union, Campbell argued 
that the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the war in Poland had worked to strengthen 
Germany. He told the assembled leaders, 
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‘The fundamental fact that we must face with regard to these 
proposals is that the Nazi Power has come out of the war in the East 
aggrandised. It has a larger army than the army of France and 
Britain combined. It has probably at the present stage a larger air 
force than the air force of France and Britain combined. Its major 
aims as an imperialist power are unchanged. It is going along with 
these major aims. If it can achieve them by peace, it will achieve them 
by peace. If it can achieve them by purchasing breathing space, which 
gives it the opportunity for a new lightning strike without the risk of 
a major war, it will seize that opportunity.’42 
 
Campbell saw Britain and France as being firmly on the defensive. He still 
did not challenge the notion that Chamberlain and Daladier were fighting in 
defence of their own imperialist interests but argued that by doing so they 
were ‘hindering objectively the spread of the fascist system in Europe.’43 In 
this situation he argued, the Party had two possibilities before it; it could 
either fight to check fascism for a time under Chamberlain whilst working 
for a new government to cement relations with the Soviet Union or it would 
face the possibility of a German victory. Communists, he argued, must 
remain ‘the deadly enemies of fascism, resolved not to allow fascism to 
conquer another foot of territory’.44 Despite taking this stance Campbell was 
not opposed to the notion of working for a negotiated peace. His main 
concern was to ensure that any negotiated peace included guarantees 
against further Nazi aggression in West, similar to those given to the Soviet 
Union in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He argued ‘the situation itself is no 
guarantee that fascist aggression has been checked… [it] is no guarantee 
that fascism is now going round hand-in-hand under the tutelage of the 
Soviet Union, and will now henceforth for ever more engage in no new acts 
of aggression.’45 Campbell instead put forward the idea that the Party 
continue to pursue a War on Two Fronts, maintaining its support for the 
war against Hitler and against Chamberlain until more concrete peace 
terms emerged whilst making it known that the Party would be for a 
settlement which gave guarantees against fascist aggression in the West.46  
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Pollitt, like Campbell, rejected the idea that Germany had been 
weakened by events in Poland.47 He argued that the failure of the peace 
front made ‘not the slightest difference’ to the fundamental characterisation 
of fascism as aggressive.48 For him Germany had ‘provoked and organised 
and instigated the war… [and was] incontestably the aggressor’, in his mind 
the war remained an imperialist war ‘with a very important distinction, that 
we were fighting German fascism.’49 He called on the Central Committee 
not to base their analysis of the situation on the current state of relations 
between Germany and the USSR and noted his fear of a situation in which 
the war continued and was lost because the Party abandoned its support of 
it.50 Pollitt, much like Campbell, proposed that the Party continue its 
support of the war whilst working to replace the Chamberlain government 
with a new government that would be open to peace proposals but ‘that will 
have the guarantee that if they cannot get the best terms which represent 
victory for the democratic countries, they will fight and they will win the 
war.’51 Both Pollitt and Campbell believed that accepting a peace which did 
not included some form of guarantee against further fascist aggression was 
to invite the defeat of Britain. Campbell in particular argued that accepting 
peace without guarantees would only invite further German aggression 
whilst simultaneously demoralising the people of Britain and France.52  
Pollitt’s definition of an acceptable peace however, went further than 
Campbell’s. Whereas Campbell simply called for guarantees against further 
fascist aggression in the West and a plebiscite for Poland, Pollitt made clear 
that he would accept nothing less than a peace which ‘cuts Hitler’s claws, 
that gives Mussolini not a single inch of territory other than what he is in 
possession of at the present time, and affords the basis for the settlement of 
disputes from some reorganised League of Nations or other’; if peace left 
Hitler in control of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig and the Nazi occupied 
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areas of Poland, it would be an unsupportable victory for fascist 
aggression.53 Such conditions were vigorously opposed by the Secretariat, 
who argued that to place firm conditions on the peace terms that the Party 
would accept only gave Chamberlain and other British imperialists an 
excuse to carry on the war.’54 
 
Gallacher’s opposition to the line of the secretariat was more similar 
to Campbell’s than Pollitt’s.  Gallacher accepted the idea that Germany was 
working from a position of weakness, at least in Eastern Europe, but he 
argued that, whilst German aggression had been halted in the East by the 
Soviet Union, this did not mean it had been halted in the West.55 Thus he 
argued, peace terms between Britain and Germany would have to act as a 
guarantee to ensure no further German advances in the West and, as a 
result, any peace proposals put forward by Hitler must be seen by the Party 
before it gave them its support.56 At the same time however, Gallacher said 
he was prepared, whilst making these criticisms, to give the new line some 
support. 57 Indeed the majority of his opposition to the new Imperialist War 
line seemed to be based on personal grievances with the manner in which 
the Secretariat treated other members of the Politburo and practical issues 
with the measures (such as the rejection of political co-operation with the 
entire Labour Party leadership and the reluctance to endorse any specific 
alternative government to the Chamberlain government) suggested by the 
Secretariat in their draft manifesto.58 
 
Pollitt and Campbell also vigorously opposed the new line on the 
grounds that it would do nothing to help the advance of Socialism either at 
home or abroad. On the home front Pollitt, and Campbell argued that the 
only opportunity for the Party to maintain and advance its position amongst 
                                                 
53 King and Matthews, About turn, p. 205. And, p. 209. 
54 King and Matthews, About turn, p. 145. 
55 Gallacher said very little on this matter in his speech at the October meeting, however his views in this 
regard were revealed in a speech he gave in Glasgow the day before the meeting began, which was 
described in ‘M.P. Wants Moves to End War’, Daily Worker, October 2nd, WCML 
56 King and Matthews, About turn, p. 119. And, p. 92. 
57 King and Matthews, About turn, p. 96. 
58 King and Matthews, About turn, pp. 92-101. 
60/140 
 
the British workers was to maintain a line of resistance to German fascism. 
They argued that the British workers still supported the war and resistance 
to German fascism. The Party had got the majority of its support for the last 
four years on the basis of appealing to the workers’ opposition to fascism, 
opposing the war a would only separate the party from its allies in the 
Labour movement.59  Campbell argued that to the average worker the 
Secretariat’s line of accepting peace proposals regardless of their content 
would appear to the average worker to be an abandonment of the fight 
against fascism.60 Furthermore, Pollitt argued that trying to mobilise the 
Party for this line would leave a bad taste in the mouths of the Party 
membership.61 Campbell suggested that the Party’s activists in the 
workshops would be undermined by the sudden shift from an anti-fascist to 
an anti-war line.62 Both argued that the Party would achieve neither peace 
nor socialist advance in Britain if it was indifferent to the menace of 
German fascism. Campbell suggested that if the war did create discontent 
amongst the workers which could be used for socialist advance, then their 
discontent would be aimed against all those who had aided fascism in the 
past rather than the war itself. Thus the Party if it abandoned its anti-
fascist line would not be able to capitalise on any discontent which might 
arise amongst the workers.63 Campbell argued that there was little chance 
that the Party’s new line would be adopted by the workers. There was no 
likelihood, he claimed that anyone in Britain would accept peace without, at 
the very least, guarantees against further fascist aggression.64 The Party 
would get no support for its line of peace unless it called for a peace which 
would halt German fascist aggression.65 
 
The remaining members of Central Committee, unlike in September, 
now rejected Pollitt and Campbell’s position and sided with the secretariat 
supporting its espousal of the Comintern’s analysis of the changed 
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international roles of fascism and bourgeois democracy and their line of 
support for the Soviet Union’s peace proposals. None of the leaders accepted 
the Secretariat’s radical reinterpretation of the roles of British and French 
imperialism and German fascism however. Whilst they agreed that the 
action of the Soviet Union had halted fascist aggression in the East, the 
majority of Central Committee members who spoke in October rejected the 
Secretariat’s claim that German fascism was so weak that it was on the 
verge of revolution and no longer posed any threat in the West. Ted 
Bramley, Emile Burns and James Shields for example, all argued that it 
would be wrong for the Party to suggest that the Germany was on the verge 
of revolution. Shields in particular, argued that the Party had to be careful 
of putting forward any such argument, which he felt ‘may do very great 
harm to the movement.’66 John Gollan found himself completely unable to 
come to terms with Dutt’s analysis of Germany, arguing that the issue of 
fascist aggression in the West has not been cleared up.67 In this Gollan was 
supported by Ted Bramley and Marian Jessop. Bramley told the Central 
Committee that despite its calls for peace, Germany remained a menace 
whilst Jessop noted that Hitler remained the main enemy of the British 
people.68 George Crane too stressed that the Party should not assume that 
Britain had the strength to defeat Germany, arguing that the attempts of 
some amongst the British bourgeois (such as Churchill) to promote further 
talks with the Soviet Union was evidence that at least some amongst 
Britain’s ruling classes still felt the need for additional forces.69   
 
Despite this the Party’s leaders did agree that Britain, France, and 
Germany were all equally responsible for the war and that there was no 
longer any discernible difference between the foreign policies of the 
belligerents, citing the Comintern’s argument that Britain and France’s 
failure to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with Soviet Union in 1939 
represented a deliberate attempt to foment war and a more aggressive 
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foreign policy meaning they could no longer be seen as non-aggressive 
powers. As evidence of this the Leadership reiterated the same arguments 
they had used in September to explain British and German responsibility 
for the war. In their speeches leaders continued to argue that Germany was 
the direct aggressor, but as John Gollan pointed out, Britain and France 
shared responsibility because they had armed Germany, encouraged its 
aggressive actions with the aim of embroiling it in a war against the Soviet 
Union and refused a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR which could 
have restrained Germany and prevented war.70 Whereas in September the 
Party’s leaders had argued that the uniquely aggressive character of fascism 
meant that Britain’s culpability for the war could not be compared with 
Germany’s the Central Committee now did just that, arguing, in the words 
of Finlay Hart, that ‘whether one is the accessory… or the aggressor, there 
is very little difference between the two states’.71 Nevertheless, the Party’s 
leaders rejected the Secretariat’s insinuation that Britain had become the 
driving force of the war. As Emile Burns argued, the differentiation between 
the international roles of fascism and bourgeois democracy had now ‘lost its 
former sense in relation to the present international situation, inasmuch as 
both groups are now engaged in a war for their imperialist aims’, but he 
argued that from this, the Party could only conclude that Britain and 
Germany were equally responsible for the war, chastising the Secretariat for 
trying to draw a distinction between them in this regard.72 John Gollan 
supported Burns, arguing that ‘both sides bear equal responsibility. That is 
so say, Germany, as well as France and Britain are out for European and 
world domination.’73 Both Burns and Gollan argued that to suggest that 
Britain was more responsible for the war, as the Secretariat had, was not in 
line with the Comintern’s analysis of the international situation.74 
 
Given that the Party leadership used exactly the same evidence to 
reach entirely different conclusions in September and October it is difficult 
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to see the Central Committee’s reinterpretation of the roles of fascist and 
bourgeois democratic states and responsibility for the war as anything but a 
reaction to the clarification of the Comintern and the Soviet Union’s 
analyses of the international situation. As Monty Johnstone and Neil 
Redfern have argued there is little evidence that this dramatic reappraisal 
was provoked by rank and file criticism of the Party line.75 There had of 
course been some opposition to the War on Two Fronts line amongst the 
Party membership since its introduction and questioning of the line 
certainly increased after the Soviet Union made its support for a negotiated 
peace public.76  Despite this however very few Party leaders mentioned this 
disquiet amongst the membership, let alone argued that it had had any 
significant effect on their interpretation of the war.77 Indeed there were just 
as many leaders who argued that the Party’s members would need to be 
carefully convinced to accept the new interpretation.78 Some leaders even 
made it explicitly clear that their acceptance of the idea that fascist and 
bourgeois democratic states were now playing an equally aggressive role in 
international affairs was based largely on the fact that the Comintern and 
the Soviet Union had adopted it. Maurice Cornforth for example, explained 
that he only began to question the Party’s interpretation of the war after 
Springhall explained the Comintern line, stating ‘the fact that from the 
International comes a line so contradictory to what we had been saying 
inevitably shakes one up in the sense of reevaluating [sic] everything which 
one has been saying and thinking.’79 Ted Bramley on the other hand, 
pointed out that, even after the Comintern’s line had been explained by 
Springhall, he was unable to understand the logic of its characterisation of 
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fascism and democracy. It was only after analysing various statements of 
Soviet policy, in particular Marshall Zhdanov’s claim that Britain and 
France failed to accept the peace front because they wanted to accelerate 
Nazi aggression against Poland into order to provoke a conflict which would 
draw the Soviet Union into a war with the Germany, that he came to accept 
that there was a new international situation.80  
 
A similar mind-set was displayed by Party leaders who argued in 
support of the Comintern’s analysis of the war because it seemed to provide 
a better explanation of soviet policy. Since the outbreak of war the Party 
leadership had made a number of false predictions regarding Soviet Policy. 
The August 23rd edition of the Daily Worker for example, confidently 
predicted that the Nazi-Soviet pact would include a saving clause which 
would release the Soviet Union from the pact if Germany attacked a third 
party.81 Similarly on September 16th, the day before Red Army crossed the 
Polish border, the Party condemned speculation about potential Soviet 
intervention in Poland.82 William Cowe and Ted Bramley, along with other 
Party leaders at the October meeting, argued that the Party’s failure to 
acknowledge the changes in the roles of the fascist and bourgeois democratic 
states explained why it made such mistakes in its interpretation of Soviet 
policy.83 James Roche took this one step further, arguing that unless the 
Central Committee aligned its policy absolutely with that of the Soviet 
Union then it would inevitably end up taking an anti-Soviet line. If the 
Party stuck to the War on Two Fronts line it would continue to misinterpret 
and misrepresent the Soviet Union’s actions to the workers in a way that 
would arouse their hostility.84 
 
The Party’s decision to reject its own rationalisation of the character 
of war in deference to the attitudes of the Comintern and the Soviet Union 
is far from surprising.  As James Jupp has pointed out, the Party’s 
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understanding of Marxism in the 1930s was relatively unsophisticated, 
lacking knowledge of key theoretical texts and concepts. Even the Party’s 
understanding of Leninist theory, upon which it claimed to be founded, was 
incomplete. The CPGB’s lack of ideological development left it in no position 
to challenge the ideological knowledge of the Soviet Union which was able to 
exert a largely unchallenged ideological hegemony over most British 
Marxists, the Communist Party included. To the Leaders of the CPGB 
Marxism was what the Communist Party of the Soviet Union claimed it 
was.85 The Comintern too played a similar role for the Party. This was made 
clear by William Cowe’s speech to the Central Committee in which he 
explained how he had always considered the Comintern ‘an unrivalled 
political authority and guide’ and had often been willing to ‘blindly submit 
to its decisions.’86 When the Party reviewed its change in line some forty five 
years later Ted Bramley revealed the importance that such faith in the 
intellectual superiority of the Comintern and USSR had for him personally. 
Bramley explained that he was convinced that the Comintern and the Soviet 
Union would not have turned away from their interpretation of fascism as 
the main enemy of the workers without unassailable evidence.87 As 
Campbell was later to note, the Central Committee was under immense 
pressure to convince themselves of the correctness of the political lines of 
the Comintern and the Soviet Union.88 However, it is important to note that 
the CPGB’s leadership would have had good reason to suspect that the line 
now espoused by the Comintern was correct. As noted in chapter one the 
Central Committee had long been convinced that the National 
Government’s foreign policy was aiding fascism for anti-Soviet objectives 
and, as pointed out in Chapter two, these fears were reiterated by a number 
of Party leaders in September as a reason to focus more of the Party’s 
propaganda on the fight against Chamberlain. At the October meeting a 
number of Central Committee members pointed to the Party’s mistrust of 
Chamberlain’s motives through the Popular Front period as a justification 
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for their acceptance of the Comintern’s analysis of the war. George Crane, 
for example, pointed to an article written by Campbell in June 1939 which 
claimed that the Chamberlain government was aligning itself with German 
fascism in opposition to the democratic forces of the world, concluding that, 
if this were the case, it was impossible to support the Party’s initial line on 
the war as it would therefore be impossible to defend democracy by 
supporting Chamberlain.89  Thus it would seem that, as John Callaghan has 
suggested, the Central Committee’s support of the Comintern’s 
interpretation of the war has to be viewed alongside this mistrust of the 
British government.90 
 
Having agreed that Germany, France and Britain were all equally 
responsible for the war the Central Committee now accepted that the war 
was therefore a purely imperialist war. As a result they argued that any 
attempt to support the war would mean supporting the British government 
and aiding it in the achievement of its imperialist aims. As Idris Cox 
argued, ‘Our old line was for fighting on two fronts, this would now mean 
supporting the aims of British imperialism and is therefore incorrect.’91  The 
Party leaders agreed that in such a situation it was the duty of the Party to 
oppose the war and work for the overthrow of British Government. The 
Central Committee now argued that the CPGB, along with all the other 
parties of the Communist International, now had to adopt the position 
advocated by Lenin in 1914 and oppose their own governments.92 Just like 
the Secretariat however, the other Party leaders did not now embrace the 
programme of revolutionary defeatism which had been advocated by Lenin 
but rather argued that the Party should oppose the war by supporting a 
negotiated peace. As John Gollan pointed out, the Party could not support a 
war for the final military defeat of Germany as the imperialists did; ‘This is 
clear to the Central Committee. Any peace proposals advanced must receive 
our consideration, we must advance to the workers that they must consider 
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all proposals advanced.’93 The other leaders now criticised Campbell, 
Gallacher and Pollitt for failing to recognise this in their statements. 
Cornforth criticised the approach taken by Campbell, Gallacher and Pollitt 
by claiming that they were trying to take a middle course, adopting peace in 
theory whilst continuing to support the core of the War on Two Fronts line, 
the military defence of Britain. Cornforth argued that it was impossible to 
make a distinction between those who supported the war to resist German 
fascism and those who supported the war for imperialist aims; supporting 
the war, regardless of the reason, would in practice mean supporting the 
government and its aims.94 Finlay Hart too criticised Campbell’s arguments 
as attempt to cover up a line which meant supporting British imperialism.95  
 
The belief that aiding the war would lead to support of the aims of 
British imperialism led the Central Committee to abandon their previous 
belief that supporting the war might be in line with the interests of the 
international movement and the Soviet Union. Some members of the 
Central Committee seem to have shared the secretariats concern that 
providing support for the British government in its imperialist aims might 
damage the build-up of revolutionary forces in Germany. A number of the 
CPGB’s leaders including Idris Cox and James Shields now argued that 
opposing the Chamberlain Government was the best way for the CPGB to 
aid its German Comrades. 96 This was not a new idea for the Party; even in 
its September manifesto the Central Committee had argued that the defeat 
of the Chamberlain government, and its imperialist and pro-fascist aims, 
would be a signal for the German workers to strengthen their fight against 
Hitler.97 Far more importantly however, the Party’s leaders were concerned 
not to give any support to the anti-Soviet aims of the British government. 
Maurice Cornforth was particularly vocal on this issue. Britain’s foreign 
policy, he reminded the assembled leaders, was unchanged since the 1938 
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Munich crisis, during which Britain had aimed not only to appease the 
fascist powers but also to direct them against the Soviet Union.98 He now 
argued, as the secretariat had, that  
 
‘British imperialism, still with its reactionary motives of domination 
and attack upon the Soviet Union, is trying now to fight against 
German fascism with the object of weakening them and of conniving 
to impose upon the German people, of having that British domination 
of Europe which they have so long worked for, which will 
fundamentally be able to turn the war against the Soviet Union.’99 
 
Therefore, Cornforth stated, it was obvious that the Party could not support 
any war, which British imperialism was waging for these anti-Soviet 
objectives.100 The majority of the other leaders gave their support to these 
ideas. Indeed some leaders, in particular Idris Cox, James Roche and 
William Whittaker, now believed that the Soviet Union’s weakening of 
Germany (as demonstrated by the Nazi-Soviet pact and peace proposals) 
meant that British and French imperialism now posed the greatest threat to 
the USSR and were convinced that supporting the war would aid them in 
their anti-Soviet objectives and increase the threat to the Soviet Union.101 
Only John Gollan provided any direct opposition to this claim. He argued 
that there were two tendencies at work in the government with some 
pursuing a more anti-Soviet line than others. He pointed out that some in 
the government and the press, in particular Churchill, had viewed the 
Soviet Union’s actions in Eastern Europe positively and had even pushed for 
some further negotiations with the USSR. Nevertheless, Gollan agreed that 
the fundamental line of the British bourgeoisie was to try to create an anti-
Soviet combination.102  
 
It was not just consideration of the potential ramifications for 
supporting an imperialist war that led the Central Committee to support an 
immediate peace however; some Party leaders argued that the Party should 
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support peace simply because the Soviet Union opposed the continuation of 
the war. The contributions of Cornforth, Bramley and Kerrigan are all 
notable in this regard. Cornforth rejected Campbell, Pollitt and Gallacher’s 
statements on the grounds that they advocated continuing to support the 
war ‘despite the very firm warning which has been given by the Soviet 
Government and the Communist Party’.103 In view of the Soviet 
Government’s calls for peace, he suggested, the Party now had to come out 
‘very, very strongly in favour of peace.’104 Ted Bramley likewise argued that 
the most important factor preventing support of the Chamberlain 
government and the British war effort was that the Soviet Union was 
against the continuation of the war.105 Neither Cornforth nor Bramley gave 
any particular theoretical or practical explanations for these statements of 
support for the Soviet Union’s policy; rather they were seemingly based on 
the commitment made by the Party at the Seventh Congress to always 
defend the foreign policy choices of the Soviet Union.106 Cornforth’s speech 
made this clear stating that the Soviet Union ‘can do no wrong, and is doing 
no wrong… these are the reasons why personally I commenced to turn 
political somersaults.’107 Peter Kerrigan gave an equally demonstrative 
example of this kind of thinking when he told the Central Committee, ‘I 
have always justified the Soviet Union in every action that the Soviet Union 
has taken… That is why I cannot accept Johnny’s [Campbell’s] points on 
peace… That is why I believe it is absolutely necessary for us to say that the 
peace proposals must be considered… anything that the Soviet Union is 
involved in means that we must give it support.’108  
 
At this point it would seem as if the CPGB’s Central Committee 
accepted the new analysis of the war and the new line presented by the 
Secretariat purely based on the authority of the Comintern and the Soviet 
Union and considerations of the interests of these two bodies. Certainly 
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Kevin Morgan and Neil Redfern were correct when they argued that the 
impetus for the Party’s change in line came from the intervention of the 
Comintern and changes in Soviet policy but to suggest  however, that 
policies of the Comintern and the Soviet Union were the only factors which 
the CPGB considered, a stance oft adopted in older histories of the Party 
such as those provided by Hugo Dewar and Henry Pelling and still present 
in more recent works such as those of James Eaden and David Renton, and 
Keith Laybourn and Dylan Murphy, would be, as Andrew Thorpe has 
suggested, a mistake.109 Whilst the acceptance of the Comintern line led to a 
revolution in the Party’s understanding of the interests of the international 
movement it did not lead to a similar complete reassessment of the Party’s 
own objectives. Indeed, whilst justifying their adoption of the new line, the 
Central Committee argued not only that it was the best way to advance the 
interests of the international movement and the USSR but also that it could 
achieve those objectives identified as most important for their own Party in 
September, the advance of the working class in Britain and the defence of 
British democracy, even if the new interpretation of the character of the war 
led to some changes in the Party leadership’s tactical approaches to these 
objectives. 
 
Notwithstanding their adoption of the changed interpretation of the 
international roles of fascism and bourgeois democracy the Central 
Committee remained convinced of the need to defend the British people 
from German fascism.  As noted earlier, other than the Secretariat, the 
Party’s leadership remained unconvinced that Germany no longer posed a 
threat to Britain. In addition to this, the Central Committee and 
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particularly Maurice Cornforth, John Gollan and Peter Kerrigan, pointed 
out that, whilst Britain and France’s attempts to foment war by refusing the 
Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact meant there was no difference between the foreign 
policies of bourgeois democratic states and fascist states there was still a 
difference between them in terms of the democratic liberties their internal 
policies afforded to the working class.110 As Ted Bramley pointed  ‘I cannot 
see this [changed situation] as absolutely altering our position of being for 
the defence of democracy in Britain and France and the other countries and 
continuing to stand against everything that fascism stands for.’111 These two 
factors had led the Central Committee to argue in September that the war 
should be supported to defend the British people from the loss of their 
democratic rights and despite its changed stance on supporting the war the 
Party’s leaders retained this desire to defend British democratic rights in 
October too. Ted Bramley for example, argued that, whilst the Party could 
no longer support the continuation of the war, it could not overlook the 
British people’s desire for security.112 Marian Jessop pointed out that the 
British people ‘want the sort of peace which means that fascism can no 
longer be the aggressor, can no longer imperil them, can no longer open the 
situation where they feel they are going to be called upon to face the war in 
a worsened situation.’113 In September the majority of the Party leadership 
who spoke in favour of the War on Two Fronts line saw supporting the war 
as the only way defending British democratic liberties against German 
aggression. It was the belief of a number of the Central Committee, in 
particular Pollitt, Hart and Horner, that there was no possibility of getting 
an acceptable peace with Hitler and that the war would have to be seen 
through to either a British or German defeat.114 Campbell especially had 
argued that the Party should not envision seeking peace before the advance 
of German fascism had been halted.115 Only Emile Burns foresaw and 
supported the idea of a peace settlement negotiated and guaranteed by the 
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Soviet Union.116 Now that such a peace settlement had been publicly 
endorsed by Germany, and more importantly the Soviet Union, however, the 
Party saw an alternative way to defend British liberties.  
 
At the same time, the majority of the CPGB’s leaders remained 
convinced, in spite of the Nazi-Soviet peace proposals, that the Soviet Union 
was still hostile to German fascism. The Central Committee argued that 
whilst Soviet policy was intended to combat the imperialist aims of Britain 
and France it was still also directed against German fascism as well. James 
Shields was direct, he told the Central Committee, ‘I don’t believe that the 
Communist International or ourselves or the Soviet Union stands for Nazi 
aggression or for Nazi domination. I think on the contrary that the biggest 
blows given against the Nazi aggression [sic] have been given by the Soviet 
Union.’117 Marian Jessop and Ted Bramley shared his convictions. Jessop 
reminded the other leaders that the Soviet Union opposed the plans of all 
imperialist powers involved in the war. She pointed to the example of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact of non-aggression, which, she claimed, had struck a blow 
‘against Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe and a blow against the plans of 
British and French imperialism [to engineer a war between Germany and 
the Soviet Union]’.118 Bramley argued that this desire to check the 
imperialist aims of both Britain and France and Germany underlay the 
Soviet Union’s decision to support peace. He claimed, ‘If the Soviet Union is 
for peace now it must be because if peace can be secured, in their opinion it 
checks Nazi aggression, equally it checks British and French aspirations in 
Europe’.119  
 
The Party’s faith in the Soviet Union’s opposition to fascism was 
accompanied by a similar faith in the notion that the Soviet Union was now 
the dominant power in Europe. They believed that, since the signing of the 
Nazi-Soviet pact, every new development in Nazi-Soviet relations had 
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strengthened the Soviet Union and weakened Germany in relation. For 
most of the Party’s leaders this change in the balance of Soviet and German 
strength could be measured in terms of their respective military 
capabilities. Idris Cox in particular embraced this idea. Still unaware of the 
secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet pact, he argued that the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Poland had forced Germany to abandon its goal of dominating 
the whole of the country. This, he claimed, was not only evidence of the 
Soviet Union’s superior military capabilities but represented a significant 
blow to Hitler’s plans for European domination. ‘It is not a question of what 
Hitler got in Poland but what Hitler failed to get’, Cox argued, ‘the aims of 
German Fascism were clearly spelled out in Mein Kampf and the plan was 
to get the whole of Poland. These plans have been destroyed by the Soviet 
Union and Hitler has failed to achieve what he set out for.’120 Cox argued 
that, as a result of Soviet intervention in Poland, Germany no longer had 
the strength pose a threat to the Soviet Union, concluding that ‘As far as 
military strength is concerned the Soviet Union is the stronger power.’121 
Marian Jessop adopted a similar stance. She argued that the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact was evidence of the strength of the Soviet Union in relation to 
Germany and that by signing the pact Hitler had publicly recognised that 
‘he cannot play the game that British and French imperialism strengthened 
him to play. He recognises it would be a disaster for fascism to attack the 
Soviet Union.’122  The majority of the Central Committee continued to see 
Germany as an aggressive power but believed that the Soviet Union was 
immune to this aggression. In this sense Ted Bramley’s claim that ‘so far 
the Nazis have strengthened themselves at the expense of British and 
French imperialism, but the Soviet Union has strengthened itself 
immeasurably more at the expense of German imperialism and the British 
and French and Polish reactionary governments’, was representative of the 
views of the wider Central Committee.123  
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Others, such as Emile Burns and George Crane saw the Soviet 
Union’s dominance over Germany as stemming from its greater diplomatic 
power. Burns argued the Party had to view Germany’s territorial expansion 
in Poland alongside shifts in European politics, arguing that Germany had 
been succeeded by the Soviet Union as the dominant political power in 
Europe. In reference to Nazi-Soviet talks that resulted in the joint peace 
proposals, he pointed out that, whereas previously Germany had sent for 
diplomats from other countries and received them in Germany, now the 
reverse was the case. In Burns’ own words, ‘[now] the Soviet Union sends for 
Ribbentrop and he comes – this all expresses a very important weakening of 
the position of German fascism which I think is of far greater importance for 
the future than the expansion of territory.’124 A similar idea was put forward 
by Crane, who expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was far more 
skilled in diplomatic manoeuver than Britain, France or Germany.125  
 
Regardless of how they perceived the source of the Soviet Union’s 
strength however, the majority of the Central Committee were agreed; in a 
contest between the USSR and Germany, the Soviet Union was the stronger 
power. Pollitt and Campbell’s arguments that the Soviet Union had signed 
the Nazi-Soviet pact in order to defend its territory by securing necessary 
breathing space and that Germany had pursued the pact in order to avoid a 
war on two fronts could not stand up to the rest of the Central Committee’s 
faith in the USSR.126 William Whittaker spoke against Pollitt and 
Campbell’s contributions precisely on these grounds, criticising the two for 
trying the convince him to ‘weaken my confidence in the Soviet Union’.127 In 
his own mind Whittaker was clear, ‘the role of the Soviet Union is not 
merely one of narrow defence of its own people and not due to the weakness 
of the Soviet Union, but absolutely due to her strength.128 This faith in the 
Soviet Union led the Party’s leaders to believe that the Soviets had both the 
strength and the desire to ensure that any negotiated peace which came out 
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of the Nazi-Soviet peace proposals would include guarantees against the 
potential for further westward German expansion, which the Party found so 
worrying. In the Daily Worker the Party had previously decried offers of 
peace from Germany and fascist Italy as an attempt to split Britain and 
France.129 The involvement of the Soviet Union in peace proposals however, 
had led to a dramatic reassessment of Germany’s position. The Daily 
Worker of September 30th announced, 
 
‘So far as Eastern Europe is concerned the Soviet Union has taken 
care that the path of Fascism is now blocked. Whatever the Fascists 
want to do, they have to ask the permission from the Soviet 
Government.’  
 
The paper announced that the Soviet peace offers represented an attempt on 
the part of the USSR to help prevent the expansion of Germany in the 
west.130 Precisely these views were now expressed amongst the leaders at 
the October meeting. In his speech, Ted Bramley argued that the Soviet 
proposals ‘can help to stop Nazi aggression in the West as effectively as it 
has been stopped in the East’, with the increased strength of the Soviet 
Union acting as a guaranteeing factor.131 Marian Jessop, James Roche, John 
Gollan and Emile Burns too, all expressed their confidence that the Soviets 
would be able secure a peace that prevented German aggression and served 
the best interests of the working people of the world, including the British 
working class.132 Pollitt and Campbell had admonished such ideas as being 
based on an over-reliance on the Soviet Union but of those Central 
Committee members who were neither part of the Secretariat nor aligned 
with Pollitt and Campbell only Maurice Cornforth and Peter Kerrigan 
warned against relying on the Soviet Union to secure an acceptable peace in 
the West.133  
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The need to prevent fascism emerging in Britain had, since 1935, 
driven the CPGB to oppose not only the expansion of foreign fascist states 
but also the continued rule of the National Government. In October, just as 
in September and throughout the Popular Front period, the Party 
leadership was, in part, driven by the need to defend working conditions and 
democratic liberties from fascisisation. The Central Committee’s continued 
perception of fascism as a qualitatively worse form of class rule than 
bourgeois democracy led its members to argue that it was just as important 
as ever to protect the British working class from the imposition of fascism 
from within. This kind of thinking was particularly evident in Marian 
Jessop’s speech. There was, she argued, a ‘vital difference’ between the 
internal characters of the fascist and bourgeois democratic states; ‘we have 
to see that in this country fascism is not going to be imposed.’134 Peter 
Kerrigan too argued that it was one of the most important tasks of the Party 
‘to fight to defend our liberties in Great Britain’.135 Likewise, just as it had 
throughout the Popular Front period, the Central Committee continued to 
argue that the primary fascist threat in Britain stemmed from the National 
Government. As Idris Cox pointed out, ‘fascism is not likely to develop in 
Britain as it has on the continent. The main problem in this country is not a 
fascist party but the National government itself.’136  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in September some of the leadership 
had already drawn attention to attacks on the workers’ economic conditions 
and liberties, arguing for a strengthening of the Party’s line against 
Chamberlain to combat this, with Pollitt, Hart and Kerrigan in particular 
arguing for greater focus on this element of the National Government’s 
policy. At this time the Party leadership had thought the best way to move 
the workers to a position of opposition to the National government was to 
highlight to them the fact that the government was not prepared to win the 
war and to call for its replacement with a government that would effectively 
prosecute the war. In October the Party leadership remained committed to 
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defending the liberties and economic conditions of the workers. However, 
having accepted that the war was purely imperialist, it now abandoned the 
idea of fighting for a government which would continue the war for, as 
Maurice Cornforth and Emile Burns both pointed out, any government 
which advocated the continuation the war would also be advancing Britain’s 
imperialist aims and thus could not be supported.137 However, whilst fear of 
promoting British imperialism was an important factor in convincing the 
Party leadership to oppose the war, this was also accompanied by a fear of 
promoting British fascism. 
 
Between the September and October meetings the Daily Worker 
reported on a number of worrying restrictions on civil liberties such as 
amendments to Defence Regulations allowing for the detainment of 
individuals with views ‘prejudicial’ to the government, the Ministry of 
Information’s control of news and information for publication and the 
introduction of army units to armaments factories ‘ostensibly for the 
protection of the factories’.138 In addition the Party began to perceive an 
encroachment on British democratic liberties in the growth of 
unemployment, price rises and wage cuts which accompanied the outbreak 
of war. In the Daily Worker these occurrences were blamed on the 
government’s economic policies, portraying them, along with the new tax 
rates introduced by the war budget, as a deliberate attempt on the part of 
the national government to prepare Britain for ‘a total shift of industry to a 
“war economy” basis’; a policy which had been perceived by the Party as a 
clear indication of the development of fascism throughout the Popular Front 
period.139 
 
At the October meeting this perceived intensification of attacks on 
British democracy led a number of Party leaders to refocus on the domestic 
fascist threat posed by the National government (which had been secondary 
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to considerations of the threat posed by Nazi Germany in September) and 
argue that supporting the war would only lead to the further erosion of 
British democracy at the hands of the Chamberlain Government. Arguing 
that the Party could not support a war on two fronts forever, John Gollan 
told the Party leadership,  
 
‘The Central Committee has got to note a very big extension of the 
imperialist front in this war in one month of the war… you can go 
over every step which has been taken by the Government to prosecute 
the war and none of these acts are in any way a concession to the 
people. There has been no relating of democratic influence but on the 
contrary, the government has more fastened and extended the 
imperialist hold.’140 
 
Ted Bramley too argued that the Central Committee had to recognise the 
rapid development of fascisisation in Britain whilst stressing that the CPGB 
could not attempt to justify continuing the war for Czech and Austrian 
independence and the overthrow of German fascism whilst democratic 
rights in Britain were being ‘rapidly denied’.141 Finlay Hart too doubted the 
ability of the Party to act to save the German people from fascism by 
military means without aiding the establishment of fascism in Britain.142 
 
A minority of the leaders, none of whom had spoken in September, 
even began to overtly argue along the same line that Rust had taken in 
September, claiming that the War on Two Fronts line had damaged the 
Party’s ability to respond to these attacks on the working class. George 
Crane criticised the Party machinery for its lax response to what he 
described as ‘one of the greatest offensives that the employing class has ever 
carried out against the working class’.143 He accused the Party’s Metal 
bureau (which directed the Party’s work in the engineering industry and 
unions) of giving no guidance to Party activists who were left, as a result of 
the Party’s support of the war, ‘unsure of whether to push for higher wages 
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in engineering for fear of it being to the detriment of the war effort.’144 
William Whittaker also criticised the Party’s response to attacks on the 
workers arguing, like Crane, that under the War on Two Fronts line the 
Party had failed to give any lead to the workers to defend their working 
conditions.145 Crane and Whittaker along with James Roche all argued that 
the workers were actively opposed to the policy of sacrificing working 
conditions in the interests of increasing war production which some 
members of the Party had adopted under the War on Two Fronts line. Crane 
recalled how, at an Amalgamated Engineering Union meeting in 
Birmingham, a movement opposing wage increases for fear of damaging the 
war effort got no backers and the man who proposed it was shouted down by 
the crowd.146 Whittaker pointed out a similar attitude was prevalent 
amongst Cotton workers. He claimed that the trade union leadership in the 
cotton industry had supported the idea of making sacrifices for the war 
whilst the workers, even in badly organised factories, had staged walk outs 
and threatened to revolt against the leadership of the Amalgamated 
Weavers’ Association in opposition to such sacrifices.147 Roche gave a more 
personal account. He claimed that when promoting the Party’s line of 
defending Britain in the factories he had been met with hostility to the point 
where he felt like he ‘could not really argue with the workers’ along that 
line.148   
 
Very few leaders were so openly critical of the War on Two Fronts line 
but the increased offensive at home led the majority of the Party’s leaders to 
re-evaluate their stance on the Working class’ opinion of the war. They now 
argued that, whilst the workers had initially supported the war, the 
conditions being imposed on them in the name of the war effort were 
creating an attitude of apathy, if not outright opposition towards the war. 
Maurice Cornforth for example, argued that originally there was strong 
support for the war and the people were ‘willing to undertake anything, to 
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stick anything to beat German fascism’. For Cornforth however, the attacks 
on working conditions and democratic rights in Britain had made it ‘clear to 
the workers that the war was not really against German fascism’ and that 
realisation dampened popular support for the war to the point where the 
British public were fed up with it.149 Marian Jessop made a similar claim, 
noting that the lack of conflict on the Western front in contrast with the 
attacks on the working class in Britain had lead the workers to reconsider 
the war. She argued that ‘The workers are beginning to consider where it is 
all going to end, if in one month of the war they have lost so many 
advantages’, claiming to have heard some expressing support for peace.150  
Few were prepared to argue that there was already mass opposition to the 
war amongst the British people, indeed only Crane made such a claim.151 
However, the majority of the leadership now accepted the Secretariat’s 
position that by campaigning on the issues of immediate relevance to the 
workers (e.g. wages, working conditions, unemployment, etc.) the Party 
would be able to win them over to opposing the war. As James Shields 
pointed out, the imperialist character of the war had to be linked to the 
social and economic problems faced by the workers; ‘The two go hand-in-
hand, it is not a case of separating these but a case of these being 
interconnected, and using this offensive which is taking place against the 
working class movement in this country in order to show the type of people 
that are conducting the war and what their aims actually are.’152 Finlay 
Hart, Maurice Cornforth, William Whittaker and Idris Cox all gave their 
support to this, stressing that it was by showing how the war contributed to 
the immediate concerns of the workers that the Party would gather support 
for its line of peace.153 Although, as Sonya Rose has pointed out, the 
majority of the British working class were generally supportive of the war in 
its early stages, the CPGB’s leaders’ identification of potential anti-war 
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feeling was not entirely wishful thinking.154 Some members of the Central 
Committee were able to give practical evidence of this. Idris Cox for 
example, pointed to a number of successful meetings held by the Party in 
South Wales after September 30th on the basis of the new line.155 Cornforth 
too noted that a speech at a meeting in Letchworth on September 30th in 
support of the Soviet peace proposals garnered ‘a very big response and very 
little opposition from quite a large meeting.’156 These were not simply 
isolated examples either. As Eaden and Renton have pointed out, the 
continued growth of the CPGB immediately after its change in line – whilst 
admittedly exaggerated by the Party itself – can be seen, when viewed 
alongside growth in other anti-war organisations, as evidence that there 
was an appreciable amount of anti-war feeling for the Party to draw upon.157 
Indeed it was precisely at the time the Party was changing its line that this 
anti-war, or at least pro-peace, feeling was becoming particularly noticeable 
especially amongst the Labour movement. As T.D. Burridge notes, whilst 
the Labour Party leadership remained entirely opposed to a negotiated 
peace, the dissolution of Poland and Nazi-Soviet peace proposals led, in 
particular the Labour left but also a large section of the wider British 
public, to question the continuation of the war.158 Burridge’s arguments are 
supported by  data gathered by the British Institute of public opinion in 
October 1939 which found the British public to be split, with 48% of people 
asked accepting of the idea of a negotiated peace (although admittedly 
negotiated by Roosevelt not Stalin), 41% opposed and the rest undecided.159 
The extent of opposition to the war should not be overstated however; the 
same survey of public opinion found that in November 1939 54.9% of the 
public were satisfied with the Chamberlain government’s conduct of the war 
with only 9.9% calling for an immediate end to the war.160 Despite this, it 
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would seem that there were at least some credible grounds for the Party 
believing that its new line of the war might gain some degree of support. 
 
It seems reasonable to argue from all this that the Central 
Committee’s adoption of the Imperialist War line reflects a degree of 
continuity with the interests they espoused at the September meeting. 
There can be little doubt that majority of the Central Committee adopted 
the Comintern’s stance on the character of the war based largely on the 
authority of the Soviet Union and the Comintern itself, even if this was 
reinforced by suspicions regarding the motives of the National government 
which the Party had harboured throughout the 1930s. However, the 
leadership’s adoption of the fight for peace was to a large extent motivated 
by the same factors which motivated the Party’s support of the War on Two 
Fronts line in September, namely the desire to pursue a policy in line with 
that of the international communist movement, the desire to remove the 
National Government and the desire to defend British democratic rights 
from the menace of German fascism. The Party leaders’ new understanding 
of the war as purely imperialist led to a complete reassessment of the needs 
of the both the Soviet Union and the wider international movement, 
replacing any hopes that leaders had harboured in September of using the 
war to liberate Europe from fascism, with fears of aiding the counter-
revolutionary and, more importantly, anti-Soviet plans of British capitalism, 
convincing them of the need for peace. On the home front, evidence of rising 
discontent amongst the workers, as a result of worsening working conditions 
– in contrast to Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher –  convinced the majority of 
the Central Committee that the new line would not only find the ear of the 
British working class but may even act to better defend their interests 
against the domestic fascist threat.  
 
In each of these views the wider Central Committee found itself 
largely in agreement with the secretariat, however, it was not the case that 
the Central Committee simply swallowed everything that Dutt, Rust and 
Springhall told them. Indeed the wider Central Committee’s understanding 
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of the war remained remarkably independent to that of the Secretariat and 
the justifications that the majority of the Central Committee made for their 
support of the Comintern’s line reflects both this separate analysis and the 
importance which those leaders had placed on the defence of British 
democratic rights in September. Where the Secretariat argued for an 
immediate peace claiming that the Soviet Union had weakened Germany to 
the point where German aggression was no longer a threat to Britain the 
majority of the Central Committee continued to see Germany as a threat. 
Unlike Pollitt, Campbell and Gallacher however, they were largely happy to 
believe that the involvement of the Soviet Union in any potential peace 
conference would guarantee safeguards against fascist expansion in the 
West. The Central Committee was convinced that a Soviet backed peace 
would serve the best interests of the Party and the British working class. 
The majority, it seems, saw the fight for peace in the same way as Finlay 
Hart who claimed that the fight for peace was of an ‘all-embracing 
character’, giving the Party the opportunity to both prevent further fascist 
expansion in the West and to challenge the governance of  the Chamberlain 
government.161 Ultimately, despite these differences of opinion, the Central 
Committee voted in favour of the secretariat’s resolution as all of issues on 
which they disagreed were contained in either the secretariat’s speeches or 
its draft manifesto, which Dutt claimed were open to discussion and 
revision, rather than the resolution itself.162 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis finds no reason to challenge the established notion that 
the Communist Party of Great Britain’s stance towards the war and the 
British war effort in 1939 was initially influenced primarily by the anti-
fascist line adopted by the Party since 1935 and was later changed primarily 
as a result of the intervention of the Comintern. At the same time however, 
it finds room for elaboration on these points.  
 
Chapter two shows that, primarily, the Party Leadership’s acceptance 
of and support for the War on Two Fronts line rested on their adoption of 
the Seventh Congress’ differentiation between fascism and other types of 
capitalist rule and between the states that adopted these systems. The 
Party’s acceptance of the Comintern’s portrayal of fascist states as 
inherently expansionist and anti-Soviet compared with the at least 
temporarily non-aggressive small and democratic nations along with the 
Comintern’s portrayal of the fascist system as the worst environment for 
class struggle in comparison with the relatively benign environment offered 
by bourgeois democracy, led it to entertain the notion of supporting Britain 
in war. Specifically the Party accepted the notion of supporting their 
country in either a war in which it was allied with the Soviet Union or one 
in which a democratic Popular Front government was defending Britain’s 
democratic rights against fascist aggression. 
 
Although the Party was eventually to face war with neither an Anglo-
Soviet alliance nor a Popular Front government in power, the basic message 
of the Comintern’s Seventh World Congress, that fascism represented an 
especially aggressive and reactionary form of capitalism were to provide the 
Party leadership with the justifications it required to give its qualified 
support to the British war effort. The majority of the CPGB’s Central 
Committee accepted the new line on the basis that, because of the uniquely 
aggressive character of German fascism, Britain and France could not be 
held equally responsible for the war, thus preventing the war from being 
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seen in the same way as the First World War, therefore preventing the 
formula of revolutionary defeatism Lenin developed in that war from being 
applied to this new one. More importantly than this, Party leaders pointed 
to the extreme reactionary nature of the Nazi regime, the danger of that 
regime being imposed on Britain as a result of military defeat and the 
Party’s history of defending democratic rights from fascist expansion in 
other countries, to argue that the Party was justified in giving support to 
the war to defend the British people’s democratic rights. Matters were 
complicated somewhat by the Party’s pre-war interpretation of the 
Chamberlain government as a proto-fascist organisation with pro-fascist 
and anti-Soviet sympathies but the War on Two Fronts line was able to 
manage residual distrust of Chamberlain by restricting the Party to 
qualified support for the war and promising to use the situation to oust the 
Chamberlain government and replace it with the kind of anti-fascist 
People’s Government the Party had striven to create since 1935. This goal 
seemed all the more achievable to the Central Committee given the general 
consensus that the working class supported the war or at least the ideals 
behind it. 
 
Doubts about the War on Two Fronts line only emerged after the 
Soviet press telegram and the statements of the American and Belgian 
Parties began to describe the war as imperialist. At this point however the 
evidence that the Soviet Union had turned away from the principles of the 
Popular Front period was not convincing enough to alter the stance of the 
Central Committee. Despite its claim that the war was imperialist, the 
Central Committee pointed to Russia’s actions to argue that it was still 
primarily opposed to Germany. The Soviets’ apparent prevention of German 
expansion in Poland in particular served as proof of this. At the same time 
the stances of the American and Belgian Parties were discounted not only 
due the fact that numerous other Parties had declared themselves in favour 
of some form or another of the War on Two Fronts line but also because the 
Comintern, in the run up to the war, seemed to have been expounding a line 
of defence against German aggression and showed little sign of changing 
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this stance in the period from the outbreak of war until September 25th. In 
addition the Central Committee were able to argue that defeating Germany 
was in the interest of the whole international movement, as a British victory 
would liberate European countries from imposed fascism whilst a German 
victory would mean the destruction of the British and French working 
classes and their support for the Soviet Union. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis shows that Comintern intervention 
was the primary reason behind the Party leadership’s decision to cease 
portraying the war as an imperialist war in which Germany’s uniquely 
aggressive and reactionary character made it possible to support a limited 
line of national defence and to instead portray the war as an imperialist war 
for which all its belligerents were equally responsible. The Central 
Committee advanced no new evidence to support this changed stance. Nor is 
there any evidence of significant pressure from within the Party for the 
Central Committee to revise its opinion of the war. Rather the Party’s 
leaders simply re-evaluated the significance of the actions of Britain, 
France, Germany and the Soviet Union on the international stage in 
accordance with Comintern and Soviet explanations of the significance of 
those actions. The Central Committee’s acceptance of the Comintern and 
Soviet Union’s interpretation of the war was facilitated by two things. 
Firstly by the Party’s own sense of intellectual inferiority when it came to 
matters of political analysis, which resulted in an over-reliance on and an 
over-confidence in the correctness of analyses emanating from Moscow. 
Secondly, by the Central Committee’s continuing mistrust of the 
Chamberlain government’s character and motives, which allowed the Party 
to perceive the Comintern’s new interpretation of Britain’s role in the war 
as being aligned with their own beliefs rather than as a complete departure, 
softening the blow of the change in line.  
 
The Central Committee’s decision to campaign for an immediate 
peace was not entirely an original idea either. Here too the CPGB 
leadership wedded itself to a policy already put forward by the Soviet Union. 
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In part the Central Committee’s decision was the inevitable result of its 
acceptance of the Comintern’s characterisation of the war as purely 
imperialist. Having accepted this stance it was no longer tenable for the 
Party to support the British war effort, even in a limited degree; the threat 
of aiding the imperialist aims of the Chamberlain government by doing so 
(particularly its anti-Soviet aims) was too great to risk. Furthermore the 
fact that the Soviet Union was now actively supporting an immediate peace 
forced the Party to re-evaluate its understanding of Soviet interests. The 
Central Committee’s decision was in part motivated by its recognition that 
an immediate peace was in the USSR’s direct interest and of its own 
continued desire to uphold those interests. 
 
The Central Committee’s new approach to tactics was not however, 
solely decided by the position of the Comintern and USSR. Indeed the 
Central Committee’s decision to change its line in this regard was 
considerably influenced by a consideration of its own best interests. Support 
for an immediate peace actually seemed to offer a practical way of achieving 
the Party’s immediate goals of defending British democratic rights and 
working conditions from both domestic and foreign fascist threats and of 
building the Party’s support amongst the working class. The Chamberlain 
government’s continued attacks against democratic rights and working 
conditions led to a resurgence of fears of the Chamberlain government’s 
fascist objectives at home and convinced the Party leadership that 
supporting the war effort might assist the growth of domestic fascism. At 
the same time the emergence of a degree of anti-war feeling amongst certain 
sections of the working class and labour movement convinced many of the 
Party’s leaders that the new line, if carefully applied, could win the support 
of these and other workers; support which could be used to resist attacks on 
workers’ conditions and democracy in Britain and defeat the primary 
domestic fascist threat, the Chamberlain government.  
 
An immediate peace also seemed to provide an opportunity for the 
CPGB to safeguard Britain from foreign fascism. Although the Central 
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Committee was now operating under the assumption that Britain and 
Germany were pursuing equally aggressive foreign policies and were 
equally responsible for the war, the majority of its members continued to 
hold an unabated fear of a Germany military victory and the fascist regime 
that victory would impose on Britain. Furthermore, despite the fact that the 
Soviet Union was officially operating under the same assumptions, the 
majority of the Central Committee remained convinced that the Soviet 
Union had not made its peace with fascism. Faith in the Soviet Union’s 
continued antipathy to fascism and in its military and diplomatic strength 
led the Central Committee to believe that Soviet involvement in any peace 
deal guaranteed the inclusion of Soviet-backed guarantees which would 
preclude further German expansion in Western Europe. 
 
The actions of the Central Committee in both September and October 
1939 can provide a great deal of insight into the relationship between the 
CPGB on the one hand and the Comintern and the USSR on the other, both 
in this specific situation and in general. In particular, the analysis of the 
factors that led the majority of the Party’s Central Committee to accept that 
the war was purely imperialist highlights the degree of leverage which the 
Comintern and USSR had over the CPGB’s line. This leverage was 
particularly pervasive in questions of political analysis. Here the Central 
Committee’s generally imperfect grasp of Marxist philosophy, combined 
with its simultaneous faith in the theoretical capabilities of the Comintern 
and USSR left Party leaders particularly accepting of political analyses of 
the war emanating from Moscow as they had little faith in their own 
abilities to provide an accurate counter-analysis. The example of October 
1939 also reinforces arguments that Moscow’s influence over the CPGB was 
largely voluntary.1 There is little evidence of any attempt on the Comintern 
or USSR’s part to try to coerce the Party leadership to accept the new line in 
October. The closest that either the Soviet Union or the Comintern came to 
using threats to force the CPGB to change its line was the Comintern’s overt 
                                                 
1 Thorpe, Andrew, “Comintern ‘Control’ of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1920-43”, The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 113, No 452, (Oxford University Press, June, 1998) pp. 642-8. And p. 657 
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statement in the short thesis, that the British Party and all other parties 
which had taken a line of support for the war ‘must now immediately correct 
their policy’.2 
 
This thesis also highlights the limitations of Moscow’s influence in 
October 1939, namely the lesser influence it was able to wield over the 
tactical line the CPGB adopted. Admittedly the Central Committee’s 
decision to support the USSR’s call for an immediate peace was influenced 
by the Political line it adopted from the Comintern and the fact that the 
USSR supported such an approach. While adopting the idea of supporting 
an immediate peace however, the Party simultaneously rejected the 
Comintern’s line of gradual advance to revolutionary defeatism (as 
explained by Springhall). Due to the fact that so many of the Central 
Committee’s members couched their support for a Soviet backed peace in 
terms of its ability to achieve the Party’s immediate objectives of 
safeguarding Britain from German fascism and providing a line which could 
rally the workers against the Chamberlain government and its policies, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that consideration of these immediate 
objectives played an extremely important role in the Central Committee’s 
decision on the tactical line to be taken by the Party. Ultimately all of this 
strengthens the case proposed by historians who, like Andrew Thorpe, have 
argued that, whilst both the USSR and the Comintern inevitably played a 
significant role in shaping CPGB policy, international factors were not the 
only considerations influencing the decisions of the British Party’s 
leadership.3 Rather the Central Committee factored considerations of both 
the Party’s domestic position and the position of the international 
movement into its decision making. 
 
The general position of the Central Committee identified in this 
thesis also provides an answer to the question of whether the Party’s 
                                                 
2 King, Francis and Matthews, George, About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second World 
War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990), p. 69. 
3 Thorpe, Andrew, The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000), p. 13. 
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acceptance of the Imperialist War line was the result of mechanical and 
unquestioning acceptance of the Comintern line or a sincere belief in the 
correctness of the Comintern’s position. This thesis shows that, whilst the 
direct and unambiguous statement of opposition to the British line provided 
by Springhall’s explanation of the Short Thesis in October (as opposed to the 
more ambiguous statements the Party had received in September) did lead 
the Party to make some immediate modifications to its public stance in the 
Daily Worker and the composition of its leadership to show the Comintern 
that the CPGB would not try to undermine the new line, the receipt of the 
Comintern’s line did not result in an immediate, total acceptance of that 
line. Indeed, whilst the Comintern and USSR’s arguments that the war was 
purely imperialist were to play a major role in the Party leadership’s 
eventual acceptance of the correctness of the Comintern’s political analysis 
of the war, the majority were convinced to accept that analysis after 
studying those arguments, not simply because it was the Comintern’s 
analysis. To give a specific example, the arguments of Marshal Zhdanov 
might have been the primary factor which convinced Ted Bramley to accept 
the Comintern’s interpretation of the war but he accepted that 
interpretation only after he read and accepted Zhdanov’s arguments, not 
simply because it was the Comintern’s position. When one looks at the 
tactical stance adopted by the Party the idea that the Party’s Imperialist 
War line was adopted via a process of mechanical acceptance becomes even 
more untenable. Rather it would seem that the fact that the Party’s 
consideration of its own immediate interests led it to reject the Comintern’s 
call to move gradually to a position of revolutionary defeatism and instead 
give its support to a Soviet backed peace, would conclusively disprove such 
an idea. 
 
All of this then helps us to establish a general interpretation of the 
main factors which impacted the Central Committee’s attitude towards the 
Second World War at its outbreak but, whilst the general interpretation 
might provide a more accurate picture of the Party leadership in 1939 than 
other, shorter, less detailed but more common accounts, it itself still does 
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not provide a true representation of the Central Committee. Whilst trying to 
derive this general interpretation, this thesis has also exposed a number of 
differences of opinion within the Party leadership which often contradict the 
conclusion made above. Some of these divisions amongst Party leaders are 
obvious and already fairly well documented, for example, the division in 
interpretation of the character of the war in September between Dutt and 
Rust and the rest of the Central Committee, or the division between Pollitt, 
Campbell and Gallacher and the rest of the Central Committee on the 
question of whether continuing to support the British War effort was 
justifiable in October. This thesis, however, also draws attention to a 
number of other divisions amongst the Party’s leadership, which are less 
well documented. The most apparent of these differences is visible in the 
different analyses of the relative strength of British and German 
imperialism made by the Secretariat and the majority of the Central 
Committee. Other examples are evident in the variances in the justifications 
for intensifying the struggle against Chamberlain put forward by Central 
Committee members in September; in the attitude taken by Central 
Committee members towards the significance of the Nazi-Soviet Pact; in the 
stances adopted by members on how the working class would react to the 
Party’s Imperialist War line and in the reasons which led party members to 
support the USSR’s call for peace. 
 
Developing an understanding of why these differences emerged is key 
to painting a truly representative picture of the Central Committee’s 
decisions in September and October 1939. One route to achieving this 
understanding is through studying the background of those individuals 
whose stance did not fit with that of the rest of their comrades with a view 
to building a contextual understanding of the events, experiences and pre-
conceptions which influenced their position. In this endeavour biographical 
research has obvious value; however, the existing biographical literature on 
the leaders of British Communism in the 1930s is relatively sparse. This is 
due not only to the fact that historians have only relatively recently begun 
to give serious attention to biographical study of key communist figures in 
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the wider international movement outside of Russia, but also to a lack of 
sources and to the strict discipline to which Party members held themselves 
when discussing the Party or their comrades within it, which makes finding 
accurate information for biographical studies difficult.4 Despite this relative 
paucity of readily available biographical information on the Central 
Committee of 1939, it is possible, with the aid of the short biographies 
compiled for this thesis (see Appendix II) to begin to suggest some reasons 
for some of the aforementioned divisions amongst the Central Committee. 
 
To explain Dutt and Rust’s early decision that the war was 
unsupportable, for example, we might point to the reputation for adherence 
to Comintern/Soviet orthodoxy that characterised both men. Whilst this 
tendency to align themselves with the prevailing opinion in Moscow 
stemmed from different roots (a belief in the infallibility of Bolshevik 
doctrine in the case of Dutt and considerations of career advancement in 
Rust’s case), it could perhaps explain why both men were so quick to 
denounce the war as unsupportable, whilst simultaneously making no solid 
statement on how the Party should modify its policy in response, after 
similar sentiments emerged in Moscow and amongst other international 
parties. Similar considerations may have influenced not only Dutt and 
Rust’s but also Springhall’s decision to portray Britain and France as the 
driving force of the war in October. As a Soviet agent Springhall had just as 
much reason as Dutt and Rust to align himself with the position adopted in 
Moscow and it seems possible that a desire to align themselves with Soviet 
statements regarding responsibility for the war may have motivated their 
position in September.5 
 
                                                 
4 Morgan, Kevin, “Parts of People and Communist Lives” in in McIlroy, John, Morgan, Kevin and 
Campbell, Alan (eds), Party People Communist Lives, Explorations in Biography, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 2001), pp. 10-4. 
5 In conjunction with the Nazi-Soviet peace proposals the Soviet government issued a statement in 
which it declared that failure to secure peace would ‘demonstrate the fact that England and France are 
responsible for the continuation of the war’ See Isserman, Maurice, Which Side Were You On? The 
American Communist Party During the Second World War, (University of Illinois Press, Urbana and 
Chicago, 1993), p. 44. 
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For Dutt in particular there is another factor which must be 
considered when assessing his stance in September and October 1939 and 
that is his extreme hatred of British Imperialism. The majority of the 
Central Committee were aided in overcoming their overwhelming fear of 
German victory by their mistrust of Chamberlain. For Dutt however, this 
mistrust had always been paramount; throughout the Popular Front period 
his understanding of the goals of British Imperialism led him to continually 
argue that Britain, not Germany, was the real driving force behind the 
advance to global conflict. Thus for Dutt, unlike the majority of the Central 
Committee, it would seem that the Comintern’s analysis of the war was not 
a sudden change which seemed contrary to his own beliefs, but rather 
something that fitted entirely with his own estimation of the war and its 
belligerents. 
 
That Pollitt and Campbell were to so adamantly oppose Dutt, Rust 
and Springhall’s analysis of the war and to continue to portray 
Chamberlain’s Britain as waging a defensive war, even after the 
Comintern’s intervention in October, is similarly understandable when one 
considers the stance adopted by both men during the Popular Front period. 
Throughout this period both Pollitt and Campbell placed increasing 
emphasis on the danger posed by the spread of foreign fascism, a view that 
was only sharpened by their involvement with the Spanish Civil War and 
the British Battalion of the International Brigade. Pollitt and Campbell’s 
stance was also influenced by their characteristic focus on pursuing 
practical policies which would receive the support of the working class, as 
can be seen in their warnings in October that the Imperialist War line 
would seem to the average worker as an abandonment of the fight against 
fascism. Pollitt and Gallacher’s stance in October might further be 
explained by the concerns which both leaders came to harbour in connection 
with Soviet Union, the Comintern and their intervention in the affairs of the 
British Party. The belief that the Comintern and Soviet Union might no 
longer be acting in the interests of the wider international movement but 
rather in the pursuit of more selfish goals, which both men developed during 
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the late 1930s, explains why, in both in September and October, they 
stressed the ability and need of the Party to consider its own interests and 
set its own policy in accordance with them. 
 
We might also look to biography to help explain the attitude of 
members of the Central Committee towards the Party’s anti-Chamberlain 
activities in September. For example, Emile Burns argued in favour of 
intensifying the Party’s attacks on the British government based on the 
need to remove the government in order to make the war truly supportable. 
One might argue – considering that Burns, like Dutt, had developed a 
certain hostility to the British imperial system and an affinity for national 
independence movements as a result of his experiences with British 
imperialism in his youth – that Burns’ position on the Comintern’s analysis 
of the war was likewise influenced by an untypical mistrust of British 
imperialism, albeit to a far lesser degree than Dutt. A desire not to 
unnecessarily aid the spread of the British Empire might also help explain 
why Burns was the only Party leader besides Dutt and Rust to suggest the 
possibility of a Soviet-backed, negotiated peace in September. Idris Cox’s 
support for a greater focus on the fight against Chamberlain for similar 
reasons may suggest a tendency towards alignment with Moscow (similar to 
Rust or Springhall) when one compares this situation with his decision in 
the Class Against Class period to align himself with the Comintern-backed 
left, a position which he only modified in the final year before the Comintern 
openly back Popular Front tactics. 
 
The fact that Pollitt was to suggest a greater focus on Chamberlain 
for entirely different reasons is perfectly understandable when one considers 
the strength of his antipathy towards German fascism. Considering the 
particular determination to resist German invasion which this antipathy 
imbued Pollitt with, it is unlikely that he should be overly concerned with 
the need to transform the character of the war. Similarly, Pollitt’s tendency 
to interpret events through the lens of his own gut feelings, rather than 
through Marxist analysis, further reinforces why questions regarding the 
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character of the war were of so little consequence to him and why it took 
tangible attacks on British working class rights to compel him to refocus on 
domestic problems. That Peter Kerrigan was likewise inspired by events at 
home rather than considerations of the character of the war to support 
refocusing on Chamberlain may seem strange considering the fact that he 
had a similar background to Rust and Springhall – with all three being 
schooled in Soviet orthodoxy at the International Lenin School in Moscow 
and all three developing a reputation for rigid discipline as political 
commissars in Spain. At the same time however, Kerrigan’s heroism in 
Spain and his close connections with Pollitt in the latter half of the 1930s 
might suggest that he internalised the politics of the Popular Front line to a 
much greater degree than his fellow international school graduates. This in 
turn may help explain why he was less troubled by the character of the war 
than either Burns or Cox. At the same time however, we might point to 
Kerrigan’s Moscow connections and tendency towards discipline to explain 
why he had particularly servile reasons for supporting the Soviet Union’s 
peace proposals. Of course the issue of scope affects the ability of this thesis 
to portray the divisions within the leadership. There are still a number of 
divisions which existed in the Central Committee which are not mentioned 
here nor highlighted in the rest of the thesis. By conducting a larger, more 
detailed study it would be possible to evaluate the stance of each individual 
Central Committee member in greater detail and give greater exposure to 
many of the smaller differences in opinion which existed between them, 
which in turn would help direct studies into the factors which influenced 
individuals to take different stances. 
 
Whilst this thesis has attempted to expand historical understanding 
of the Party Leadership’s reaction to the outbreak of war by discussing the 
wider Central Committee, its definition of the wider Central Committee is 
still limited. This thesis purposefully focused on those Central Committee 
members who voted on the Party’s line in October and therefore had a 
degree of responsibility for the adoption of the Imperialist War line on a 
national scale. There were however, a number of other Central Committee 
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members who did not attend the October meeting but whose position should 
nevertheless be evaluated in the pursuit of a truly accurate and all inclusive 
picture of the CPGB’s central leadership. Take for example Arthur Horner 
whose importance in the Party arguably derived far more from his role as 
president of the South Wales Miner’s Federation than it did from his 
involvement in the decisions of the Central Committee. As noted in 
Appendix II, a review of Horner’s activities between 1939 and 1941 clearly 
shows that he opposed the Imperialist War line. As Horner did not attend 
the October meeting and therefore did not register a vote however, his 
stance on the war is often overlooked by histories which explain the stance 
of the Central Committee by quoting the results of the October vote. Other 
similar studies of the war time activities of other leaders not present in 
October, such as Will Paynter and Tom Mann, could be equally revealing as 
studies of Horner and could therefore provide an even wider more inclusive 
picture of the Central Committee’s response to the war. Furthermore such 
an approach could be used to expand our understanding of those who voted 
in October and provide insight into how the Central Committee’s attitude 
towards the Imperialist War line changed as a result of having to implement 
it. Thus, by augmenting the general analysis provided by this thesis with 
more detailed studies along the same lines and further biographical 
research into the experiences and preconceptions which influenced 
individual members of CPGB’s leadership in September and October 1939 
and the actions they took afterwards; it should be possible to create a fuller, 
more nuanced and above all more accurate assessment of the factors which 
motivated the Central Committee at the outbreak of the war. 
 
 
97/140 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Published Sources 
 
British Institute of Public Opinion, “Public Opinion Survey”, The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Oxford University Press, 
March 1940), pp. 75-82. 
 
Communist Party of Great Britain, “War! Communist policy” in 
Pollitt, Harry, How to Win the War, (Communist Party of Great 
Britain, London, 1939) 
 
Degras, Jane, (ed), The Communist International 1919-1943 – 
Documents Volume 3 1929-43, (Frank Cass, London, 1971) 
 
Horner, Arthur, Towards a Popular Front, (Communist Party of 
Great Britain, London, 1936) 
 
King, Francis and Matthews, George, About Turn: The British 
Communist Party and the Second World War, (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1990) 
 
Dimitrov, Georgi, ‘The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the 
Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class 
against Fascism’, 
<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_0
2.htm#s1>, [accessed 03/11/14] 
 
Marty, André, “For Peace! For the Defence of the Soviet Union!”, in 
Comintern 7th World Congress Part 12: For Peace and Defence of the 
Soviet Union, (Modern Books, London, 1935) 
 
Pollitt, Harry, “A Working Class Peace Policy”, The Labour Monthly, 
(May 1936), pp. 295-315. 
 
Pollitt, Harry, How to Win the War, (Communist Party of Great 
Britain, London, 1939) 
 
 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre 
 
98/140 
 
CPGB Political Letter September 25th 1939, CP/IND/DUTT/31/05 
 
Minutes of July 3rd Central Committee Meeting, Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre, CPGB Microfilm Collection 
 
Resolution on Manifesto of September 2nd, Sept 24th, Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre, CP/IND/POLL/2/7/ 
 
Minutes of September 24th-25th Central Committee meeting, Labour 
History Archive and Study Centre, CP/IND/POLL/2/7 
 
Soviet Press Telegram, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, 
CP/IND/POLL/2/7 
 
Statements of various Communist Parties on the war, LHASC, 
CP/IND/POLL/2/7 
 
 
Modern Records Centre 
 
Communist Party of Great Britain, “Report of the Central Committee 
to the 14th National Congress”, Modern Records Centre, 
MSS.15X/2/103/284 
 
Communist Party of Great Britain, “Report of the Central Committee 
to the 15th Party Congress”, Modern Records Centre, 
MSS.15X/2/103/203 
 
Campbell, J.R., “How Chamberlain helped Hitler” (1938), Modern 
records Centre, MSS.15X/103/206 
 
Horner, Arthur, “Towards a Popular Front”, Modern Records Centre, 
MSS.15X/2/103/170 
 
 
National Archives 
 
British Empire Endorsement – Omission and Cancellation, National 
Archives, KV-2-1760_2, Emile Burns file 
 
Report on Executive of Labour Research Department dated 
15/10/1926, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, Emile Burns file 
 
99/140 
 
Untitled report dated 27.7.1934, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, 
Emile Burns file 
 
Undated Report on Burns, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, Emile 
Burns file 
 
 
Working Class Movement Library 
 
Daily Worker, September 2nd – October 7th, Working Class Movement 
Library 
 
Morning Star, 1972-89, Working Class Movement Library 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Books 
 
Attfield, John, and Williams, Stephen, (eds), 1939 The Communist 
Party and the War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1984) 
 
Beckett, Francis, Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British 
Communist Party, (John Murray Publishers Ltd., London, 1995) 
 
Burridge, T.D., British Labour and Hitler’s War, (Andre Deutsch 
Limited, London, 1974) 
 
Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
192-41, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1985) 
 
Callaghan, John, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: The CPGB 1951-69, 
(I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, London, 2003) 
 
Callaghan, John, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism, 
(Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1993)  
 
Cohen, Gidon, and Finn, Andrew, “In Search of the Typical 
Communist” in Morgan Kevin, Cohen, Gidon, and Finn, Andrew (eds), 
Agents of the Revolution, New Biographical Approaches to the 
History of International Communism in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, 
(Peter lang, Oxford, 2005) 
 
100/140 
 
Dewar, Hugo, Communist Politics in Britain: The CPGB from its 
Origins to the Second World War, (Pluto Press Limited, London, 
1976) 
 
Drachkovitch, Milord M., and Lazitch, Branko, ‘The Communist 
International’ in Drachkovitch, Milorad M., (ed.) The Revolutionary 
Internationals 1864-1943, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968) 
 
Eaden, James, and Renton, David, The Communist Party of Great 
Britain Since 1920, (Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002) 
 
Finn, Andrew, “William Rust: the Comintern’s Blue Eyed Boy?” in 
McIlory, John, Morgan, Kevin and Campbell, Alan (eds), Party People 
Communist Lives, Explorations in Biography, (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 2001) 
 
Fishman, Nina, “Horner and Honerism”, in McIlroy, John, Morgan, 
Kevin and Campbell, Alan (eds), Party People Communist Lives, 
Explorations in Biography, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 2001) 
 
Fishman, Nina, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 
1933-45, (Scolarpress, Aldershot, 1996) 
 
Isserman, Maurice, Which Side Were You On? The American 
Communist Party During the Second World War, (University of 
Illinois Press, Chicago, 1993) 
 
Jupp, James, The Radical Left in Britain 1931-41, (Frank Cass and 
Company Limited, London, 1982) 
 
Kenefick, William, Red Scotland! The Rise and Fall of the Radical 
Left, c. 1872 to1932, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007) 
 
Klugmann, James, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 
Volume One: Formation and Early Years, 1919-24, (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1968) 
 
Laybourn, Keith, and Murphy, Dylan, Under the Red Flag: A History 
of Communism in Britain, (Sutton Publishing Limited, 
Gloucestershire, 1999) 
 
101/140 
 
Martin, Roderick, Communism & the British Trade Unions 1924-
1933, A Study of the National Minority Movement, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1969) 
 
Mates, Lewis, The Spanish Civil War and the British Left: Political 
Activism and the Popular Front, (Tauris Academic Studies, London, 
207) 
 
Mcleod, Allison, the Death of Uncle Joe, (Merlin Press, Woodbridge, 
2007) 
 
Morgan, Kevin, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities 
in British Communist Politics 1935-41, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1989) 
 
Morgan, Kevin, Harry Pollitt, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1994) 
 
Mortimer, Edward, The Rise of the French Communist Party 1920-
47, (Faber and Faber, London, 1984) 
 
Myant, Martin, “1935 – The Turning Point”, in in Fyrth Jim, (ed), 
Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front, (Lawrence and Wishart 
Limited, London, 1985) 
 
Pelling, Henry, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile, 
(Adam and Charles Black, London, 1975) 
 
Redfern, Neil, Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two 
World Wars, (I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, New York, 2012) 
 
Rose, Sonya O., Which People’s War: National identity and 
Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003) 
 
Thorpe, Andrew, “Communist MP: Willie Gallacher”, in Morgan, 
Kevin, Cohen, Gidon and Flinn, Andrew (eds), Agents of the 
Revolution, New Biographical Approaches to the History of 
International Communism in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, (Peter 
Lang, Oxford, 2005) 
 
Thorpe, Andrew, The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43, 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000) 
102/140 
 
 
Thorpe, Andrew, ‘The Communist International and the British 
Communist Party’ in Rees, Tim, and Thorpe, Andrew, (eds), 
International Communism and Communist International, 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998) 
 
 
Journals 
 
Childs, David, “The British Communist Party and the War, 1939-41: 
Old Slogans Revived”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 
2, (Sage Publications Ltd., April, 1977), pp. 237-53. 
 
Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy in the British Communist Party”, The 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Wiley, June, 1958), pp. 
143-58. 
 
Haslam, Jonathan, “The Comintern and the Origins of the Popular 
Front 1934-5”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, (Cambridge 
University Press, September, 1979), pp. 675-91. 
 
Kozlov, Nicholas N., and Weitz, Eric D., “Reflections on the Origins of 
the ‘Third Period’: Bukharin, the Comintern, and the political 
economy of Weimar Germany”, The Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, (Sage Publications Ltd., July, 1989), pp. 387-410. 
 
McIlroy, John, and Campbell, Alan, “The British and French 
Representatives to the Communist International, 1920-1939: A 
Comparitive Study”, International Review of Social History, Vol. 50, 
No. 2, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 203-40. 
 
McIlory, John, “The Establishment of Intellectual Orthodoxy and the 
Stalinization of British Communism 1928-33, Past & Present, No. 
192, (Oxford University Press, August, 2006), pp. 187-226. 
 
Thorpe, Andrew, “Comintern ‘Control’ of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, 1920-43”, The English Historical Review, Vol. 113, No 
452, (Oxford University Press, June, 1998), pp. 637-62. 
 
 
 
 
 
103/140 
 
Theses 
 
Murphy, Dylan Lee, The Communist Party of Great Britain and its 
struggle against fascism 1933-1939, (University of Huddersfield 
repository, 1999) 
 
 
 Webpages 
 
http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/anw/get_collection.php?inst_id=35&
coll_id=11328&expand=, (last accessed, 20.05.15) 
 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11190779, (last 
accessed, 16.05.15) 
 
Johnstone, Monty “Gollan, John (1911–1977)”, in Matthew, H.C.G. 
and Harrison, Brian (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
(Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, Jan 2011), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65950, (last accessed 08.05.15) 
 
McIlroy, John, “Kerrigan, Peter (1899–1977)”, in Matthew, H.C.G. 
and Harrison, Brian (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
(Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, Jan 2011), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/65950, (last accessed 18.05.15) 
 
104/140 
 
Appendix I – The Role of the Central Committee in the Organisation of the 
CPGB 
 
The most basic organisational units of the CPGB were the groups, of 
which there were three different types, factory, street and area groups. 
Factory groups brought together Party members employed in the same 
workplace so that they could organise their political activities, which 
included factories but also any other place of work (mills, building sites, 
offices, etc.).1 Those members who could not be organised according to their 
place of work (i.e. housewives, the unemployed and the self-employed) were 
organised into the Party’s street groups which brought together members 
who lived on the same or immediately adjacent streets. From the start of 
1936 onwards street groups with less than six members were dissolved. 
Those who were, as a result, left isolated without a factory or street group to 
attend were organised into broader-reaching area groups to connect them 
with other members in a similar position.2 Of these groups, the factory 
groups were most important to the Party. Believing that class antagonisms 
were most palpable within the workplace and that therefore political 
organisation there would be the most beneficial, the Party prioritised the 
growth of factory groups above that of street or area groups. For example, 
Party members could not join a street group if a factory group was available 
and even in cases where there were too few members within a given 
workplace to form a factory group, members would be directed to join 
another nearby factory group in their industry, rather than join a street 
group.3 
 
All of the Party groups within a given area, regardless of type, came 
together to form a single Party branch and were responsible to a local 
Branch Committee.4 Above the Branch Committees were the District 
                                                 
1 Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 192-41, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1985), pp. 172-3. 
2 Branson, History of the Communist Party, (1985), p. 189. 
3 Branson, History of the Communist Party, (1985), pp. 172-3. And 
Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy in the British Communist Party”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
(Wiley, June, 1958), p. 143. 
4 Branson, History of the Communist Party, (1985), pp. 172-4. 
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Committees. The CPGB was divided into eighteen districts; sixteen of which 
were in England, with Scotland and Wales each counting as a single district. 
In the smaller districts the various Branch Committees within the district 
were responsible to the District Committee directly. Larger districts (e.g. 
Scotland, Wales and London) on the other hand, were divided into several 
different areas organised by Area Committees appointed by the District 
Committee. In these cases the Branch Committees were responsible to their 
Area Committee, which was in turn responsible to its District Committee.5  
The CPGB’s pyramidal structure was reinforced by its adherence to the 
principles of democratic centralism. According to these principles, decisions 
on Party policy were decided by majority vote and flowed down through the 
Party with lower Committees being bound to accept the decisions of those 
higher than themselves, i.e. the Area Committees were bound to accept the 
decisions of the District Committees.6 Those who disagreed with Party 
policy could raise their criticisms with their Party organisation, which if 
accepted by the majority would be passed up to the next highest Committee 
for voting, but they could not make their doubts known to any lower 
organisational unit.7  
 
At the top of the Party’s hierarchy of Committees was the Central 
Committee (also known as the Executive Committee). Formally the Central 
Committee was only responsible to one higher authority, the Party’s 
National Congress, which convened every two years to set Party Policy on a 
national scale and was attended by representatives from the District 
Committees and the branches.  However, the role that Congress played in 
setting Party policy was in reality rather limited, as the agenda and 
discussions at Party Congresses were frequently set and dominated by the 
Central Committee itself.8 
                                                 
5 Callaghan, John, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: The CPGB 1951-69, (I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, London, 2003), 
p. 10. 
6 Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict, p. 7. And 
Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy”, The British Journal of Sociology, p. 143. 
7 Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy”, The British Journal of Sociology, p. 146. And p. 151. 
8 Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict, p. 10. 
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Formal Party Structure: Arrows point from responsible bodies to 
subordinate ones.9 
 
Regardless of the formal structure of the CPGB, in terms of practical 
organisation the power of the Central Committee was in fact extremely 
limited. Indeed, the Party organisation with the most effective authority 
was the Party’s Political Bureau (Politburo for short). Officially the Political 
Bureau was only a sub-committee of the Central Committee, which was 
elected from and by the Central Committee’s members and was intended to 
decide on questions too urgent to wait on the decisions of the Central 
Committee, however its responsibilities and powers were poorly defined in 
the Party’s rules.10 Despite, or more likely because of, this lack of a formal 
definition regarding its role in the Party organisation, the Politburo was 
often the principle exerciser of power when it came to decisions on Party 
policy.  Just as the Central Committee came to dominate the National 
Congress, the Politburo dominated the Central Committee. Every Central 
Committee meeting began with a report from the Politburo which set the 
agenda for the discussion to follow and any material which was required for 
the discussion was also provided by the Politburo. At a meeting on July 3rd 
                                                 
9 Adapted from Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy”, The British Journal of Sociology, p. 144. 
10 Grainger, G.W., “Oligarchy”, The British Journal of Sociology, p. 153. 
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1938 members of the Central Committee were invited by the Political 
Bureau to offer reflections on the role of the Central Committee. A 
significant proportion of the members who spoke deplored the lack of 
authority held by the Central Committee, with several, especially William 
Gallacher and Finlay Hart, claiming that the body only acted as a rubber 
stamp for decisions already made by the Political Bureau.11 The Central 
Committee was consulted on policies but their recommendations were often 
ignored. In July a number of members noted how frequently Central 
Committee members would raise alternative points of view on a policy 
which were then never addressed or resolved.12 The perfunctory role of the 
Central Committee in comparison to the Politburo is further highlighted by 
the fact that the Politburo also frequently issued policy in the name of the 
Central Committee without consulting it at all.13 
 
Practical Party Structure: Arrows point from responsible bodies to 
subordinate ones. 
 
                                                 
11 Minutes of July 3rd Central Committee Meeting, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, CPGB 
Microfilm Collection, pp. 1-2. 
12 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 4. 
13 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 7. 
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According to the Central Committee’s own testimony the body’s lack 
of authority was in part the result of practical problems. In particular 
Central Committee members pointed out that late delivery of materials for 
Committee meetings (which were often only distributed on the day of the 
meeting itself) resulted in members being unable to prepare themselves 
sufficiently to conduct a useful or valuable discussion.14 By far the most 
common complaint amongst members of the Central Committee however, 
was that the Committee’s ability to contribute to decisions was crippled by a 
sense of inferiority felt by the majority of its members in comparison to 
members of the Political Bureau.15  Members argued that there was a vast 
gap between the political capabilities of the majority of the Central 
Committee and those of the Politburo, which often discouraged these less 
capable members from contributing to discussions. Finlay Hart pointed out 
‘it is always with a great deal of timidity I rise to speak due to the fact 
that… there are a number of very capable comrades in our party able to 
make a very detailed political statement…the rest of us are feeling our way 
when we are speaking’. As a result of this there existed two types of leader 
within the Central Committee, ‘the outstanding comrades and the others 
[who] have not the boldness to put in a suggestion’.16 This sense of 
inferiority was particularly acute for Committee members with other 
commitments outside the Party’s HQ in London.  William Allan for example 
noted how difficult it was for such members to prepare properly for a 
meeting whilst juggling their other work, whilst those at the very heart of 
the Party’s leadership had weeks to prepare themselves.17 Such 
commitments, argued Arthur Horner, left half of the Central Committee 
essentially acting as spectators, rather than leaders.18  
 
The ability of Central Committee members to speak effectively was 
also compromised by the format of Central Committee meetings. As noted 
earlier, these meetings began with a lengthy report from the Politburo; this 
                                                 
14 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 8-9. And p. 11. 
15 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, pp. 5-6. And p. 11. 
16 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 5. 
17 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 9. 
18 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 10. 
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was then usually followed by similarly lengthy speeches from other 
Politburo members.19 This led to less experienced Central Committee 
members feeling that there was little of value left which they could add to 
the debate.20 Even if individuals felt that they had something to add to the 
discussion, these initial presentations were often so detailed that less 
experienced Committee members felt that they did not know enough to 
speak up.21 Horner pointed out that the length and detail of speeches made 
the rest of the Central Committee feel that the speakers knew so much 
about the topic that ‘it would be an impertinence on their part to interfere’.22 
When they did speak up members were immediately put on the spot. The 
seating at meetings was not arranged in a way which encouraged free 
discussion and fluid debate, such as around a single table, but rather in the 
manner of a classroom, with members seated in rows behind one another. 
This made small interjections difficult and forced members to make all their 
points in one long speech; a task which Douglas Springhall noted often 
represented ‘something in the nature of an ordeal’ for many comrades.23 If 
members’ feelings of political and intellectual inferiority were exacerbated 
by the way in which they had to make statements at meetings then it was 
likely to be further intensified by the fact that all contributions were 
recorded, introducing yet another layer of formality to meetings.24  
 
The primacy of the Politburo over the Central Committee was further 
reinforced by their roles outside of Central Committee meetings. For 
example, Central Committee members were never empowered to make 
consultative visits to other sections of the Party’s organisation as 
representatives of the Party’s central leadership. This function was almost 
always performed by Politburo Members operating from the Party’s 
headquarters.25 The main role of the Central Committee was therefore, in 
effect, to explain the decisions of the Political Bureau to members of the 
                                                 
19 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 4. And, p. 9. 
20 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection,  p. 9. 
21 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 10. 
22 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection,  p. 10. 
23 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 4. 
24 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 10. 
25 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 6. 
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District Committees, either directly (as some members of the Central 
Committee were also district secretaries, which were to the District 
Committees as the Politburo was to the Central Committee) or through the 
reports sent by the Central Committee to comrades in the districts.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Minutes of July 3rd Meeting, LHASC, CPGB Microfilm Collection, p. 7. 
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Appendix II – Biographical notes on select Central Committee Members.1 
 
Emile Burns 
 
Emile Burns was born in 1889 in St Kitts in the British West Indies.2 
He joined the CPGB from the Left Wing Committee of the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) 1921.3 He was made a member of the Central 
Committee and the Politburo in 1935.4 
 
A product of the Oxbridge system, Burns was one of the Party’s few 
intellectual leaders.5 During his time in the CPGB Burns put his academic 
skills to good use and developed a reputation as a prolific theorist, 
propagandist and writer. As a result of his skills in these areas Burns was 
elevated to head of the CPGB Propaganda Department. At the same time 
Burns produced a number of influential books on Marxism (for example 
What is Marxism?) and worked as a Marxist educator for the CPGB.6 Burns 
also played a significant role in a number of Communist aligned 
organisations. In particular Burns was involved with the foundation of the 
Friends of the Soviet Union organisation and was a leading member of the 
Labour Research Department, serving on its executive for much of the 1920s 
and 30s except for in 1926 when he became involved in the St. Pancras 
                                                 
1 This appendix focuses on providing biographical details which identify significant character traits, 
political opinions or formative experiences which may help to contextual the position of the leader in 
question in September and October 1939. As such Party leaders for whom such information is not 
readily available have been omitted. Basic biographical details for omitted leaders can be found in King 
and Mathews’ About Turn. 
2 British Empire Endorsement – Omission and Cancellation, National Archives, KV-2-1760_2, Emile Burns 
file, p. 1. 
3 The Left Wing Committee was a loosely organised group within the ILP set up to agitate for the Party to 
affiliate itself with the Third International, other members included Rajani Palme Dutt and the CPGB’s 
first MP Shapurji Saklatvala, Klugmann, James, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: Volume 
One: Formation and Early Years, 1919-24, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968), p. 26-7. 
4 King, Francis and Matthews, George, About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second World 
War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990), p. 300. 
5 Callaghan, John, Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1993), 
p. 17. 
6 Branson, Noreen, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 192-41, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1985), p. 214. 
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Strike Committee during the General Strike.7 In 1936 Burns also worked 
with Harry Pollitt and Victor Gollancz to develop the Left Book Club which 
helped expose elements of Party policy to a wider left wing audience.8 
 
Burns’ intellectual skills also had a downside. In a Party mostly 
dominated by those with working class roots Burns’ intellectualism, and as 
a result Burns himself, could often be seen negatively by others. It has been 
suggested by John McIlory that one of the ways in which Burns attempted 
to overcome this prejudice was by dedicating himself to conformity and 
proletarian discipline.9 Having said this however, Burns was at the same 
time amongst the ranks of those who supported Harry Pollitt’s practical 
politics during the Class Against Class period. During this time Burns 
provided theoretical justifications for Pollitt’s policies and used the 
Busmens’ Punch, which he edited, as a platform to expound them.10 As a 
result Burns has also been portrayed as a staunch ally of Pollitt.11 
 
Throughout his time in the Party, Burns had a particular interest in 
the advancement of national liberation struggles in the colonies, a result of 
his early experiences of British colonialism in St Kitt’s, where his father was 
part of the colonial administration.12  He was involved in the Colonial 
Department of the CPGB during the 1930s, later becoming chair of the 
Party’s National Cultural Committee, and was instrumental in spread of 
socialist ideas to the colonies.13 
 
                                                 
7 Report on Executive of Labour Research Department dated 15/10/1926, National Archives, KV-2-
1760_1, Emile Burns file, p. 100. And  
Untitled report dated 27.7.1934, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, Emile Burns file, p. 48. And 
Metropolitan police Report on Burns dated 29/10/1926, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, Emile Burns 
file, p. 144. And 
Morning Star, February 9th 1972, Working Class Movement Library 
8 Morgan, Kevin, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist Politics 1935-
41, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989), p. 257. 
9 McIlory, John, “The Establishment of Intellectual Orthodoxy and the Stalinization of British 
Communism 1928-33, Past & Present, No. 192, (Oxford University Press, August, 2006), p. 224. 
10 Fishman, Nina, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 1933-45, (Scolarpress, Aldershot, 
1996), p. 81. And pp. 108-10. 
11 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 255. 
12 Morning Star, February 9th 1972, WCML 
13 Undated Report on Burns, National Archives, KV-2-1760_1, Emile Burns file, p. 71. And 
King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 300. 
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John Ross Campbell (a.k.a. Johnny or J. R. Campbell) 
  
John Ross Campbell was born in Paisley, Renfrewshire, Scotland in 
1894.14 Campbell held a number of positions of responsibility within the 
Party and spent the vast majority of his adult life working for it.15 Campbell 
joined Central Committee in 1923 and the Politburo in 1924 remaining on 
both committees until 1965, although he was absent from the politburo 
between 1939 and 1941. Campbell was also briefly editor of the Daily 
Worker in 1939. In addition to his role in the leadership of the British Party, 
Campbell also played a role in the leadership of the Communist 
International, serving as a member of its Executive Committee from 1925 to 
1935 and as a candidate member of the same committee from 1935 onwards. 
16 Campbell also provided, at times, a direct link between the Party and the 
International through his role as the CPGB representative to the 
Comintern, which he held on two separate occasions, once in 1930 and once 
between 1938 and 1939.17  
 
Campbell was a foundation member of the CPGB but like many of the 
other key Party leaders in the 1930s (e.g. Pollitt, Gallacher, etc.) he had 
become attracted to socialist politics, and Marxism in particular, prior to the 
Party’s creation. Campbell joined the British Socialist Party in 1912 whilst 
he was still a teenager. Prior to the First World War he worked as a clerk at 
a Cooperative Society but in 1914 he voluntarily enlisted to fight (a decision 
which would be used against him by his opponents later in his life). He was 
later discharged after he lost a foot at Galipoli whilst rescuing a fellow 
soldier under fire.18 After this Campbell became involved in the shop 
                                                 
14 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 300. 
15 McIlroy, John, and Campbell, Alan, “The British and French Representatives to the Communist 
International, 1920-1939: A Comparitive Study”, International Review of Social History, Vol. 50, No. 2, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 219. 
16 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 300. 
17 McIlroy, and Campbell, “Representatives to the Communist International”, International Review of 
Social History, pp. 206-7. 
18 McIlroy, and Campbell, “Representatives to the Communist International”, International Review of 
Social History, pp. 219. And 
Mcleod, Allison, the Death of Uncle Joe, (Merlin Press, Woodbridge, 2007), p. 19. And 
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stewards’ Clyde Workers’ Committee, where he showed his talents as a 
propagandist.19 
 
During his time in the CPGB Campbell developed a close working 
relationship with Harry Pollitt. Pollitt and Campbell came from somewhat 
similar backgrounds; both had, for example, acquired their belief in the 
inevitability and desirability of proletarian revolution through former 
membership of the BSP and both had gained significant experience of trade 
union militancy during the war.20 Both men also shared a belief in the 
necessity of a pragmatic approach to politics which would allow the Party to 
expand its influence amongst the workers, and particularly within the trade 
unions which they thought would form the foundations of the proletarian 
forces in any future revolution.21 Nevertheless, Campbell and Pollitt 
brought different skills to their alliance; Pollitt brought his charisma, 
passion and common sense politics, whilst Campbell supplied the 
understanding of Bolshevik and Marxist doctrine which Pollitt lacked. 
Campbell’s clear grasp of Marxist dialectics allowed him to translate and 
recast Pollitt’s common sense policies into revolutionary language which 
would be acceptable both to other members of the Party and to Moscow.22 
This partnership was particularly evident during the late 1920s and early 
30s when Campbell and Pollitt worked together to push the Party away 
from the Class Against Class policy of forming independent ‘red’ unions in 
opposition to existing trade unions and back towards a policy of trying to 
build the Party’s influence amongst the workers from within the unions.23 
By carefully moderating the language of their arguments and remaining, on 
the surface at least, loyal to the Class Against Class line Campbell and 
Pollitt were able to maintain their position in the Party leadership from 
which they could provide support to those who took an approach of passive 
resistance to the line. Later as the Comintern moved away from such 
                                                                                                                                               
Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 22. 
19 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 22. 
20 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 6. 
21 Fishman, British Communist Party, pp. 6-7. 
22 Fishman, British Communist Party, pp. 5-6. 
23 For a detailed account of Pollitt and Campbell’s partnership in this period see Fishman, British 
Communist Party, p. 30-61. 
115/140 
 
sectarian approaches Campbell and Pollitt were able to use their leadership 
position to launch a counter attack against supporters of Class Against 
Class and slowly push the Party to adopt a more and more practical 
approach to the unions.24 
 
This partnership between Campbell and Pollitt was also evident 
during the Popular Front period. In particular from 1937 onwards, 
Campbell and Pollitt both became increasingly focused on the need to 
combat the expansion of foreign fascism and the ever growing threat of 
war.25 Both men were equally active in promoting the cause of the 
Republican Forces and the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil 
War and campaigning for the creation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet peace 
front, and encouraged Party members to focus their energies on these issues 
too.26 In mid-1939 as the war drew ever closer and the Party still refused to 
address the issue of whether it considered Hitler or Chamberlain the 
greater threat, Campbell and Pollitt at least seemed to have made up their 
minds. Campbell believed the Party should decide its stance on a war 
between Britain and Germany with Chamberlain in power and wrote to 
Pollitt outlining the War on Two Fronts policy which the Party was to adopt 
in September.27 Campbell’s priorities prior to the war are particularly well 
shown in the Daily Worker’s coverage of the war up until September 24th 
and the jingoistic tone which the paper adopted under Campbell’s editorship 
in this period, which earned a certain degree of criticism from party 
members.28  
 
Understanding the importance Campbell placed on the danger posed 
by foreign fascism throughout the Popular Front period, his focus on 
practical politics and his personal role in cdeveloping the War on Two 
Fronts policy perhaps helps to explain his reluctance to accept the new 
                                                 
24 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 34-8. 
25 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 230. 
26 Fishman, British Communist Party, p. 230. 
27 Morgan, Kevin, Harry Pollitt, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993), p. 106. 
28 Minutes of September 24th-25th Central Committee Meeting, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, 
CP/IND/POLL/2/7, p. 1/3. 
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Imperialist War line in 1939, whilst his history of modifying his own stance 
in order to resist a strict application of Comintern diktat explains his 
attempts to modify the War on Two Fronts line in response to the 
International’s intervention. 
 
 
Idris Cox 
 
Idris Cox was born in 1899 in Maesteg, South Wales, and grew up in 
the neighbouring village of Cwmfelin.29 He joined the CPGB in 1924 and 
served as organiser for the South Wales district from 1927 until 1930 at 
which point he was appointed as the Party’s national organiser. Cox joined 
the Central Committee of the Party in 1929 and remained a member until 
1952.30 
 
As a boy Cox worked at the local colliery. He became interested in 
politics in his teenage years and at the age of 18 became involved with the 
Garth Miners’ Institute. Three years later in 1920 Cox attended his first 
Marxist classes. Between 1923 and 1925 he studied at the Labour College in 
London on a scholarship from the South Wales Miners’ Federation. Upon his 
return to Maesteg, Cox joined the local Communist Party branch and, after 
experiencing unemployment first hand, helped to establish a branch of the 
National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (NUWM).31 Cox continued to 
play a role in the organisation of the NUWM and its hunger marches 
throughout the 1930s.32 
 
During the Class Against Class period, Cox aligned himself firmly 
with William Rust and other proponents of sectarian tactics, joining with 
them in their attacks on the more pragmatically minded members of the 
                                                 
29 http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/anw/get_collection.php?inst_id=35&coll_id=11328&expand=, (last 
accessed, 20.05.15) 
30 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 301. 
31 http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/anw/get_collection.php?inst_id=35&coll_id=11328&expand= , (last 
accessed, 20.05.15) 
32 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 301. 
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Party leadership.33 Despite this, as the Comintern’s Seventh World 
Congress approached, Cox’s stance began to move to the right. In 1934 he 
began to support the idea of differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
elements within reformist parties and by the end of the year was openly in 
favour the Party’s line of supporting Labour candidates in that year’s 
municipal elections.34 
 
During the Popular Front period Cox briefly served as editor of the 
Daily Worker from 1935-6.35 Following this he was appointed as the 
Communist representative on the Hunger Marches Council in Wales.36 
 
 
Rajani Palme Dutt 
 
Born in 1896 in Cambridge to an Indian father and a Swedish 
mother, Rajani Palme Dutt joined the CPGB in its founding year of 1920 
from the Independent Labour Party and very quickly rose to a position of 
leadership within the Party, joining the Central Committee in 1922 and the 
Politburo soon thereafter. An Oxford educated scholar, Dutt was one of the 
CPGB’s few intellectual leaders and one of its most capable theoreticians. 
He played a key role in the Party’s propaganda machine producing 
numerous pamphlets, editing the Daily Worker between 1936 and 1938 and 
producing a large quantity of works on various topics including, Marxism, 
imperialism, India, fascism and general politics. Dutt is also notable for 
having founded the Party’s theoretical journal Labour Monthly in 1921, a 
publication for which he wrote a regular column ‘Notes of the Week’ and of 
which he remained editor until his death in 1974.37 
 
                                                 
33 Thorpe, Andrew, The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000), p. 147. and p. 157 
34 Thorpe, The British Communist Party, p. 213-5. 
35 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 301. 
36 Morning Star, July 27th 1989, WCML 
37 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 302. 
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Dutt was an early initiate to British working class politics. As a result 
of his father’s connections to the labour movement, Dutt’s childhood home in 
Cambridge was often visited by prominent Socialist and Marxist figures 
(e.g. H.M. Hyndman, Philip Snowden and Tom Mann). Such visits served to 
introduce Dutt to socialist ideology and the divisions within the wider 
Labour movement.38 Upon leaving home Dutt was quick to politicise 
himself. When he arrived at University just weeks after the outbreak of the 
First World War, Dutt quickly joined the ILP, which was the largest anti-
War Party of the time.39 Deeply troubled by the collapse of the Second 
International, Dutt made few attempts to align himself with the Labour 
mainstream, despite the opportunities which presented themselves to him 
in the form of Oxford University’s Socialist Federation.40 The Bolshevik 
revolution was a source of inspiration for Dutt, as it was for many other 
Party Leaders, and served to vindicate both his anti-war stance and his 
decision to adopt Marxism in 1915. Indeed, the revolution strengthened 
these alignments. The subsequent creation of the Communist Third 
International also seemed to promise to rectify the failings of the Second 
International.41  
 
One thing in particular which attracted Dutt to the fledgling Soviet 
State and its newly created Third International was its stance on ideological 
pluralism. Even prior to his association with the CPGB, Dutt had always 
taken an uncompromising approach to politics and he was critical of the 
inconsistency of British Marxism. The organisational method of Democratic 
Centralism espoused by the Bolsheviks appeared to spell the end of such 
inconsistencies and Dutt was quick to accept it as central to the success of 
the revolutionary working class. He held that there could only be one line 
for the revolutionary workers, one party and no third roads.42 After joining 
the Party, Dutt’s vision of Marxism as an exact science monopolised by the 
Communist Party, which held the answers to all of life’s burning questions, 
                                                 
38 Callaghan, Dutt, p. 12. 
39 Callaghan, Dutt, p. 14. 
40 Callaghan, Dutt, pp. 15-6. 
41 Callaghan, Dutt, p. 15. 
42 Callaghan, Dutt, p. 15. And, pp. 30-4. And, p. 141. 
119/140 
 
led him to distrust those outside the Party and those within it who deviated 
from established theory. Dutt worked hard within the Party to limit the 
occurrences of such deviations, he personally attempted never to allow the 
peculiarities of the British Party’s position to affect his political judgements 
and attempted to ensure that others did the same. He frequently dispensed 
patronising and sometimes even threatening advice to other Party leaders 
and set himself up as the Comintern’s unofficial watchdog within the Party 
to ensure the principles of democratic centralism were enforced.43 
 
Another feature of Dutt’s politics which developed throughout his life 
was his extreme hostility towards imperialism and the British Empire in 
particular. Hostility to British colonialism and support for Indian 
nationalism was common amongst members of Dutt’s family. As a result, 
during his younger years, Dutt’s family home received frequent visits from 
Indian nationalists which helped to further expose him to and develop his 
own antipathy towards British Imperialism.44 Indeed the role Britain played 
as an imperial power was perhaps the factor which had the greatest 
influence on Dutt’s opposition to the British ruling class.45 Dutt’s anti-
Imperialist views only served to deepen the attraction which the Bolshevik 
revolution and Marxist-Leninism held for him; the October Revolution was 
the first anti-imperialist revolution and Leninist doctrine laid a heavy focus 
on the imperialist nature of modern capitalism, which resonated with Dutt’s 
existing beliefs.46 Indeed the leading role which British Imperialism played 
in attempts to intervene on the behalf of anti-Bolshevik forces during the 
Russian Civil War served to strengthen Dutt’s negative attitude towards 
it.47  
 
This then perhaps explains why, during the Popular Front period, 
Dutt took a particularly negative attitude towards the British Government 
and its aims both at home and abroad. Throughout the thirties Dutt saw the 
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Party’s main fight as being directed against British Imperialism, identifying 
it as the driving force behind the ever increasing danger of war.48 He 
pointed out that, whilst Britain’s involvement in a collective security 
agreement would guarantee the ability of that pact to prevent war, there 
was little chance of this happening whilst Britain was still under the 
governance of representatives of British imperialism.49 Dutt pointed out 
that the class solidarity between the ruling class of Britain and other 
capitalist states combined with the class antagonisms between Britain’s 
rulers and the Soviet Union made Britain a natural ally of fascism and the 
natural enemy of the Soviet Union. He warned that the consistent policy of 
British Imperialism since the end of the First World War was the creation of 
a four-power pact of British, German, French and Italian Imperialisms 
against the Soviet Union.50 Throughout the 1930s and even in the last few 
years before the war Dutt sought use the domestic and foreign policy 
manoeuvres of the Chamberlain government as evidence to justify his 
analysis of the anti-Soviet goals of British Imperialism. The Munich 
agreement, for example, was presented as evidence of the beginnings of a 
larger agreement between the four Western Imperialisms, whilst Anglo-
Soviet negotiations in 1939 were perceived as an attempt on the part of 
British imperialism to coerce Hitler into Eastward expansion. Even 
Chamberlain’s belated attempts at rearmament were dismissed by Dutt as 
simply a smokescreen to conceal Chamberlain’s pro-fascist alignment from 
his critics.51 Thus despite his official agreement with the Seventh World 
Congress’ analysis of the colony-hungry fascist powers as the primary forces 
preparing for war, Dutt’s hatred of British imperialism led him to perceive 
it, rather than German fascism, as the ‘real incendiary of the threatening 
world war’ and this belief almost certainly played a role in his actions 
following the outbreak of war.52 
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William Gallacher 
 
 
William Gallacher was born in 1881 in, Paisley, Renfrewshire, 
Scotland. Gallacher is notable for being one of the most publicly 
recognisable communists of his time, a position accounted to him by his role 
as Member of Parliament for West Fife between 1935 and 1950. Gallacher’s 
position as one of the Party’s few successful MPs helped him to become one 
of its longest serving leaders. He joined the Central Committee in 1922 and 
the Political Bureau in the same year. He remained in the latter position 
until 1945 and held the former until 1963.53 Gallacher was able to navigate 
early purges of the Party leadership by careful moderation whilst his MP 
status gave him a continued relevance which, as Andrew Thorpe has noted, 
gave him an influence beyond the confines of the Party membership which 
could not be matched by other CPGB leaders like Dutt and Campbell. 
Indeed the only Party leader who exceeded Gallacher in terms of public 
influence was Pollitt.54 
 
Gallacher was well acquainted with radical left wing politics long 
before he was influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution. He rejected 
parliamentary action as futile and ineffective early in his political 
development and as a result held a certain contempt for the Labour Party. 
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War Gallacher was involved with 
numerous left wing groups. During the war itself, Gallacher was a member 
of the British Socialist Party, aligning himself with the anti-war stance of 
his political mentor, Scottish revolutionary Marxist John Maclean, against 
the line of the Party leadership.55 The war provided Gallacher with the 
opportunity to put his beliefs regarding direct action into practice in order to 
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promote his anti-war line. Through his actions as chairman of the Clyde 
Workers’ Committee between 1915 and 1919 Gallacher gained a reputation 
as a leader of British shop-floor militancy.56 
 
Where others amongst the CPGB’s leadership were drawn to the 
Party by the success of the Bolshevik revolution, the reputation that 
Gallacher earned during the war and his position in the Scottish socialist 
movement led to his being courted by the Soviet State. As a result of their 
desire to create a single united British Communist Party, the Bolsheviks 
invited Gallacher to attend the second world congress of the Comintern in 
order to help convince him of the need for such a Party. The Soviet Union’s 
ideas regarding the tactics the CPGB should follow proved to be a hurdle for 
Gallacher as they included using parliamentary action to spread 
propaganda and affiliation to the Labour Party to weaken its reformist 
leadership from within. Whilst in Moscow Gallacher had the chance to talk 
with Lenin who convinced him of the value of such tactics. Gallacher was 
further convinced that these tactics were valid by the simultaneous decline 
of extra-parliamentary politics and the rise of the Labour Party following 
the end of the First World War.57 As a result Gallacher joined the Party at 
its Second Unity convention in 1921 along with other members of the 
provisional Scottish Communist Party, the Communist Labour Party, and 
was immediately co-opted into the leadership of the CPGB by being made 
vice president of the Party.58 
 
In terms of his day-to-day political conduct Gallacher was by-and-
large loyal to Moscow but, unlike more strictly obedient figures like Rust, he 
was also prepared to object to Moscow’s line when it conflicted with his own 
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thoughts.59 Such was the case during the Party’s Class Against Class period; 
Gallacher initially strongly resisted pressure for a leftwards swing in policy 
both from within the Party and from the Comintern, instead espousing 
continued support for the united front tactics hitherto followed by the Party. 
Gallacher was only convinced to accept the new line when it received the 
influential backing of figures like Stalin and Bukharin but even after this he 
was slow to support Class Against Class fully and even made attempts to 
revive the old line. Gallacher did however, eventually totally accept the new 
line (a decision which kept him on the Politburo of the Party) but he 
subsequently found the new line impractical and, in light of this, began to 
move back towards supporting more effective policies.60 
 
Another notable feature of Gallacher’s approach to politics was the 
emotionally charged nature of the stances he adopted. Gallacher did not 
fight his political battles with elegant theories or careful strategic 
manoeuvres but with passion.61 This often led to emotional outbursts which 
resulted in Gallacher refusing to associate with other Party leaders or to 
attend specific meetings; for example he refused to associate with Dutt 
following changes to the Party leadership in the 1920s and refused to attend 
the Central Committee meeting where the Party officially renounced 
opposition to conscription in 1939.62 Such tendencies were particularly 
visible during major changes of line. In his resistance to Class Against Class 
for example, Gallacher made no secret of his hatred for its proponents, an 
attitude which later reappeared in his decision to devote almost all his time 
at the October 1939 Central Committee criticising Dutt, Rust and 
Springhall and their conduct rather than the line they espoused.63  
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During the Popular Front period, Gallacher continued along the 
rightwards trend that began after his brief affair with Class Against Class. 
He took a stance of strong support for United Front initiatives after Hitler’s 
rise to power and for Popular Front tactics after the Comintern’s Seventh 
World Congress.64 Despite his support for the Comintern’s new approach to 
politics however, Gallacher began to develop a number of private concerns 
regarding the USSR and Comintern. These were fuelled by the feeling that 
neither body was giving the CPGB the respect owed to it. This feeling was 
particularly influenced by the purges in the Soviet Union (which also 
affected some British Communists whom Gallacher knew personally) and 
the Comintern’s successful attempts to force the CPGB to reverse its line of 
opposition to conscription in 1939. This compromised Gallacher in particular 
due to his prior public opposition to conscription in the House of Commons.65 
Whilst Gallacher did not make such mistrust public knowledge, Andrew 
Thorpe has suggested that it may have played a role in his decision to 
oppose the Comintern’s line on the war, or at least its proponents, in 1939.66   
 
Ultimately it was Gallacher’s position as the Party’s only MP which 
was to save him from being ejected from the leadership along with Pollitt 
and Campbell in 1939. His opposition to the line was written off as a result 
of his ‘temperament’ and he remained on the Central Committee and 
Politburo. After the change of line Gallacher said little about the Imperialist 
War line, which made his appearances in Parliament rather awkward. 
Following the fall of France Gallacher was quick to return to a more anti-
fascist and defencist position, even going as far as to attempt to organise a 
visit to Moscow to petition Stalin himself.67 
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John Gollan 
 
John Gollan was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1911.68 A painter by 
trade, Gollan was inspired to join the Party in 1927 whilst still an 
apprentice after hearing the speeches of William Gallacher.69 He was 
appointed to the Central Committee in 1935.70 After the change of line in 
October 1939 Gollan was elevated further by being made a member of the 
Party’s new Politburo.71 Eventually Gollan, after a number of years of 
careful guidance and grooming from Harry Pollitt, was chosen to be his 
successor as General Secretary of the Party in 1956.72 
 
Gollan developed his early interest in Socialism though his parents, 
both of whom were working class socialists. He quickly became involved in 
political activism, taking part in the 1926 general strike by selling strike 
bulletins produced by the Council of Action.73  After the general strike 
Gollan remained politically active, particularly in the anti-war movement.74 
When he joined the CPGB he simultaneously joined the Young Communist 
League (YCL).75 In late 1931, following a six month period of imprisonment 
for distributing anti-war material to soldiers in Edinburgh; Gollan became 
editor of the YCL’s paper the Young Worker. In 1935 he was appointed 
general secretary of the YCL and spoke as its representative at the 
Comintern’s Seventh World Congress. His speech placed particular 
emphasis on the need for the YCL to abandon sectarianism and unite the 
British youth in opposition to war.  These were not empty words; over the 
next four years Gollan was to play a key role through his position as YCL 
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general secretary in the formation of the British Youth Peace Assembly, a 
coalition of over forty youth organisations united by a common desire for a 
system of collective security to deter fascist aggression.76 Gollan was also 
one of the Party leaders who made visits to volunteers of the British 
Battalion in Spain during the Civil War.77 
 
 
Arthur Horner 
 
Born 1894 in Merthyr Tydfil in South Wales, Arthur Horner was one 
of the CPGB’s key trade union figures holding a number of prominent posts 
in various mining unions throughout his life, such as his role from 1926 on 
the Executive of the South Wales Miners’ Federation, of which he was 
president between 1936 and 1946, and the National Mineworkers’ Union, of 
which he was general secretary from 1946 to 1959.78 It was as a result of his 
role in the trade unions that he was originally accepted into the CPGB’s 
Central Committee and Politburo in 1923. He was removed from both 
positions in 1929 but regained his role in the Central Committee in 1935.79  
 
Horner was introduced to socialism relatively early his youth through 
his environment. He grew up in an area of Britain in which public 
participation in and discussion of politics was particularly intense and found 
himself inspired by the speeches of Keir Hardie the ILP, and subsequently 
Labour, MP for Merthyr.80 In his youth Horner was associated with the 
Christian sect The Churches of Christ, a group which attempted to prove 
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the truth of Christianity with logic and reason. Horner’s time with the 
church taught him many of the skills he would later go on to use in his trade 
union work but he began to become removed from his Christian beliefs after 
moving to the Rhondda coalfield and starting work at the Standard 
Colliery.81 There he was to meet the militant miner-intellectual Noah Ablett 
who introduced Horner to Marxism. Horner gradually replaced his 
theological faith with this new political ideology; his final break with 
Christianity came after the outbreak of the First World War which Horner 
resisted, not with the religiously based pacifist notions of other members of 
The Churches of Christ but with the claim that it was a capitalist war being 
waged for Capitalist ends.82 Horner worked at the Colliery through the war 
until January 1918 when he fled to Ireland to avoid being conscripted. He 
was imprisoned following his return to Britain in the summer of 1918 and 
was only released in April 1919 after being elected in absentia as the 
checkweighman for the Mardy Colliery.83 
 
Horner became a founding member of the CPGB in 1920 as a result of 
his prior membership of the Rhondda Socialist Society but he remained 
preoccupied with daily economic struggles at the Colliery and struggles 
between the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, Coalfield owners and the 
government.84 Horner’s activism over the next few years brought him to the 
attention of the Secretary of the British Bureau of the Red International of 
Labour Unions (RILU), Nat Watkins, and Horner was chosen to attend a 
conference of the RILU in Moscow in 1923. The conference coincided with 
the Comintern’s attempts to Bolshevise the CPGB. As a part of this it was 
recommended that a greater number of comrades with significant 
experience of work in industry should be brought into the leadership of the 
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Party. Horner was, as a result, promoted to not only the Central Committee 
but also the Politburo.85  
 
Like Pollitt and Campbell, Horner was driven by a desire to capture 
the support of the working class by working inside existing trade unions. 
Despite his elevation to the Party leadership Horner continued to focus his 
efforts on the economic struggles of the miners, attempting to sustain and 
revitalise the rank-and-file activism that had emerged in the trade unions 
through the war and bolster support for revolutionary tactics amongst such 
activists through the Miners’ Minority Movement.86 A focus on union work 
at the expense of engagement with Party politics, which would later be 
dubbed ‘Hornerism’ by Horner’s critics, stayed with Horner throughout the 
left-wards swing initiated, first by the Party following the failure of the 
general strike, and then pushed to extremes by the Comintern after the 
Sixth World Congress.87 Horner rejected the aspects of the Class Against 
Class line, which called for the Party to encourage workers to leave 
established unions and join new revolutionary replacements.88 Unlike other 
members of the Party leadership who learnt to moderate their political 
position to accommodate the Comintern to better guard against the 
wholesale adoption of undesirable elements of the Comintern line (for 
example, John Campbell and William Gallacher), Horner made little or no 
attempt to hide his opposition to the new sectarian line and those who 
espoused it.89 His open defiance resulted in his removal from the Party 
leadership in 1929. Horner’s continued resistance to the line and the 
ascendance of its supporters to the leadership of the Party in 1929 might 
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have led to a more serious break with the Party were it not for the actions of 
Campbell, who sent Horner to work in Moscow for the RILU to remove him 
from potential conflicts.90 Horner had similar problems with speaking his 
mind in 1931 when he was criticised for not pushing the rank-and-file of the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation to continue a strike begun on New Year’s 
Day that year when it was ended by the union leadership after only two 
weeks. He heavily criticised the Party leadership for not giving enough 
support to the strike and despite the efforts of those who sympathised with 
Horner’s position to defuse the conflict, Horner was, as a result, pushed out 
of the leadership of the Miners’ Minority Movement.91 Horner refused to 
accept the charges laid against him but eventually recanted after being sent 
to Moscow to defend his position against the Comintern.92 
 
Horner eventually returned to the leadership of the Party in 1935 but 
found himself once again in opposition to the Party leadership following the 
change of line on the war in 1939. Horner was both an enthusiastic 
supporter of the Popular Front line and a firm believer in the need to resist 
foreign fascism, as evidenced by his speech in September 1939 and his 
material written in the inter-war period.93 Had Horner attended the October 
Central Committee meeting it is almost certain that the results would have 
recorded four in opposition to the new line and Horner’s defence of the War 
on Two Fronts line in September shows that he would have voted against 
the new line for largely the same reasons as Pollitt and Campbell.94 At the 
time of the change in line Horner was working on the South Wales District 
Committee and it is likely that the one abstention in that committee’s vote 
on the line was Horner’s.95 Horner did on this occasion show some deference 
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to the Party line, but he seems to have been unable to promote it 
unreservedly. In discussions on the war Horner would only condemn war in 
general rather than making criticisms of the actual war.96 Horner’s 
continued agreement with the War on Two Fronts was obvious but in this 
instance he was saved from any serious repercussions by his position as 
President of the South Wales Miners’ Federation. Despite initial attempts 
by Dutt and Rust to use anti-war feeling amongst the union’s rank-and-file 
to attack Horner, he was able to use majority support for the War on Two 
Fronts line at a coalfield conference in February 1940 and his responsibility 
as President of the SWMF to uphold the majority decision, to gain a degree 
of freedom from working according to the Party’s new line. 97 
 
 
Peter Kerrigan 
 
Peter Kerrigan was born in 1899 in the Gorbals district of Glasgow in 
Scotland.98 He was perhaps unique amongst the Party leadership of the 
1930s in that he joined the Party, not once, but twice. He originally joined in 
1921 but soon left as a result of his disagreement with the Party’s decision 
not to field candidates against Labour in the 1922 general election.99 
Kerrigan returned to the Party in 1924 however, and rose to a position of 
leadership relatively quickly, being appointed Scottish district secretary in 
1930.100 Kerrigan served two periods on the Central Committee, once 
between 1927 and 1929 and again between 1932 and 1953. He became a 
member of the Politburo after the change of line in October 1939.101 
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Kerrigan was an engineering worker by trade. He left school at the 
age of fifteen and undertook an apprenticeship at the North British Loco 
Company in Springburn, Glasgow. Between 1918 and 1920 Kerrigan served 
in Palestine with the Royal Scots Regiment.102 Between 1923 and 1925 
Kerrigan found work as an iron-turner back in Glasgow at Parkhead Forge. 
Kerrigan was well acquainted with industrial militancy and trade unionism. 
He played a significant role in the Amalgamated Engineering Union and 
during the 1926 general strike he sat as chair of the central strike co-
ordinating committee.103 
 
During his time in the CPGB Kerrigan began to develop a number of 
links with Moscow, particularly after his invitation to the Third Congress of 
the Red International of Labour Unions and the Fifth Congress of the 
Communist International in 1924. In 1929 Kerrigan was chosen to study at 
the International Lenin School, and like fellow Lenin School students, 
William Rust and Douglas Frank Springhall, developed a reputation for 
conformity and discipline.104 
 
In 1935 Kerrigan was chosen to become the CPGB’s representative to 
Moscow and as a result was invited to participate in the Seventh World 
Congress of the Comintern. Despite being initially surprised by the Party’s 
return to united front policies in the early thirties, Kerrigan took the 
change, and the later adoption of the Popular Front line, well, establishing 
himself as one of Harry Pollitt’s more reliable allies after 1935.105 During 
the Popular Front period Kerrigan was particularly active in his role as 
Scottish district organiser, during which time his skills contributed to the 
election of William Gallacher as M.P. for West Fife and the near trebling of 
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the Scottish district membership.106 At the same time Kerrigan was very 
active in the Spanish Civil War. Like Rust and Springhall he served as a 
political commissar attached to the British Battalion between December 
1937 and April 1938, a role in which he further cemented his reputation for 
discipline.107 Through his exploits on the battlefield Kerrigan won the 
respect of his comrades in arms, becoming known for his courage under fire 
and leadership skills.108  He returned to Spain in May 1938 as a 
correspondent for the Daily Worker, remaining in the country until 
November that year.109 
 
 
Harry Pollitt 
 
Harry Pollitt was born in 1890 to a relatively poor working class 
family in the textile village of Droylsden, Manchester in Northwest 
England.110 Initially a boilermaker by trade, Pollitt became a foundation 
member of the CPGB in 1920 and joined its Central Committee and 
Politburo in 1922, remaining in both bodies until his death in 1960 except 
for in the years 1939-41. Pollitt was a gifted orator, inter-party diplomat and 
leader and was elected general secretary of the Party in 1929. He held this 
post until his expulsion from the Party leadership in October 1939 but 
resumed it once again following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941.111 
 
Pollitt was introduced to Socialist politics at a young age through his 
parents and in particular his mother. It was through her that Pollitt began 
attending socialist meetings at the age of thirteen and became a member of 
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the Openshaw branch of the ILP (which later defected to be become the 
Openshaw branch of the British Socialist Party).112 Pollitt took up an auto-
didactical study of Marxism and his politics quickly took a militant edge to 
which his desire to pay back the exploitative bosses for the hardships 
suffered by his family contributed.113 Pollitt’s commitment to revolutionary 
politics was further strengthened by his membership of the BSP and his 
experience of anti-war work and industrial conflict as a trade unionist 
during the First World War.114  
 
Pollitt fervently identified with the victory of Lenin’s Party in Russia 
and was quick to involve himself in the ‘Hands off Russia’ movement (which 
formed to oppose British intervention in the Russian Civil War and later the 
Polish-Soviet war of 1919-21) of which he became national organiser.115 The 
inspiration which the Bolsheviks’ victory held for Pollitt was not based on 
the particular theoretical or doctrinal aspects of Bolshevism however, but 
rather on the simple fact that they had achieved a successful revolution. 
Pollitt later wrote of his feelings at the time of the revolution, ‘All I was 
concerned about was that power was in the hands of lads like me, and 
whatever conception of politics had made that possible was the one for 
me.’116 Pollitt had similar reasons for joining the fledgling CPGB, being 
attracted to the Party by a sense that by joining it he would be involved in 
the ending of capitalism on a global scale.117 
 
Pollitt’s indifference towards theory continued, along with a similar 
indifference towards Marxist analysis, throughout his time in the CPGB. 
His actions within the Party were driven more by his gut instinct and a 
desire for practical results than by considerations of abstract theory. Indeed, 
in order to offset his relatively poor understanding of Marxism, Pollitt, at 
various different points in his career, partnered himself with more 
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intellectually minded members of the Party (notably Rajani Palme Dutt, 
Emile Burns and John Ross Campbell) allowing them to create theoretical 
justifications for his pragmatic policies which would make them acceptable 
both in terms of Marxist theory and Comintern tactics.118 
 
One of the primary concerns which drove Pollitt’s desire to implement 
practical policies was his desire to never allow the Party to become isolated 
from the wider British working class. With his upbringing in the heart of 
industrial Britain and his early political involvement in the trade unions 
Pollitt identified closely with Britain’s indigenous working class and had a 
particularly good understanding of how to appeal to it.119 This prioritising of 
the Party’s standing amongst the working class led Pollitt to spearhead 
resistance against the worst excesses of the Party’s sectarian attempts to 
create its own independent trade unions in the late 1920s and early 1930s, a 
move which secured his position as leader of the Party.120 The Popular Front 
policy, with its focus on making the Party popular to the widest base of the 
workers and the relaxation Comintern controls and greater scope for 
observance of local conditions that came with it, was particularly popular 
with Pollitt as it resonated with this desire to implement practical policies 
to expand the Party’s membership and political influence.  
 
Pollitt did not simply embrace Popular Front tactics because of their 
usefulness in extending the Party’s influence amongst the British left 
however; he also embraced them because the influence they could generate 
could be used to combat the rise of fascism. Pollitt’s anti-fascist stance was 
not a matter of tactics but rather was sincere and deeply felt, and his desire 
to strike against it and those who supported it, either directly or indirectly, 
informed the rationale for many of his decisions in the Popular Front 
period.121 For Pollitt the fight against fascism became the primary issue 
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with which the Party had to concern itself. In particular it was the fight 
against foreign fascism which came to dominate his thoughts. The vast 
majority of Pollitt’s writing in the period focused on the worsening 
international situation, to the point where purely domestic issues, though 
important, became secondary concerns. Whilst Pollitt, like all other Party 
leaders, focused his attacks on the National Government, his criticisms were 
overwhelmingly concerned with what he considered the crime of 
appeasement rather than the government’s domestic policy.122 
 
Pollitt’s hostility towards fascism was further fuelled by his 
experience of the Spanish Civil War. His role in promoting the International 
Brigades gave him a sense of responsibility for the fate of its volunteers 
which was only reinforced by his visits to Spain in 1936 and 1937. The 
destruction he witnessed on these visits, particularly in the town of Tortosa 
impassioned his hatred of and desire for revenge against Hitler to the point 
where there were few with a greater antipathy towards fascism within the 
Party leadership.123 Both this antagonism towards fascism and his desire 
not to separate the Party from the anti-fascist feeling of the British working 
class featured prominently in his opposition to the new Imperialist War line 
in October 1939.124 
 
It is also important to note that, despite his agreement with the 
Popular Front line, the outbreak of the war was not the first time in the 
1930s in which Pollitt had come into conflict with Moscow. The Comintern’s 
intervention in the Party’s line on conscription earlier in 1939 left Pollitt so 
disgusted he attempted to resign his post. Similarly when the Soviet Union 
signed the Nazi-Soviet pact that Autumn it further reinforced Pollitt’s 
existing suspicions that Soviet Policy was becoming more and more 
influenced by national rather than international interests.125 Understanding 
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this existing tension between Pollitt and Moscow is important for 
understanding his position in September and October. 
 
 
William Rust 
 
William Rust was born in the working class district of Camberwell, 
South London in 1903. The exact circumstances of his early family life are 
unclear but he appears to have come from either a working class or at least 
lower middle class family. The early inspirations for Rust’s adoption of left 
wing politics are also unclear but regardless of the reasons he found work as 
a clerk at an early age. From the age of sixteen he was both a member of the 
Labour Party and active in the clerks’ union, later even becoming briefly 
involved with Sylvia Pankhurst’s Workers Socialist Federation.126  
 
Following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, Rust decided to 
place his faith and loyalty in the newly formed workers state and joined the 
CPGB mere months after its formation in 1920. In the same year Rust lost 
his job. He spent long periods of time in subsequent years unemployed, 
focusing his efforts on full time political activism, particularly in the 
National Unemployed Workers’ Movement. At the same time Rust began to 
rise quickly through the ranks of the CPGB becoming the secretary of his 
local branch before going on to serve on the London District Committee.127 
In October 1923 Rust was chosen by the Young Communist International 
(YCI) (possibly on the recommendation of Andrew Rothstein) to become the 
Secretary of the CPGB’s youth organisation the Young Communist League 
in a Moscow-initiated reorganisation of the League.128 From this position 
Rust was able to make connections with other decidedly pro-Moscow figures, 
in particular Rajani Palme Dutt, to whom Rust would become something of 
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a protégé.129 In addition to this, the appointment allowed Rust to strengthen 
his ties with the machinery of the international movement.130 In his 
capacity as YCL secretary Rust became a regular delegate to the congresses 
and plenums of the YCI (and even sometimes the plenums of the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International) and was able to travel 
extensively through Europe and the USA to participate in Comintern 
meetings.131 By the end of 1929 Rust had begun to work full time for the 
YCI and was elected as its representative to the ECCI.132 Such travels, 
particularly in Moscow, only served to deepen his enthusiasm for and 
loyalty to the Comintern.133 
 
Rust’s position in the YCL also enhanced his importance in the CPGB 
itself, leading to his election as a full member of the Central Committee in 
1926 and sitting on Politburo meetings from 1924.134 Rust used this position 
and his role as a leading Comintern official to apply pressure to the other 
leaders of the CPGB to conform to Comintern Orthodoxy. In 1929 Rust was 
to lead the charge of other young, likeminded party activists to force the 
Party to adopt the Comintern’s sectarian Class Against Class policies. 
Actively encouraged and supported by the Comintern, Rust was able play a 
key role in pressuring the Party leadership to accept a leftward turn. He 
was rewarded for his efforts by being made editor of the Party’s new daily 
newspaper, the Daily Worker.135 
 
The Comintern’s shift away from ultra-left policies in the early 1930s 
saw Rust fall from favour. In 1932 he was removed as editor of the Daily 
Worker and was appointed as the CPGB’s representative to the ECCI, a role 
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which was probably intended to pressure him to come to terms with the 
Comintern’s new tactics and which prevented him from having any 
immediate influence in the governance of the CPGB.136 For his part Rust 
dutifully took up the new Popular Fronts tactics espoused by Moscow after 
1935, effectively promoting anti-fascism and left-wing unity in Lancashire 
in his brief role as district secretary and aiding the suppression of those who 
dissented from Popular Front politics amongst Republican forces in the 
Spanish Civil War, in which he served as a political commissar between 
November 1937 and June 1938.137 Alongside this demonstration of his 
acceptance of the Popular Front however, Rust continued to seek out 
opportunities to increase his influence within the Party, especially by 
campaigning amongst Communist representatives to have himself installed 
as assistant general secretary of the British Party.138 
 
In light of his persistent loyalty to the Comintern line, regardless of 
how drastically it changed, and the benefits that this approach had for his 
career in the CPGB, it is easy to understand why Rust has been portrayed 
as being primarily motivated by a desire for career advancement. Ex-party 
member Douglas Hyde for example argued that, for Rust, obedience to 
Moscow was not only the best way of achieving political advance but also the 
best way of securing a position of influence for himself and the privileges 
that such a position would bring after the triumph of Communism.139 Indeed 
Rust’s sudden adoption of the Comintern’s new interpretation of the war 
(despite his previous support of the War on Two Fronts) and his subsequent 
elevation to the highest echelons of the Party leadership and return as 
editor of the Daily Worker can be seen in precisely this context.140 
 
 
Douglas Frank Springhall (a.k.a. Dave Springhall) 
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Douglas Frank Springhall was born in 1901 in Kensal Green, London. 
After briefly serving in the Navy between 1916 and 1920 Springhall joined 
the CPGB as a founding member. Springhall was placed on the executive of 
the Young Communist League during its reorganisation in 1923. He, along 
with other like-minded individuals such as William Rust, was responsible 
for transforming the previously naïve and idealistic YCL into a disciplined, 
ultra-orthodox organisation.141 Springhall studied at the International 
Lenin School in Moscow between 1928 and 1931, after which he was elected 
to the Central Committee of the CPGB in 1932.142 Springhall also held a 
number of other posts in the Party becoming the CPGB representative to 
the Comintern following the Conscription controversy in 1939 and its 
National District organiser after October 1939.143 
 
Like Rust, Springhall was particularly active in steering the CPGB to 
uphold the decisions and general Political line of the Comintern. As part of 
the left wing YCL group within the leadership he tried to force through 
acceptance of the Class Against Class line in the 1920s and resisted its 
decline into the 1930s.144 Springhall like the other proponents of Class 
Against Class eventually accepted its decline and the rise of the new 
Popular Front line. During the Popular Front period Springhall became the 
Party’s London district organiser and he briefly edited the Daily Worker in 
1938. Springhall also took part in the Spanish Civil War. In 1936 he was the 
first Briton to be appointed as a political commissar of the British battalion 
of the International Brigade and he was tasked with improving the morale, 
discipline and behaviour of the British recruits.145 Despite this however 
Springhall remained committed to enforcing Comintern orthodoxy within 
                                                 
141 Finn, “William Rust” in McIlory, Morgan, and Campbell, (eds), Party People Communist Lives, p. 83. 
142 http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11190779, (last accessed, 16.05.15) 
143 Morgan, Kevin, Harry Pollitt, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994), pp. 106-8. And 
King, Francis and Matthews, George, About Turn: The British Communist Party and the Second World 
War, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990), p. 305. 
144 Finn, “William Rust” in McIlory, Morgan, and Campbell, (eds), Party People Communist Lives, p. 86. 
And 
Beckett, Enemy Within, p. 40. 
King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 305. And 
Thorpe, The British Communist Party, p. 241. 
140/140 
 
the Party. In 1935 he acted to delay the assimilation of a group of 200 
defectors from the Independent Labour Party due to his suspicions 
regarding their ideological purity.146 
 
As the Party’s Comintern representative it fell to Springhall to 
communicate the content of the Comintern’s short thesis to the leadership of 
the CPGB in 1939. Springhall himself played no part in the drafting of the 
Short Thesis, which was drawn up by a closed session on the 9th and 10th of 
September restricted to members of the Comintern’s Secretariat, of which 
Springhall was not a part. The only opportunity that Springhall had to put 
forward the position of the British party was at a discussion with Georgi 
Dimitrov and André Marty after the Short Thesis had been adopted by the 
Comintern. His own account of this discussion gives little impression that 
he attempted to seriously challenge the line of the Short Thesis in any 
way.147 
 
Further evidence of Springhall’s close affinity for and loyalty to 
Moscow emerged in 1943 when he was exposed as a Soviet spy after being 
caught attempting to pass information to the Soviet Union regarding a top 
secret British radar jamming device, which he received from a secret  group 
of Party supporters within the Ministry of Air. Springhall was expelled from 
the Party immediately and the Central Committee denied knowledge of his 
activities.148 He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, although he 
served only five. He lived the last years of his life mostly in China before 
dying in 1953 in Moscow.149 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Beckett, Enemy Within, p. 86. 
147 King and Matthews, About Turn, pp. 58-60. 
148 Thorpe, The British Communist Party, p. 269. 
149 King and Matthews, About Turn, p. 305. 
